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A B S T R A C T
The thesis investigates how firm entry and exit into industry
influences macroeconomic productivity. The first contribution
is to show that firm entry and exit dynamics cause endogenous
productivity movements over the business cycle due to the slow
response of incumbent firms to macroeconomic conditions. The
second contribution is to show that these productivity effects
persist into the long run because of firm dynamics’ effect on in-
dustry competition. Therefore the thesis argues that slow firm
responses cause amplified productivity effects in the short run
and that these effects can persist into the long run.
A key distinction of the research is to develop an analytically
tractable dynamic general equilibrium model. This provides
a precise explanation of productivity movements, without us-
ing numerical simulation. A crucial feature of the modelling
is that firm dynamics have a time-to-build lag, so entry and
exit are noninstantaneous. This causes a short-run period dur-
ing which shocks to the economy are borne by inert incumbent
firms and this is responsible for amplified short-run productiv-
ity effects. However, over time firms are able to enter and exit
which ameliorates the amplification effect. Thus this process
alone does not explain persistent effects on productivity. In
order to understand persistent effects, the thesis explains that
one must consider the effect of entry and exit on the competi-
tive pressure of incumbents. When this is taken into account it
shows that firms change their pricing behaviour in response to
entry and exit, and the result is that long-run pricing markups
change which in turn affect long-run productivity.
Chapter 1 demonstrates the empirical relevance of the rela-
tionship between productivity, firm entry and output in US
data. Chapter 2 develops a structural model to explain short-
run movements in productivity and firm dynamics. Develop-
ing chapter 2, chapter 3 explains the long-run effect of firm dy-
namics on productivity through entry’s effect on competition.
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1.1 main findings
This dissertation is a theoretical investigation into the effects
of firm dynamics on the macroeconomy. I refer to ‘firm dy-
namics’ as the process of firm entry and exit into industries.
I study how these processes affect macroeconomic behaviour
with particular focus on total factor productivity (TFP). The the-
sis is divided into four chapters: Chapter 1 is an introduction
that unifies the work and outlines empirical motivation; Chap-
ter 2 develops the theory that slow firm entry and exit cause
short-run productivity movements; Chapter 3 extends this ar-
gument to endogenize markups which explains the effect of
firm dynamics on long-run productivity movements; Chapter
4 analyzes the implications of the thesis, and proposes future
developments.
This introductory chapter 1 sets the thesis in its wider con-
text. First I summarise the main findings and modelling tech-
nique. Second I unify the research with other literature. Third
I complement the literature with empirical evidence that firm
dynamics and productivity are closely correlated with the busi-
ness cycle.
1.1 main findings
Chapter 2’s main result is to show that firm dynamics cause
measured productivity to overshoot underlying productivity
whilst firm entry or exit adjusts. The result relies upon firms
being slow to adjust. Chapter 3 then extends this short-run the-
ory to explain how measured productivity overshooting in the
13
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short run can persist into the long run. The result relies upon
entry(exit) increasing(decreasing) competition, and thus having
a long-run effect on markups. Hence chapter 2 is about short-
run productivity amplification, whereas chapter 3 is about long-
run productivity propagation.
Chapter 2 explains how firm dynamics cause short-run en-
dogenous productivity movements. The theory is that firm dy-
namics determine the number of firms in the economy which
determines division of inputs per firm and consequently pro-
ductivity through returns to scale. Returns to scale are present
because of a fixed cost and imperfect competition. Entry in-
creases resource division and reduces incumbents returns to
scale; exit decreases resource division and increases incumbents
returns to scale. Importantly firm dynamics take place slowly,
so there is an adjustment period during which changes in scale
arise. For example, a positive shock to the economy, with slow
firm adjustment, means that incumbents initially benefit from
that positive shock. Thus their production increases (without
changing anything they produce more), and by returns to scale
are more productive. But over time firms are able to adjust
and outsiders recognize the excess profit now being earned by
incumbents. Consequently they enter the market eroding per
firm output and therefore productivity until these excess profits
are arbitraged to zero leaving a long-run zero profit free entry
equilibrium. If one assumes instantaneous free entry, as is nor-
mal in macroeconomics, then these dynamics are eradicated.
Chapter 2 roadmap of main results: The main result, theorem
2.5.1, emphasizes that initial measured productivity overshoots
14
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long-run underlying productivity in response to technology shocks.
The effect is increasing in the degree of imperfect competition
and the size of the fixed cost, and it disappears if either of
these are zero. This is because a higher fixed cost strengthens
the degree of returns to scale, and similarly more imperfect
competition increases returns to scale because it allows firms
to suppress more production (raising their marginal product).
Aside from the fixed cost that causes initial increasing returns
to scale, the firms’ variable (net of the fixed cost) production
function has decreasing returns to scale (i.e. rising marginal
cost) so the cost curve is U-shaped. Thus there is an efficient
level of production at minimum cost that provides a benchmark
to gauge firm output against. In theorem 2.2.2 I show that these
efficient output outcomes always exceed those that arise under
imperfect competition, the difference being a firm’s excess ca-
pacity. So, given imperfect competition, we interpret increases
in firm production as capacity utilization since a firm moves
closer to its cost minimizing level, and decreases in firm pro-
duction are opening in capacity as a firm moves further from
its cost minimizing level.
Chapter 3 extends this argument to explain why productivity
effects can propagate into the long run. The chapter considers
a second firm dynamics factor that determines per firm output
and therefore productivity. This second factor is that pricing
markups of incumbents reflect the number of competitors in
the market. Whereas in chapter 2, firm dynamics solely alter
per firm inputs, in chapter 3 they also affect competitive pric-
ing decisions. Entry increases competition and lowers markups;
15
1.1 main findings
exit decreases competition and raises markups. For example,
firm exit weakens competition among remaining incumbents
and they raise markups, in turn they produce less to reach the
necessary revenue to cover costs, so per firm output falls. The
new mechanism creates a trade-off that is not present in chap-
ter 2: exit expands per firm resources (less division of inputs)
increasing production, contrarily it raises markups decreasing
production, vice-versa for entry. The result is that in addition to
the short-run endogenous productivity movements of chapter
2, firm dynamics have a long-run persistent effect on produc-
tivity.
Chapter 3 roadmap of main results: Section 3.4 defines the two
competing effects of entry: a “competition effect” reducing markups
and increasing per firm output and productivity; an “allocation
effect” reducing per firm output and productivity as inputs are
divided among more firms. The effect of endogenous markups
is to create endogenous long-run output per firm and produc-
tivity (i.e. the long-run outcomes depend on long-run num-
ber of firms). Theorem 3.5.1 shows that long-run output and
productivity are increasing in number of firms. These feed
through to the main result, theorem 3.6.1, which emphasizes
that technology shocks will amplify the response of measured
productivity on impact and lead to a long-run persistent effect.
The concept is investigated in relation to negative shocks which
cause exit, and propagate to lower long-run productivity. This
is because of the analog to current empirical productivity puz-
zles facing economies like the UK, France and Italy.
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1.1.1 Modelling Approach
The thesis develops a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) frame-
work that extends a Cass-Koopmans type model to account for
entry, endogenous labour and imperfect competition. The work
is analytical, continuous time and deterministic; parametric as-
sumptions are only made for numerical illustrations. At any
point in time an economy is defined by its levels of consump-
tion, labour, capital and number of firms.
The thesis recognize that firm entry and exit are a slow pro-
cess. This means the number of firms in the economy is a state
variable, that can be thought of like capital. Similarly it rec-
ognizes that imperfect competition teamed with a fixed cost in
production and increasing marginal costs (decreasing returns
in variable production) leads to locally increasing returns to
scale because firms produce below the cost minimizing level of
output (to the left hand side of minimum on U-shaped aver-
age cost curve). The result is that variations in firm production
cause procyclical productivity changes. The shocks I investi-
gate are once-and-for-all unexpected changes in TFP measured
by technology. I analyze entry and exit in the broad sense of net
entry. So the process is symmetric, entry and exit do not occur
concurrently. If the number of firms in the economy increases
there has been entry, and if it decreases there has been exit.
17
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1.2 thesis contribution within wider literature
New Keynesian theory, beginning with Blanchard and Kiyotaki
1987 and Dixon 1987, extended neoclassical theory to account
for product differentiation and imperfect competition in gen-
eral equilibrium. This development superseded neoclassical
RBC models characterized by perfect competition, constant re-
turns to scale and zero fixed costs. In RBC research goods are
priced at marginal cost, profits are superfluous and as a re-
sult investigating the microeconomic structure that determines
number of firms, their interaction, and production is an unre-
warding research path. However, the New Keynesian introduc-
tion of monopolisitic competition, following Dixit and Stiglitz
1977 and Spence 1976, creates a role for these microeconomic
market structures by embedding a separate industry equilib-
rium within general equilibrium. Monopolistic competition
formalizes Chamberlin 1933 theory that firms face downward
sloping demand curves (have some market power) but there
is free entry so the marginal firm makes zero profits. In this
environment the number of active firms becomes an important
determinant of output per firm and pricing markups, but New
Keynesian literature has initially simplified firm dynamics’ ef-
fects by assuming both number of firms and markups are ex-
ogenous. Similarly to recent papers by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz 2012 (BGM)1 and Etro and Colciago 2010, I repeal these
two assumptions (1. exogenous number of firms 2. exogenous
1 Widely cited as lengthy working paper Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz 2007.
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markup) to endogenise market structures so that the number
of firms in the economy and the markup they charge are en-
dogenous2. Chapter 2 of the thesis repeals the first assumption,
then chapter 3 repeals the second. The next two sections inves-
tigate how these two assumptions have been addressed in the
literature. The contribution of my research is to interpret their
importance analytically, and the reward is to better understand
why firm dynamics create endogenous and persistent produc-
tivity movements.
1.2.1 How to endogenize number of firms?
The introduction of sunk entry costs for prospective firms en-
dogenizes firm entry. In this environment a prospective firm’s
entry decision is to compare the sunk cost with discounted fu-
ture profits from incumbency, and in free entry equilibrium
these equate so a marginal firm is indifferent between entry
and inactivity. This has become quite standard, a more inno-
vative consideration is timing. Is entry static or dynamic? In
static models entry is instantaneous so free entry equilibrium
arises immediately (profits are zero immediately), whereas in
dynamic models there is a short-run phase during which prof-
its are nonzero as they are arbitraged but in the long run free-
entry equilibrium arises leading to the same equilibrium out-
comes as the static case. Early work in the area by Chatterjee
and Cooper 19933 and Devereux, Head, and Lapham 1996b,
2 Etro 2009 terms this approach ‘endogenous market structures’.
3 Finally published as Chatterjee and Cooper 2014.
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Devereux, Head, and Lapham 1996a focused on the static case
and interactions with monopolistic competition, but static mod-
els are frictionless, there is no sunk cost to entry and profits
are arbitraged immediately (entry is bound by fixed cost of
production which is equivalent to a sunk cost if entry occurs
instantaneously). Therefore these models avoid the procycli-
cal relationship between profit and entry. Some extensions of
the static case, notably Comin and Gertler 2006, Jaimovich and
Floetotto 2008 and Jaimovich 2007, have focused on the endoge-
nous markups effect of entry, rather than the time-to-build lag
(dynamic entry) that is crucial in this thesis and most recent
literature.
The recent popularity of teaming entry with macroeconomics
is centred on the advantages of dynamic entry which adds
an endogenous propagation mechanism that the standard RBC
setup lacks. Dynamic entry means that firms are fixed in the
short-run which appeals to intuition and evidence Cook 2001.
It can be added to a standard RBC environment in the absence
of the New Keynesian extensions of imperfect competition. In
an RBC environment movements in capital stock do not create
enough variation in state variables. With dynamic entry the
number of firms becomes an additional state variable which is
mathematically analogous to capital. Brito and Dixon 2013 pro-
vide theory to explain the complex topology of dynamics that
arises with the addition of this second state variable even with-
out imperfect competition complications. And this is corrobo-
rated by nonmonotone (hump-shaped) impulse response func-
tions in more applied work by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz 2012
20
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(BGM). The two papers have a similar mathematical structure
but differ in their construction of the entry process. The first
paper is based on the earliest work on dynamic entry by Datta
and Dixon 2002, Aloi and Dixon 2003 and Aloi and Dixon 2002.
These papers’ strength is analytical tractability–a benefit I ex-
ploit. The second paper by BGM offers an accessible calibrated,
simulated DSGE approach–it has stimulated the recent popu-
larity in this area. They provide a simple additional equation
determining number of firms that DSGE modelers can port into
larger models. The impulse response functions of this work
and research based on it reflect the additional dynamic propa-
gation introduced by the extra state variable and explained in
the earlier theoretical line of research. Specifically productivity
shocks cause hump-shaped responses in output, consumption
and number of firms. My contribution is to deepen our under-
standing of the productivity propagation in these recent works
by using the tools of the theoretical line of research.
In both sets of literature a firm is a product, so firm entry can
be thought of as product entry–procylical firm entry is analo-
gous to procyclical product variation. This interpretation has
been in place since seminal work by Chatterjee and Cooper
1993, but likely understates product space variations by ignor-
ing multiproduct firms. Minniti and Turino 2013 recognize
that entering firms produce multiple products by disentangling
the entry decision and product production decision. The extra
competition from entry encourages product expansion creating
joint procyclicality. The heterogeneous firm literature I discuss
21
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in section 1.2.3 is also successful in distinguishing firm from
product.
Most of these papers focus on entry and exit as distinct pro-
cesses. The result is that most papers focus on firm entry with
firm exit ignored as an exogenous process. This follows BGM
who assume an exogenous exit rate (a percentage die each pe-
riod, like capital depreciation). Hamano and Zanetti 2014 is the
first paper to endogenize exit in this setup, drawing the result
that the survival of firms (i.e. lack of exit) is an important dy-
namic for recovery from recession. The Datta and Dixon 2002
method treats entry as symmetric, so negative entry is exit. This
allows me to discuss firm dynamics in a more general business
formation sense, and is useful as I focus on negative shocks
(related to contemporary productivity puzzles) for which firm
exit is more important.
1.2.2 How to endogenize markups?
Endogenous markups means the markup of price above marginal
cost depends on the number of firms in an industry. In a vanilla
New Keynesian model with imperfect competition the price
markup is exogenous: it is a fixed constant that depends on the
exogenous structural parameter ‘intersector substitutability of
goods’ (it diminishes to nothing when sector goods are highly
substitutable). Number of firms affecting markup can arise
through alternative setups: a demand-side approach as in BGM
and a supply side approach as in Etro and Colciago 2010. Lewis
22
1.2 thesis contribution within wider literature
and Poilly 2012 compares the two, finding that the demand-
side (translog preferences) approach is more empirically rele-
vant than the supply-side strategic interactions approach. De-
spite the puzzle that the supply-side approach is weaker, most
theoretical researchers prefer it due to its ubiquity in structural
IO and evidence for it in empirical IO literature. Furthermore
it ties more closely to firm entry, whereas the demand-side
approach suits discussion of product entry. The demand-side
approach reflects that entry alters the substitutability between
goods that characterizes the constant markup. This is due to
Feenstra 2003 translog preference specification (when there are
more firms there are more goods, substituability increases and
markups fall)4. The supply-side approach captures strategic
interactions: more firms dilute the price setting ability of in-
cumbents which lowers their markups. Therefore both lead to
countercyclical markups. Papers that combine the two assump-
tions to numerically investigate macroeconomic questions have
proven very successful in answering questions on monetary pol-
icy (Lewis and Stevens 2015, Lewis and Winkler 2015a Winkler
and Lewis 2014), fiscal policy Lewis and Winkler 2015b and
generally at improving moment-matching of benchmark mod-
els Colciago and Etro 2010. An important aspect of my work is
to avoid relying on numerical simulation in order to improve
our understanding in general of how firm dynamics affect the
economy. Of course, this simplicity trade-off precludes answer-
4 Advocates suggest most pressure on markups comes from existing firms
switching products and hence is demand-side preference driven, rather than
the small effects of firm entry usually by insignificantly sized firms. This
however requires a switch to thinking of firms as products, so undermines
discussion of firm entry.
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ing some of the interesting questions addressed by computa-
tional methods, but it offers a preciser narrative to attach to
these investigations.
1.2.3 The View from Outside Macroeconomics: Firm Heterogeneity
A shortcoming of the literature I have reviewed is absence of
firm size and productivity differences, a benchmark feature in
structural industrial organization (IO) modeling. It is well doc-
umented that firm movements are attributable to small (poten-
tially insignificant) firms Giovanni and Levchenko 2013. This
causes skepticism of entry and exit influence over the business
cycle. Complementing the literature I have discussed is an
equally large body that recognizes firm heterogeneity. Typically
this literature defines ‘firm dynamics’ by entry, exit, size, age and
life cycle features. It builds on the work of Hopenhayn 1992a,
Hopenhayn 1992b, Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993, Veracierto
2008, Campbell 1998. Whereas literature I have explored, like
mine, stems from macroeconomists (and trade economists) ques-
tioning the micro underpinnings of market structures. The com-
plementary literature with greater emphasis on heterogeneity
stems from microeconomists questioning the aggregate impli-
cations of IO work. A small number of papers begin to link the
two literature. For example, Clementi and Palazzo 2013 shows
that allowing for firm heterogeneity (idiosyncratic productivity)
and entry-exit improves internal propagation. Exit is endoge-
nously determined by the stochastic idiosyncratic productivity
24
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component that alters operating costs and there is capital accu-
mulation. However, the analysis is partial equilibrium–output
price is give. This setup, like Campbell 1998, Samaniego 2008
Lee and Mukoyama 20085, is perfectly competitive. These stud-
ies succeed in distinguishing firms from products; in fact, they
abstract from from modeling the household investment and
consumption decision so the impact of products on utility is
irrelevant, but this is a double-edged sword as it abstracts from
general equilibrium. Samaniego 2008 deserves mention as a pa-
per that reports negative findings. He suggests that firm entry
and exit are not influential at an aggregate level. But this is
debated by Lee and Mukoyama 20156 who conclude entry and
exit are necessary to match data, and question Samaniego’s as-
sumptions on entry costs. To complete discussion on using het-
erogeneity among firms to explain aggregate puzzles one must
mention Gabaix 2011 that has ignited a movement recognising
that very large firms can wield influence at the aggregate level
in the economy as supported by growing empirical evidence
Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean 2014 and Stella 2015.
Ottaviano 2011 and Peters 2013 are examples of links in the
opposite direction: macro papers at core but recognising firm
heterogeneity. Additionally both papers are analytically tractable.
Ottaviano 2011 introduces firm heterogeneity and endogenous
markup using a linear quadratic demand function in a two-
sector model. He seeks to understand how heterogeneity in
productivity feeds through to technology shock propagation
5 Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 is the mutual feature of these papers.
6 Part of which is from the widely cited Lee and Mukoyama 2008.
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by recognizing that most entry-exit activity arises among low
productivity firms. Peters 2013 considers the impact of supply-
side markup competition on aggregate TFP. His innovation is
to consider that there is heterogeneity in production which
feeds through to the markup measure. His interest is misal-
location of resources across firms. He finds that the TFP gap
depends on the marginal distribution of markups only and not
the correlation between markups and firm productivity. There-
fore more entry reduces markups which reduces misallocation
across firms (there is tighter distribution of markups).
Lastly some very recent papers have made the natural con-
nection from firm dynamics in the macroeconomy to stock mar-
ket dynamics. These finance oriented papers (Loualiche 2014
and Corhay, Kung, and Schmid 2015) recognise the link be-
tween firm dynamics and asset price in general equilibrium.
Both follow the BGM firm evolution approach.
1.3 descriptive statistics on entry, productivity and
the business cycle
A fundamental implication of my research is that firm entry is
procyclical and correlated with TFP movements. In this section
I outline these relationships with US data.
Large volumes of research have sought to understand the
empirical relationship between firm dynamics and aggregate
movements. The stylized facts are that entry (business forma-
tion) and productivity are procyclical, and markups are coun-
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tercylical (though this is contested, Nekarda and Ramey 2013).
An early reference on the topic is Portier 1995 who finds current
entry and GDP are correlated 0.53 from 1977-1989 in French
data. More recently Lee and Mukoyama 2008 use the US An-
nual Survey of Manufacturers to show at the plant level that en-
try correlates 0.413 with output growth. Rotemberg and Wood-
ford 1999 is a good survey of countercylical markup behaviour
over the business cycle for US data, though it relates to work on
sticky prices. An important benefit of my entry narrative is that
profits are procylical and markups countercyclical, a feat the
sticky price literature struggled to replicate. Literature in indus-
trial organization strongly suggests markups decline with com-
petitive pressure from entry (Campbell and Hopenhayn 2005),
but this does not draw a relationship to the correlation between
entry and GDP and thus the business cycle significance. The
procyclicaltiy of productivity is well-documented, a common
reference is Rotemberg and Summers 1990. Of core interest to
this thesis is the negative side of the relationship: the fall in
productivity associated with recession that is outlined in UK
data by Haskel, Goodridge, and Wallis 2015.
In the following analysis data is logged and Hodrick-Prescott
filtered7. TFP and GDP data are taken from FRED (Federal Re-
serve Economic Database). Net Business Formation (NBF) is an
index (1967=100) of business formation kept by the US Bureau
of Economic Analysis 1948:1 - 1995:38. Figure 1 plots comove-
ments between US net business formation (NBF) and detrended
7 The chapter appendix includes detailed descriptions and the primary source
for NBF.
8 Thanks to Vivien Lewis in helping me to access this data.
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output. The correlation across the period is 0.59, similar to fig-
ures of 0.6 for France 1993-2002 documented by Dos Santos
Ferreira and Dufourt 2006 and strengthening the Ambler and
Cardia 1998 figure of 0.58 for US 1954-1991 (I use their data
but extend the time series). The graph also suggests NBF is
more volatile than output over the business cycle which pairs
with the well-known business cycle fact of excess investment
volatility9.
Figure 1.: US Net Business Formation and Output Business Cy-
cle Relationship
A more discerning correlation across the period captures this
volatility and confirms the statistical significance of the corre-
lation. Figure 2 plots the beta values of NBF given a move-
ment in output using a simple dynamic volatility model NBF =
α+ βGDP. Therefore the y-axis is the the coefficient β from the
9 The other common stylized facts are less volatile consumption than GDP
and equally as volatile labour.
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dynamic OLS regression. It is dynamic because the regression
is run on the previous 7 years, so 28 quarterly observations. For
example, in 1994 the beta value on the y-axis is 2.0, so over the
7 years previous (1997-1994) a 1% rise in output above trend is
associated with a 2% rise in net business formation above trend.
The 95% confidence intervals (dashed) show the relationship is
statistically different to 0.0 for the whole time period, excluding
the late 60s during which there was spurious volatility in NBF.
Figure 2.: US Net Business Formation and Output Correlation
and Volatility
Figure 3 adds TFP (as measured in the Penn World tables)
to figure 1 and supports its positive correlation with output
and net business formation. This graph embodies the main
relationships of the thesis. Falling output diminishes business
formation and worsens measured productivity10. Rising output
raises business formation and improves measured productivity.
10 Measured productivity since the causal reason for the initial output move-
ment could be a shift in underlying productivity (a technology shock).
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This thesis provides a structural explanation to link these stark
correlations.
Figure 3.: US Net Business Formation, TFP and Output Corre-
lation
30
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2.1 introduction
This chapter argues that firm entry causes endogenous fluc-
tuations in macroeconomic productivity through its effect on
incumbent firms’ capacity utilization. The analysis shows that
imperfect competition causes long-run excess entry: too many
firms each with excess capacity. Since entry occurs slowly, mac-
roeconomic shocks are initially borne by the excess capacity
incumbents who respond by altering their capacity utilization.
Incumbents’ efficiency changes because of non-constant returns
to scale which aggregates to affect the economy’s productivity.
In the long run, entry occurs and new firms absorb the shock,
which alleviates incumbents’ alteration in capacity. Therefore
the productivity change is ephemeral. In sum, the slow re-
sponse of firms to economic conditions causes endogenous pro-
ductivity dynamics.
2.1 introduction
How does industry competition affect firm entry and conse-
quently macroeconomic dynamics? Since Chamberlin 1933, ec-
onomists have understood that in a monopolistically compet-
itive economy there is ‘excess capacity’. Each firm produces
below their full capacity, which minimizes costs, because un-
derproduction earns monopoly profits. In terms of firm entry,
underproduction causes too many firms each producing too
little. This chapter’s focus is transition toward the excess ca-
0 This Chapter is an adaptation of a working paper co-authored with Profes-
sor Huw Dixon called ”The Effect of Firm Entry on Capacity Utilization and
Macroeconomic Productivity”.
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pacity steady state. During transition the capacity utilization
of firms fluctuates which causes endogenous productivity vari-
ations. The productivity variations arise because capacity lev-
els alter returns to scale and therefore productivity. The firm
entry capacity utilization mechanism is unexplored in macroe-
conomics, hence the aim of the chapter is to provide an ana-
lytically tractable theory to connect firm entry, capacity utiliza-
tion and productivity dynamics. The theory should interest em-
piricists in light of contemporary ‘productivity puzzles’ Haskel,
Goodridge, and Wallis 2015. For example, our theory implies
that a negative shock to the economy is not immediately dis-
sipated by firms exiting, and thus worsens capacity utilization
which exacerbates negative productivity until firms have time
to exit. This scenario could relate to large falls in productivity
experienced by the UK economy post Great Recession1.
The chapter’s main result is that resources are divided be-
tween too many firms in the long run, but a movement away
from equilibrium causes firms to increase (reduce) capacity so
they produce closer to (further from) full capacity in the short
run whilst other firms enter to arbitrage monopoly profits (exit
to avoid negative profits). For example, a positive production
shock causes a short-run productivity gain. Incumbents raise
output as other firms cannot enter in the short run to absorb the
positive shock. On raising output, increasing returns improve
incumbents’ productivity which aggregates to the macroecon-
omy. Since the output of the incumbents exceeds equilibrium
and yields monopoly profits prospective firms slowly enter to
1 I investigate this in greater depth in Chapter 3.
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arbitrage the profits back to zero profit long-run equilibrium.
Therefore the productivity gain is ephemeral, and excess capac-
ity returns in the long run. A clear implication of this model is
that capacity utilization is procylical: during expansion capac-
ity utilization increases (less excess capacity), but during booms
capacity utilization decreases (more excess capacity.) Figure 4
emphasizes this relationship in quarterly US data 1974-20132.
It is clear that the two series co-move and capacity utilization is
more volatile. Furthermore the volatility in capacity utilization
increases in downturns for example during the recent Great
Recession 2007-2009 output falls below trend, but the accom-
panying fall in capacity utilization (opening up in capacity) is
even greater. To capture the relationship more robustly figure
Figure 4.: US Procylical Capacity Utilization
2 Data are logged and HP-filtered at a quarterly frequency. Raw data is taken
from Federal Reserve FRED database with unique MNEMONICS GDP and
TCU. “Capacity utilization is the percentage of resources used by corporations and
factories to produce goods in manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities
for all facilities”.
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5 shows the betas associated with capacity utilization from a
dynamic OLS regression over the period. Each value on the
y-axis is the β from regression Cap.Util. = const + βGDP run
for the previous 28 periods (7 years). The plot confirms that
the effect of a change in GDP on capacity utilization is positive
and statistically significant e.g. the value of 1.5 in 2009 implies
over the previous 7 years a 1% rise in GDP caused a 1.5% rise
in capacity utilization3.
Figure 5.: The Effect of GDP on Capacity Utilization
The focus on theory and analytical dynamics distinguishes
this chapter from other research (discussed below) that typ-
ically focuses on quantitative replication of empirical results.
These quantitative works are stochastic and dynamics are sim-
ulated, as opposed to our qualitative deterministic study that
avoids specifying functional forms or solving parameterized,
3 Additionally the volatility of capacity utilization is typically twice that of
GDP and increases in the periods after a recession, like the early 2000s re-
cession and late 2000s recession. This interesting result is not core to the
chapter, but is too striking to ignore comment.
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path dependent models. This approach allows us to give a
robust narrative of the role entry is playing in the model by
pinpointing its interactions with other variables. The model in-
cludes important features from the main papers in the literature
so far: endogenous labour, and capital accumulation (Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz 2012); imperfect competition (Etro and Col-
ciago 2010) and entry congestion effects that Lewis 2009 finds
empirically important and Berentsen and Waller 2009 model
structurally4. Imperfect competition is the paramount addi-
tion since it is ubiquitous in these models but its relation to
entry and mapping to dynamics has not been investigated. Al-
though in an open-economy setting without capital Aloi and
Dixon 2003 follow a similar line of argument that imperfect
competition creates excess capacity that can lead to endoge-
nous fluctuations in productivity, but in this chapter we focus
on relating these arguments to a business cycle framework in-
cluding capital. Excess capacity is a standard feature of models
with imperfect competition, but its relationship to entry is often
overlooked, since three features–imperfect competition, non-
constant returns to scale, slow firm entry–are necessary for ca-
pacity utilization effects. The counterfactuals of these three as-
sumptions clarifies their necessity: 1) Without slow entry, there
is standard instantaneous free entry5, short-run capacity uti-
lization by incumbents will not arise because other firms enter
instantaneously to meet output, so incumbents do not respond
by varying their capacity. 2) If there were perfect competition,
4 Congestion means entry costs increase with number of entrants.
5 The two extremes entry cases–instantaneous free entry and no entry fixed
number of firms–are special cases the model.
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firms produce efficiently, at minimum average cost; they do not
have excess capacity which if used can improve productivity. 3)
If there were constant returns to scale, entry is inert: there is no
difference between one large firm producing all output versus
many small firms producing all output6.
To understand the relationship between entry, imperfect com-
petition and macroeconomic dynamics, we build on work by
Brito and Dixon 2013. The model is a Cass-Koopmans model
with labour-leisure choice and capital. We add Datta and Dixon
2002 entry and imperfect competition in the product market, so
firms control output price. In the model a firm is a divisor of
resources, and with this apparatus we formalize our intuitions
to ask: How does imperfect competition affect the division of
resources (capital and labour) among firms when there is en-
try? How does productivity vary as we transition toward this
division of capital to firms?
Related Literature The chapter bridges two groups of liter-
ature: quantitative endogenous entry DSGE models and qual-
itative dynamical systems analyses of determinacy, returns to
scale, capacity utilization, and imperfect competition. A bur-
geoning group of endogenous entry DSGE papers show promis-
ing quantitative results from including richer industrial organi-
zation features in standard RBC models. Recent cornerstones
are Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz 2012, Etro and Colciago 2010,
Lewis 2009 and Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008. The former two
provide initial forays into qualitative dynamics of the systems
6 Furthermore with a fixed cost, like we have, there would be a one firm
natural monopoly.
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they simulate, mainly these are complementary exercises to es-
tablish saddlepath stability, all in discrete time due to simula-
tion. A simplicity trade-off is to reduce the dimensionality to
one, so a state variable (capital) is stripped from the system
leaving only number of firms state, which rules out the most
empirically appealing dynamics of their simulations: those that
exhibit nonmonotone impulse responses.
The closest model to ours is Brito and Dixon 2013; the paper
studies entry implications for macroeconomic dynamics with-
out imperfect competition. They show that with perfect compe-
tition, firm entry causes empirically plausible macroeconomic
dynamics in a Ramsey model. The main result is that entry
is sufficient to give nonmonotone deviations from equilibrium
under fiscal shocks. The research derives sufficient conditions
for hump-shaped responses that quantitative DSGE papers ob-
serve via simulation. Our addition of imperfect competition cre-
ates the capacity utilization mechanism and excess entry7. This
concept is also present in Aloi and Dixon 2003 which relates
entry to capacity utilization in a simpler open-economy frame-
work without a second state variable in capital. They find that
demand and technology shocks cause endogenous variations
in measured productivity through changed in firm capacity uti-
lization. In these papers and our model the sunk entry cost
is endogenous, and firms’ technology gives U-shaped average
7 Etro and Colciago 2010 also note that Cournot competition causes ineffi-
ciency through excess entry. Etro 2009 provides an excellent survey of
macroeconomic models with endogenous entry and endogenous market
structures.
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cost curves8, which endogenously generates increasing returns
to scale under imperfect competition, as in Jaimovich 2007. The
endogenous sunk cost of entry depends on the number of en-
trants, a so-called congestion effect that recent papers have em-
phasised the importance of: Lewis 2009 offered initial empirical
support for congestion effects of firm entry. It is a VAR study
that shows congestion effects can account for observed lags in
monetary policy.
Roadmap – Section 2.2 proposes a model of firm entry in the
macroeconomy and derives measured productivity. The anal-
ysis follows and consists of section 2.4 on comparative statics,
stability and comparative dynamics. The final section 2.5 uses
the analytical results to reveal the main result that productiv-
ity varies endogenously, so causes measured productivity to
exceed underlying.
2.2 endogenous entry model with imperfect com-
petition
The model follows a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans setup with addi-
tions of imperfect competition, firm entry, and capital accumu-
lation. The model is deterministic, and labour is endogenous as
developed by Brock and Turnovsky 1981. There are two state
variables: capital and number of firms (K, n) ∈M ⊆ R2, where
M is the state space of the control problem that later forms a
subset of the general dynamical system state (or phase) space.
8 Often assumed in industrial organization literature such as Luttmer 2012
and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007.
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We solve the model as a decentralised equilibrium because
imperfect competition distorts the optimising behaviour of the
firm which does not coincide with centralised equilibrium of a
planner optimising behaviour of the economy. 9
2.2.1 Household
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely-lived
identical households. A household seeks policy functions of
consumption {C(t)}∞0 ∈ R and labour supply {L(t)}∞0 ∈ [0, 1]
that maximise lifetime utility
Assumption 1 Household Utility.
Aggregate utility U : R2 → R is composed of individual utility
u : R × [0, 1] → R which is jointly concave and differentiable in
both of its arguments. It is strictly increasing in C and strictly de-
creasing in L, so uC > 0, uL < 0. Thus uL should be read disutility
from labour (i.e. −uL is utility from labour). Both goods are normal
uCC, uLL < 0, so marginal utility of consumption and disutility of
labour are diminishing. Utility is additively separable uCL = 0.
A representative household solves the utility maximisation
problem:
U : =
∞∫
0
u(C(t), 1− L(t)) e−ρt dt (1)
s.t. K˙(t) = rK(t) + wL(t) +Π− C(t) (2)
9 The conditions we derive could be derived from an optimal control problem
with two restrictions, but the economic intuition is less clear. However, the
equivalence is important for the theory of dynamics we use later.
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where e is the exponential function and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the dis-
count factor over time t ∈ R+. The household owns capital
K ∈ R and takes equilibrium rental rate r and wage rate w
as determined by the market (we determine their levels in the
firm equilibrium, whereas households take them as constant).
A dot above a variable denotes time derivative x˙ = ∂x∂t . House-
holds own firms and receive firm profits Π ∈ R. There are
n ∈ R firms in the aggregate economy, or more accurately
there are n active firms per industry which translates to n in
aggregate under a continuum of symmetric industries of mea-
sure 1. Using the Maximum Principle to maximise utility yields
six Pontryagin conditions for optimal consumption and labour
10 The conditions simplify to an intertemporal consumption Eu-
ler equation (3), intratemporal labour-consumption trade-off (4)
and the resource constraint (2).
C˙(r, ρ) =
C
σ(C)
(r− ρ), where σ(C) = −C uCC(C)
uC(C)
(3)
w = − uL(L)
uC(C)
(4)
The solution of the dynamic optimization problem for house-
hold consumption will be one of the solutions of this system
of two differential equations that satisfy the initial condition
K(0) = K0. To complete the boundary value problem we add
two transversality conditions on the upper boundary. This com-
pletes the unique solution for the boundary value problem:
three variables (K, L, C), three equations (2)-(4), three bound-
10 Appendix B.1 sets up the Hamiltonian and solves it.
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ary conditions (5). λ is the costate variable associated with the
state variable K in the Maximum Principle.
lim
t→∞Kte
−ρt > 0 , lim
t→∞Ktλte
−ρt = 0 , K0 = K(0) (5)
Therefore equations (2)-(5) characterize optimal paths of con-
sumption and labour. In equilibrium these equations continue
to hold, with factor prices w and r at their market value, which
arises from firms profit maximisation under imperfect competi-
tion as we show in section (2.2.2).
2.2.1.1 Intratemporal Labour
The intratemptoral condition (4), given wage w at market equi-
librium w(L, K, n), defines optimal labour choice in terms of
the other variables L(C, K, n), so it can be substituted out of the
system, thus reducing the system’s dimensionality by one. In
section (2.2.2) we derive the market wage in firm equilibrium
(proposition 1), but for now we assume it is known in order to
understand the general equilibrium behaviour of labour.
Theorem 2.2.1 Optimal labour choice.
Labour supply increases in capital (K), number of firms (n) and de-
creases in consumption (C).
L(C−, K+, n+) (6)
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem to differentiate the
intratemporal condition (4) with labour defined implicitly by
L(C, K, n; A, ζ). See Appendix B.3.
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The intratemporal condition shows that the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labour equates to the
wage (negative because labour decreases utility11). A rise in
consumption causes the marginal utility of consumption to fall
(consumption is a normal good) therefore marginal disutility
of labour must decrease to maintain the marginal rate of sub-
stitution, hence labour increases which reduces disutility from
labour uL. When capital increases the marginal product of
labour increases as they are complements, therefore wage in-
creases which increases supply of labour.
A notable corollary to theorem 2.2.1 is that entry (rise in num-
ber of firms n) increases labour supply. This is because entry
reduces capital and labour per firm which raises the marginal
product of production by decreasing returns (decreasing re-
turns means less production causes higher marginal product).
Higher marginal product of labour raises wage which creates a
greater incentive to supply labour.
Corollary 1 Firm Entry Encourages Labour Supply.
Firm entry causes an increase in the number of firms which raises
households desired labour supply12 Ln > 0 when production has de-
creasing returns ν ∈ (0, 1); decreases labour supply Ln < 0 when
production has increasing returns ν ∈ (1,∞); and does not affect
labour supply Ln = 0 with constant returns ν = 1.
11 Think of uL as labour disutility and −uL as labour utility.
12 I follow the notation that xz is derivative of x with respect to z.
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Proof. From the intratemporal Euler condition (4) with wage w
at the market rate (14) implicitly differentiate with respect to n
uLLLn + uC(1− ζ)A
[
Flk
−K
n2
+ Fll
(−L
n2
+
Ln
n
)]
= 0,
therefore Ln =
uC(1− ζ)A(ν− 1) Fln
uLL + uC(1− ζ)A Flln
> 0
Notation is formally defined in firm section. F is the production
technology that has decreasing returns; that is, we assume it is
homogeneous of degree ν ∈ (0, 1) (hod − ν) and therefore its
derivative is hod− (ν− 1). ζ ∈ (0, 1) represents market power
(Lerner index). A is technology.
The result relies on there being decreasing returns to scale
ν ∈ (0, 1) in the variable production function. With constant
returns labour supply is irresponsive Ln = 0. This is because
the effect of entry reducing capital and labour per firm does
not change marginal products by definition of constant returns
to scale. Therefore wage is unaffected and there is no chan-
nel through which entry affects labour. It is also noticeable
that when there is absolute market power ζ → 1 entry does
not affect labour supply. This is because raising market power
increases markup between wage and marginal product. There-
fore a change in marginal product (induced by entry and re-
turns to scale) has little effect on wage and therefore optimal
labour choice. In other words there is a one price monopsonist.
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2.2.2 Firm Production
Imperfect competition leads to fixed markups of price above
marginal cost as in the standard Dixit and Stiglitz 1977 setup.
There is a continuum of n one firm industries, and substitutablity
across industries is θ ∈ (1,∞) which makes aggregate output a
Cobb-Douglas aggregate as θ → 1. Multiproduct firms do not
exist, so a firm is a producer, is a product, is an industry, is a
sector. A firm faces a fixed cost and decreasing returns to scale
which leads to a U-shaped average cost curve. There is imper-
fect competition in the product market and perfect competition
in the factor market. Product market imperfect competition
means that firms can control output price; factor market per-
fect competition means firms cannot control factor prices. That
is, the market determines the interest rate and wage, which
are the prices of factors capital and labour, and since each firm
faces the same price, then each firm employs the same amount
of capital and labour. We shall denote capital per firm and
labour per firm in lower case
Definition 1 Per Firm Variables.
By assumption of perfect factor markets, capital and labour are divided
equally among firms. Lower case letters denote per firm variables
k(t) =
K(t)
n(t)
, l(t) =
L(t)
n(t)
, y(t) =
Y(t)
n(t)
Respectively capital per firm, labour per firm, output per firm.
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The aggregate good which I take to be the numeraire is a CES
aggregate of each i ∈ n sector (a sector is a 1 firm industry, so
n is the measure of number of firms). θ ∈ (1,∞) is intersector
substitutability which tends to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator in
the imperfectly substitutable limit θ → 1. The n 11−θ component
removes love-of-variety.
Y = n
1
1−θ
 n∫
0
y(i)
θ−1
θ di
 θ1−θ (7)
With the unit price of the aggregate good as the numeraire the
sectoral demand directed at each 1-firm industry takes constant
elasticity form
y(i) = p(i)−θY, ∀i ∈ (0, n) (8)
Later we shall see that this leads to market power captured by
the Lerner Index ζ = 1θ , which is the difference between price
and marginal cost as a proportion of price ( P−MCP ). As oppose
to the Lerner Index of Market Power ζ, macroeconomists of-
ten express the equivalent idea in terms of markup (µ), as I
do in chapter 2, the markup is defined as price over marginal
costs ( PMC ) therefore µ =
1
1−ζ =
θ
θ−1 is the relationship between
markup (µ) and market power (Lerner Index) (ζ).
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Assumption 2 Production.
Firms have the same production technology
y(t) = max{AF(k(t), l(t))− φ, 0} (9)
where F : R2+ ⊇ (k, l) → R+ is a firm production function with
continuous partial derivatives which is homogenous of degree ν < 1
(hod-ν) on the open cone R2+, and φ ∈ R+ a fixed cost denominated
in output. F has concavity properties Fk, Fl, Fkl = Flk > 0Fkk, Fll <
0, FkkFll − F2kl > 0.
The production function exhibits a U-shaped average cost
curve because there is a fixed cost and decreasing returns to
scale. Decreasing returns to scale arise because the variable pro-
duction function F is convex, hod− ν < 1, in capital and labour
which causes increasing marginal cost. φ is the fixed cost and
is in terms of output; it is a nonconvexity which prevents some
firms producing; it occurs each period, and is different to the
sunk entry cost which is paid once to enter (see Entry section
2.2.3)13. Inada’s conditions hold so that marginal products of
capital and labour are strictly positive which rules out corner
solutions. Since the average cost curve is U-shaped there is an
optimal efficient level of production at minimum average cost,
where average cost and marginal cost intersect. These efficient
levels denoted with an e superscript (xe) coincide with the opti-
mal firm size Yn = 0 where under symmetry aggregate output
is Y = ny
13 As in Jaimovich 2007 the role of this parameter is to reproduce the apparent
absence of pure profits despite market power. It allows zero profits in the
presence of market power.
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F(ke, le) =
φ
A(1− ν) (10)
ye = AF(ke, le)− φ = φν
1− ν (11)
P e = y
e
F(ke, le)
1
ν
= A
1
ν ν
(
φ
1− ν
) ν−1
ν
(12)
Technology A does not affect optimal net output, but it reduces
optimal gross output F(k, l) and raises productivity. Measured
productivity P is output per unit of production, where produc-
tion is normalized to be homogeneous of degree 1 (In the steady
state section 2.3 I show that this productivity definition is a nat-
ural derivation.). From (10)
(
1
n
)ν
F(K, L)e = φA(1−ν) whence
ne =
(
A(1−ν)
φ F(K, L)
) 1
ν so number of firms is hod-1 in capital
and labour. A rise in capital and labour by some proportion
will raise number of firms by the same proportion, so capital
and labour per firm remain unchanged. Hence the result in
(11) that optimal output per firm is a fixed level, independent
of model variables.
The efficient levels that correspond to optimal firm size are
not achieved when we consider the strategic interactions of
firms under imperfect competition.
2.2.2.1 Strategic Interaction: Monopolistic Competition
Under imperfect competition, with output price as the numeraire,
a firm maximises profits given real wage w and interest rate r
by choosing labour and capital such that the following factor
market equilibrium holds
48
2.2 endogenous entry model with imperfect competition
Proposition 1 Factor Market Equilibrium.
Factor market equilibrium conditions reflect the profit maximising
choices of firms competing under imperfect competition. They show
that the marginal revenue product of capital equates to the cost of cap-
ital and the marginal revenue product of labour equates to the wage.
AFk(k, l)(1− ζ) = r (13)
AFl(k, l)(1− ζ) = w (14)
ζ ∈ [0, 1) is a fixed markup known as the Lerner index14. It
reflects the degree of market power. Under perfect competition
ζ = 0, so factor price equals marginal product, but under imper-
fect competition, firms charge a markup so prices exceed their
marginal product. Standard derivation15 shows that the Lerner
Index is the inverse of intersector substitutability ζ = 1θ , there-
fore high substitutability corresponds to little market power.
For the purpose of this research we focus on variations in ζ,
rather than its microfoundations. A result of the markup is that
a firm produces less and earns monopoly profits. The imper-
fectly competitive factor prices r and w create monopoly profits
that increase firm operating profits by ζνAF(k, l) relative to the
perfect competition case when ζ = 0. Both returns to scale of
the technology and market power increase the extra profit.
14 Notice that I refer to the Lerner Index as the markup as it is useful to bind
the parameter between 0 and 1. It is common in macroeconomics (as I do
in second chapter) to define markup as price over marginal cost calling this
definition of the markup µ we have µ = 11−ζ .
15 Maximise firm profits subject to sectoral demand 8.
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Proposition 2 Excess Profit.
Market power ζ suppresses factor prices which leads to excess profits
pi relative to the perfect competition case pi(ζ) > pi(ζ = 0)
pi(L, K, n; A, ζ, φ) = (1− (1− ζ)ν)AF(k, l)− φ (15)
Proof. See appendix B.2. Proof follows from definition of profit
pi(t) = y(t) − w(t)l(t) − r(t)k(t) with factor prices at factor
market equilibrium.
The next subsection uses proposition 2 to show that the ad-
ditional profit causes firms to have excess capacity by raising
entry incentives.
2.2.2.2 Zero Profit Outcome and Excess Capacity
The extra profit ζνAF(k, l) from imperfect competition is cru-
cial to understanding the entry-imperfect-competition relation-
ship. Profits offer entry incentives, so monopoly profits encour-
age excess entry. In section (2.4.1) we show that profits are zero
in steady state so there is no incentive to enter the market and
entry is zero. Taking zero profits as given (an asterix x∗ denotes
zero profit steady state outcome under imperfect competition.),
proposition 2 implies
F(k∗, l∗) = φ
A(1− (1− ζ)ν) (16)
y∗(φ
+
, ν
+
, ζ
−
) = AF(k∗, l∗)− φ = ν(1− ζ)φ
1− (1− ζ)ν (17)
Therefore zero-profit output per firm is increasing in both fixed
cost and returns to scale and is decreasing in market power.
50
2.2 endogenous entry model with imperfect competition
More market power raises marginal revenue products of inputs,
so less needs to be produced in order to cover fixed costs and at-
tain zero profits. Importantly y∗ is unaffected by TFP (A). Firms
always produce the same long-run level of output regardless of
technology.
With zero profit, the profit definition pi = y−wl− rk implies
y∗ = wl∗ + rk∗ = (1− ζ)AνF(k∗, l∗) (18)
P∗ = y
∗
F(k∗, l∗) 1ν
= F(k∗, l∗)
ν−1
ν Aν(1− ζ)
= A
1
ν ν(1− ζ)
(
φ
1− (1− ζ)ν
) ν−1
ν
(19)
Measured productivity P is output per unit of production, where
production is normalized to be hod− 1 16. The definition is a
generalization of productivity with constant returns to scale:
under constant returns to scale ν = 1 then PCRTS = (1− ζ)A,
so that market power determines measured productivity. With
CRTS and perfect competition ζ = 0 measured productivity
is TFP A. Importantly measured productivity is decreasing in
market power because it allows firms to suppress output more
and benefit less from returns to scale.
As mentioned the outcome is technically efficient under the
special case of perfect competition, ζ = 0. Comparing the out-
come under imperfect competition to the efficient outcome ((10)
and (11) with (16) and (17)) demonstrates excess capacity.
Theorem 2.2.2 Excess Capacity.
In zero-profit steady state variable production, output per firm and
16 since F(αk, αl)
1
ν = (ανF(k, l))
1
ν = αF(k, l)
1
ν , α ∈ R
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measured productivity are less than the efficient cost-minimizing level
that corresponds to optimal firm size.
F(k∗, l∗) < F(ke, le), y∗ < ye, P∗ < P e (20)
As ζ increases long-run output y∗ decreases. Hence imper-
fect competition causes firms to produce less than the efficient
level ye, so AC > MC and AC is decreasing, giving locally in-
creasing returns to scale. Increasing output would improve
firm productivity. With entry we shall see that firms can be
manipulated to use some of this capacity. This result implies
that in equilibrium the trade-off between an additional firm
bringing an extra fixed cost (which is underutilized, reducing
overall production possibility frontier) outweighs the efficiency
gain from smaller firms producing with lower marginal cost.
Remark 1. Zero profit equilibrium only exists if the denominator
is positive ν < 11−ζ which will always hold under our assump-
tion of decreasing returns ν < 1. But we note that as ζ → 1
monopoly power allows ever increasing returns to scale ν→ ∞.
If there is little monopoly power ζ → 0 then decreasing returns
are necessary for existence of zero-profit equilibrium since no
firm is large enough to make use of the fixed cost. With CRTS
ν = 1 then ζ > 0 because with constant returns and a fixed cost
the economy cannot be competitive.
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2.2.3 Firm Entry
The number of firms at time t is determined an endogenous
sunk cost of entry and an arbitrage condition that equates entry
cost with incumbency profits.
Assumption 3 Sunk Entry Cost (congestion effect).
Entry cost q ∈ R increases with the number of entrants n˙ in t.
q(t) = γn˙, γ ∈ (0,∞) (21)
The process is symmetric, a prospective firm pays q to enter;
an incumbent firm pays −q to exit. If there is exit n˙ < 0, so
q < 0 and −q > 0– an incumbent must pay a fee to exit. n˙
is the change in the stock of firms so represents net business
formation; later we define this as ‘entry’ (definition 2). γ is the
marginal cost of entry, and its bounds capture the limiting cases
of entry. γ → 0 implies instantaneous free entry because the
sunk cost is vanishingly small so the outcome is similar to the
static case, and γ → ∞ implies fixed number of firms because
the sunk cost is so high that it prohibits entry.
Assumption 4 Entry Arbitrage.
Gain from entry equals return from investing the cost of entry at the
market rate.
q˙(t) + pi(t) = r(t)q(t) (22)
A firm’s gain from entry is the value of incumbency which is operating
profits pi plus any change in the original sunk cost q˙.
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The two assumptions are well supported. The congestion ef-
fect assumption is common in industrial organization literature
for example Das and Das 1997. Justified by increased advertis-
ing costs, or competition for a fixed resource, and variously
called ”negative network effects” or ”entry adjustment cost”.
In terms of the macroeconomy, Lewis 2009 statistically models
congestion externalities in entry and concludes that the mech-
anism improves model fit because it reduces impact responses
of entry. Berentsen and Waller 2009 also model a congestion
effect in a DSGE model.
The arbitrage assumption implies that the return to investing
in a firm is equal to the return of that investment at the risk free
rate r. And an implication of this is that the value of a firm is
equal to present discounted value of future profits as in Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz 2012.
The two assumptions form a dynamical system in number of
firms and cost of entry {n, q} which reduces to a second-order
ODE in number of firms
γn¨(t)− r(t)γn˙(t) + pi(t) = 0 (23)
To interpret this second-order ODE consider that profits are
high, then to maintain equilibrium the speed of net business
formation n˙ is high which translates to higher sunk entry cost
thus discouraging future entry so net business formation decel-
erates n¨ < 0 to maintain equilibrium. Defining entry can help
this intuition, and by defining entry, this second-order ODE is
separable into two first-order ODEs
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Definition 2 Entry and Exit.
Entry (or exit) is measured by the the change in the number of firms.
Negative entry is exit.
e(t) = n˙ (24)
Hence our model of industry dynamics, which determines
the number of firms, is defined by two ODEs
n˙ = e (25)
e˙ = −pi(t)
γ
+ r(t)e(t) (26)
The endogenous entry cost causes a non-instantaneous ad-
justment path to steady state, which provides an analytical
framework to understand short-run dynamics. To observe the
importance of the endogenous entry cost consider the contra-
diction that entry cost is fixed, q(t) = γ. In which case the the
second-order ODE becomes pi = rγ so there is no dynamic en-
try. Datta and Dixon 2002 show that the level of entry that sat-
isfies the first order differential equation in entry arises when
cost of entry is equal to future discounted operating profits.
2.3 aggregation and general equilibrium
The last section discussed firm level production and showed
that imperfect competition caused variable production, output
and productivity of a firm to be below the perfect competition
case in the long run, so-called excess capacity. Importantly
these levels are fixed and independent of model variables in the
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long run because capital per firm and labour per firm always
return to the same level–firms enter or exit until the desired per
firm levels arise. That each firm ultimately produces the same
output, has implications for aggregation: when there is a rise
in firms, aggregate output will increase; when there is a fall in
firms, aggregate output will decrease. Both productivity and
output per firm will always tend to the same level, whereas
aggregate output will change, it has constant returns to scale.
The first firm to enter in a period pays 0, whereas the sec-
ond firm will pay γ and the third firm to enter 2γ and so on.
Therefore the economy wide cost of entry, Z(t), is
Z(t) = γ
∫ e(t)
0
i di = γ
e(t)2
2
(27)
Hence aggregate profits are aggregate operating profits less en-
try costs
Π = npi − Z(t) (28)
Π = n[AF(k, l)(1− (1− ζ)ν)− φ]− γ e(t)
2
2
(29)
Under symmetry aggregate output is the sum across each
industry that produces according to the firm level production
function.
Y = ny = n
[
AF
(
K
n
,
L
n
)
− φ
]
(30)
We previously noted at the firm level output y is homogenous
of degree 0 in inputs (K, L, n). This is despite the production
technology being hod-ν, as a proportional rise in capital and
labour is offset by the rise in number of firms. Hence we view
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firms as a type of quasi-input in production. Therefore the ag-
gregate production function Y is homogeneous of degree 1 in
(K, L, n)17. Consider a doubling of all inputs (double capital,
labour and number of firms), all firms remain as they were,
productivity and output at the firm level are unaffected, so ag-
gregate output also doubles because there are twice as many
firms each producing the same amount as before.
2.3.1 Derivation of Measured Productivity in Aggregate
Aggregate output provides a natural derivation of measured
productivity P since it is hod-1 in capital and labour. In the
long run Y∗ = n∗y∗ and we can show that output Y∗ is hod-1
in capital and labour. If we substitute in zero profit output per
firm (17) long-run output is
Y∗ = n∗
[
AF
(
K∗
n∗
,
L∗
n∗
)
ν(1− ζ)
]
(31)
= n∗
1−ν
AF(K∗, L∗)ν(1− ζ) (32)
substitute out n∗ = Y∗y∗ =
Y∗
φν(1−ζ)
1−ν(1−ζ)
Y∗
ν
=
(
1− ν(1− ζ)
φν(1− ζ)
)1−ν
AF(K∗, L∗)ν(1− ζ) (33)
Y∗ = F(K∗, L∗)
1
ν A
1
ν ν(1− ζ)
(
1− ν(1− ζ)
φ
) 1−ν
ν
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
(34)
17 Long-run aggregate output is hod − 1 in its factors. Increasing the factors
(K, L, n) in Y∗ by λ gives Y∗(λK,λY,λn) = (λn)1−νAF(λK,λL)ν(1− ζ) =
Y∗ = λ1−νn1−νλνAF(K, L)ν(1− ζ) = λn1−νAF(K, L)ν(1− ζ) = λY∗
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Since ν < 1, free entry causes long-run increasing returns to
scale between F(K, L) and Y (i.e. Y is hod- 1ν > 1 in F). Further-
more we have removed n so it is clear that Y is hod-1 in (K, L).
This leads to a natural definition of measured productivity P
which accounts for this scale effect (so that an economy is not
considered more productive simply because it has more K, L
resources)
P∗ = Y
∗
F(K∗, L∗) 1ν
= A
1
ν ν(1− ζ)
(
1− ν(1− ζ)
φ
) 1−ν
ν
(35)
Measured productivity P is an efficiency parameter since it is
a function of true TFP A. Incidentally constant returns to scale
ν = 1 imply underlying productivity (productivity at steady state)
is P∗ = YF = A(1− ζ) which is equivalent to TFP if there is
perfect competition ζ = 0. Measured productivity is decreasing
in ζ. Measured productivity P is increasing in technological
development A, whereas technology does not affect output per
firm y∗ (17).
2.3.2 General Equilibrium Effect of Entry on Aggregate Output
The response of aggregate output to entry is ambiguous under
imperfect competition with endogenous labour.
Yn = pi − ζνAF
(
K
n
,
L
n
)
+ Fl Ln (36)
Since firms operate with excess capacity, a firm entering the
economy can decrease aggregate output. Assuming the posi-
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tive labour effect Fl Ln is small, this is what happens in zero-
profit equilibrium. A firm enters the economy, pays a fixed
cost and underutilizes this fixed cost. The extra output added
by this new incumbent is more than offset by the fall in output
among other firms. And the negative effect is stronger with
closer to CRTS ν → 1. In the perfect competition case there
is no negative effect as firms all produce at constant returns to
scale so it is irrelevant how the production is split among firms.
In this classic Ramsey case with no endogenous labour, and no
imperfect competition, Yn = 0 so the steady state number of
firms is optimal in the sense that it maximises output.
2.3.3 General Equilibrium
General equilibrium determines prices, consumption and labour
given the current capital stock and number of firms. The aggre-
gate equation of motion for capital follows from the household
resource constraint (2).
K˙ = wL + rK +Π− C
= n(1− ζ)νAF(k, l) + n[AF(k, l)(1− (1− ζ)ζ)− φ]
− γ e
2
2
− C (37)
K˙ = n
[
AF
(
K
n
,
L
n
)
− φ
]
− C− γ e
2
2
(38)
This is equivalent to rearranging the standard definition of ag-
gregate output Y = C + I. Output Y is split between consump-
tion C(t) and investment I(t) = K˙ + Z(t).
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Definition 3.
Competitive equilibrium is the ‘equilibrium’ paths of aggregate quanti-
ties and prices {C(t), L(t), K(t), n(t), e(t), w(t), r(t)}∞t=0, with prices
strictly positive, such that {C(t), L(t)}∞t=0 solve the household prob-
lem. {K(t)}∞t=0 satisfies the law of motion for capital. Labour and
capital {L(t), K(t)}∞t=0 maximise firm profits given factor prices. The
flow of entry causes the arbitrage condition on entry to hold (price of
entry equals NPV of incumbent). State variables {K(t), n(t)}∞t=0 sat-
isfy transversality. Factor prices are set according to (13) and (14),
which ensures goods and factor markets clear.
2.4 dynamical system of endogenous entry econ-
omy
The model economy is a system of four ordinary differential
equations (ODEs) in four variables (C, e, K, n): two equations
dictate the law of motion of capital and number of firms and
two equations restrict these evolutions so that consumption
maximises utility and entry arbitrages profit opportunities. There
is also a fifth condition (intratemporal Euler), but it is static,
which determines labour. The system is sufficient to qualita-
tively analyse the economy, by which we mean that for a given
parameter set Ω ∈ RP, we find the set of solutions that sat-
isfy the system given an initial state on the manifold m0 :=
(K0, n0) ∈M ⊂ X, where X ∈ R4 is the four dimensional space
of the dynamical system, and M ∈ R2 is the manifold: a subset
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defined by states (capital and number of firms) in the control
problem.
At a point in time t ∈ (0,∞) our economy is entirely de-
scribed by its level of capital and the number of firms. For now
we do not specify initial conditions or functional forms that
would give specific trajectories of capital and number of firms.
The primitives of our boundary value problem are the state of
the system defined on an open set M := K × n ∈ R2, the time
t ∈ I defined on an open interval of R, the parameterization
defined on an open set Ω ∈ RP and the nonlinear C1 function
g : M× I ×Ω ⊇ R3+P → R2, or “time evolution law”, that maps
a given state, time and parameterization into a new state. This
rule determines the state of the system at each moment in time
from its state at all previous times. For most of the analysis
we work with a system where the state space includes C and e,
although these variables can be defined by their policy functions
which map K × n into C × e, so the system equations K˙ and
n˙ describe the evolution of the state variables along the stable
manifold.
Definition 4 Nonlinear system.
The dynamical system is a pair (X, g), where X = (R4,ψ) is Eu-
clidean space and metric. It defines at a point in time t ∈ R the state
of the system x(t) ∈ X ⊆ R4. The motion of the system is described
by a C1 vector valued transition map g : R5+P ⊇ X×R×Ω −→
R4
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Throughout the system labour is implicitly defined by the
static intratemporal condition w = −uLuC and the system is given
by the following four ODEs.
K˙ = Y− γ
2
e2 − C, Y = n(F(k, l)− φ) (39)
n˙ = e (40)
C˙ =
C
σ(C)
(r− ρ), σ(C) = −CuCC
uC
(41)
e˙ = re− pi
γ
, pi = AF(k, l)(1− (1− ζ)ν)− φ (42)
where factor prices
r = (1− ζ)AFk, w = (1− ζ)AFl (43)
The system equations, (39) and (40), explain how the state of
the system evolves. The optimization conditions, (41) and (42),
restrict the state evolutions. They impose that households max-
imise utility and potential entrants maximise profits. The eco-
nomic reiteration is that the system equations determine how
capital and number of firms evolve as the economy moves through
time, and the optimization conditions ensure that capital and
number of firms move so as to maximise consumers’ utility and
firms’ utility.
Mathematically it is easier to view the system in terms of the
four state variables of the dynamical system (C, e, K, n), remem-
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bering that labour is also in terms of these states L(C, K, n) via
the intratemporal condition (1− ζ)AFl = −uLuC .
K˙ = n(AF(k, l)− φ)− γ
2
e2 − C, (44)
n˙ = e (45)
C˙ = − uC
uCC
((1− ζ)AFk − ρ), (46)
e˙ = ((1− ζ)AFk)e− AF(k, l)(1− (1− ζ)ν)− φγ , (47)
2.4.1 Steady State Behaviour
In steady state capital, number of firms, consumption and entry
are stationary K˙ = n˙ = C˙ = e˙ = 018.
K˙ = 0 ⇔ Y∗(C∗) = C∗ + γ
2
e∗ (48)
n˙ = 0 ⇔ 0 = e∗ (49)
C˙ = 0 ⇔ r∗(C∗, K∗, n∗) = ρ (50)
e˙ = 0 ⇔ r∗(C∗, K∗, n∗)e∗ = pi
∗(C∗, K∗, n∗)
γ
(51)
18 Ignore the trivial steady state that arises when the state vector is the zero
vector.
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Plug e∗ = 0 into K˙ and e˙ and rewrite in terms of variables
(C, K, L, n, e)
K˙ : n∗
[
AF
(
K∗
n∗
,
L∗
n∗
)
− φ
]
= C∗ (52)
n˙ : e∗ = 0 (53)
C˙ : (1− ζ)AFk
(
K∗
n∗
,
L∗
n∗
)
= ρ (54)
e˙ : F
(
K∗
n∗
,
L∗
n∗
)
=
φ
A(1− (1− ζ)ν) (55)
with static intratemporal Euler
(1− ζ)AFl
(
K∗
n∗
,
L∗
n∗
)
= − uL(L
∗)
uC(C∗)
(56)
The system determines (C∗, L∗, K∗, n∗, e∗), where e∗ = 0 is im-
mediate, and the intratemporal Euler (56) defines L(C, K, n).
The results formally confirm that the zero-profit outcome we
analyzed in section 2.2.2.2 is a steady state outcome of the sys-
tem. The entry arbitrage condition, which becomes a zero profit
condition in steady state, gives steady state technology F(Kn ,
L
n ),
which then gives y∗, and a mapping between C∗ and n∗ via (52).
The system is recursive: first find K∗, n∗ then the policy rules
C∗, L∗ as a function of the states. Projecting the optimization
conditions (54) and (55) onto the state space determines K∗, n∗
for a given L∗, which is fixed via the capital labour ratio. Ceteris
paribus, say for the K, L, n at perfect competition steady state
levels, (55) implies imperfect competition reduces production
per firm and (56) and (54) imply marginal products rise with
imperfect competition (because firms underproduce); (52) im-
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plies lower consumption. These do not necessarily hold when
K, L, n adjust. The intuition is that firms produce less so they
benefit from greater increasing returns to scale hence marginal
products are higher.
2.4.1.1 Steady State Graphical Intuition
The optimization conditions (54) and (55) determine per firm
capital k and labour l, and therefore aggregate capital-labour
ratio kl =
K
L
19. In k, l space (55) is an isoquant for zero-profit
output, and (54) is a locus along which marginal product of
capital is at steady state. Figure (6) shows the convex isoquant
and linear marginal product of capital in steady state for the
functional forms and parameterizations used in the numerical
section. Later we shall comment on the unamibiguous decrease
in k indicated by the dashed lines which is caused by a rise in
imperfect competition. Labour on the other hand can increase
or decrease. In the numerical example it increases as market
power increases which refelcts that the income effect outweighs
the substitution effect.
Figure (7) shows K, n combinations that cause the optimiza-
tion nullclines (C˙ = 0 and e˙ = 0) to hold20. At the intersection
both hold. The interpretation of the functions is that consump-
tion does not change when interest rates equal the discount rate
r = ρ, and entry does not change when profits are zero pi = 0.
Incentives cause both results: incentive to consume today is the
19 In other words, eliminate n in the two equations to give a single relationship
between K and L.
20 Functions (54) and (55) respectively. The loci are equivalent to C˙ = 0 and
e˙ = 0 only if other vairables are at steady state.
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Figure 6.: Optimization Nullcines C˙ and e˙ (equations (54) and
(55)) in k, l space
same as incentive to consume later because discount rate and
interest rate are equal, so discount a household suffers from
waiting to consume is offset by interest earned whilst waiting.
There is no incentive for entry when profits are zero. The inter-
est rate condition is upward sloping. A rise in capital per firm
decreases the marginal product of capital21, and therefore the
interest rate, but a rise in firms decreases capital per firm back
to its steady state level. The free entry condition (pi = 0) slope
is ambiguous when labour varies, and is upward sloping when
labour is fixed. Increasing capital increases profits, but capital
also raises labour which can reduce profits. If profit falls num-
ber of firms decrease until zero profit is restored. Figure (7)
shows the case where an increase in capital raises profits and
21 since DRTS Fk is decreasing in its arguments.
66
2.4 dynamical system of endogenous entry economy
number of firms increase to syphon the profit causing a positive
slope.
K
n
r = ρ
pi = 0
A
k∗
r = ρ
pi = 0
B
Figure 7.: pi = 0 and r = ρ in K, n space
L
C
EF(ζ = 0)
IEP(ζ = 0)
A
EF(ζ > 0)
IEP(ζ > 0)
B
C(ζ0)
L(ζ0)
C(ζ1)
L(ζ1)
Figure 8.: IEP and EF in L, C space
We have shown that the optimization conditions determine
capital and labour per firm (k∗ and l∗), therefore we can deter-
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mine the marginal product of labour, which gives the steady
state wage w∗. Steady state wage is fixed so the intratemporal
condition (56) describes L, C combinations that keep the ratio of
marginal utilities constant. Thus it represents the income expan-
sion path (IEP). We call the capital evolution equation (52) the
Euler frontier when Y is replaced by zero profit output from
(55), equivalent to (17), and number of firms is written in terms
of L, so the equations can be plotted in L, C space. n = Ll and l
is determined, so when L changes it changes l but n moves to
keep l at its steady state level. Then the IEP and EF are
w∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− ζ)AFl (k∗, l∗) = − uL(L
∗)
uC(C∗)
IEP (57)
C∗ = L
∗
l∗
(
ν(1− ζ)φ
(1− (1− ζ)ν)
)
EF (58)
The IEP is downward sloping because labour is an inferior
good and consumption is a normal good. As income increases
consumption increases and labour decreases; specifically non-
labour income since w∗ is fixed. Income and utility expand
North West on the IEP. The slope is convex because utility from
consumption diminishes and disutility from labour grows. Un-
der quasi-homothetic preferences the IEP is a straight line; if
preferences are homomethic IEP intersects (1,0).
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2.4.1.2 Comparative statics: Imperfect competition
Theorem 2.4.1 Steady State Capital and Labour per Firm.
In steady state market power decreases capital per firm, and ambigu-
ously affects labour per firm.
kζ < 0, lζ Q 0 (59)
Proof. Appendix (B.4)
The result is shown in figure (6) by a downward shift in
steady state output isoquant and downward shift in steady
state marginal product of capital. The result is also shown by
the grey region of figure 7. In the grey region Kn is strictly less,
and one can see any shift in the curves caused by a rise in ζ
will put the new intersection in the grey region, as the example
with dotted lines shows–leading to new equilibrium B.
Imperfect competition reduces the interest rate so it is less
than the discount rate. Interest rate will return to parity if the
marginal product of capital increases which for given K occurs
by increasing n–less capital per firm raises MPK as each firm
employs capital more efficiently due to DRTS in variable cost.
The r = ρ curve shifts up. A rise in imperfect competition
increases profits pi > 0, so pi = 0 shifts up too because given K
a rise in n will reduce production per firm, and therefore profits,
since each firm has less capital and uses it more efficiently (has
less excess capacity lower monopoly profits), which will keep
profits at zero. Under both steady state conditions imperfect
competition must be offset by a rise in n for a given K, hence
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capital per firm, k, unambiguously falls. The grey region is k <
k∗, and any rise in ζ will reduce k, to a point in this region22.
A rise in imperfect competition shifts the IEP down and de-
creases the EF slope causing a decrease in consumption and an
increase or decrease in labour supply, but a fall in consump-
tion for any L. The IEP shifts down because market power
ζ reduces wage, so for given L, according to the intratempo-
ral condition, consumption must decrease to decrease the util-
ity from consumption and equate the fall in wages23. It is a
pure substitution effect: leisure (1 − L) is cheaper relative to
consumption, therefore the household decrease consumption
and increase leisure (for a given level of consumption takes less
labour). The EF slope is shallower because each unit of L in-
creases income less, which creates an income effect. The house-
hold has less income so decreases intake of both normal goods:
consumption and leisure. For a given L the household reduces
C. Both substitution and income effects reduce consumption,
but the substitution effect reduces labour whereas the income
effect increases labour (decreases the normal good leisure). Fig-
ure 8 shows the case where substitution effect dominates the
income effect–labour falls. Under fixed labour EF would still
rotate because return on capital and wage decrease, but the IEP
is vertical which removes substitution effect, leaving consump-
tion reducing income effect.
22 The diagram is schematic; k must be in a region bound above both original
curves, which rules out some of the grey, but consider different functions
e.g. both are flatter so they tend to the k∗ line–this opens up more of the
grey region.
23 The ratio of marginal utilities is negative, so we want the ratio to increase
which means a decrease when we consider the negation.
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In summary, the steady state analysis gives a snapshot of the
economy when capital, number of firms, consumption and en-
try are constant. Entry is zero because profits are arbitraged
to zero in the long run. The effect of a rise in imperfect com-
petition is lower output per firm, lower consumption, higher
marginal products, and ambiguous change in capital, number
of firms and labour. However, the ratios capital per firm and
consumption to labour are lower. A decrease in capital per firm
is important for our thesis because in steady state firms have
excess capacity and employ too few inputs. This result asserts
that more imperfect competition will worsen excess capacity.
2.4.2 Parameterization and Numerical Exercise
In this section I specify functional forms and parameterizations
which allow us to view the bifurcations mentioned above. Fur-
ther I shall show that the system is a saddle point.
The baseline RBC model assumes isoelastic (constant elastic-
ity) separable subutilties and a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion.
2.4.2.1 Isoelastic Utility
U(C, L) =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ − ξ
L1+η
1+ η
(60)
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The derivatives are
UC = C−σ, UCC = −σC−σ−1, UL = −ξLη (61)
The degree of relative risk aversion is constant σ(C) = −C UCCUC =
σ. Isoelastic utility implies there is constant elasticity of utility
with respect to each good24. Conceptually, σ ∈ (0,∞) \ {1} is
the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion25. σ → ∞ im-
plies infinite risk aversion, so consumption has little effect on
utility, no effect in the infinite limit. σ → 0 is risk neutrality
so that a % change in consumption has the same % change on
utility. The limiting case of σ → 1 implies log utility ln(C); we
shall assume this for the numerical exercise–it will lead to fixed
labour as income and substitution effects cancel out. 1η is Frisch
elasticity of labour supply. Inverse elasticity η ∈ (0,∞) of η = 0
implies indivisible labour; Mertens and Ravn 2011 estimate it
as η = 0.976.
2.4.2.2 Cobb-Douglas Production
F(k, l) = kαlβ = KαLβn−(α+β) = F(K, L)n−(α+β) (62)
so derivatives are
Fk = αkα−1lβ = αKα−1Lβn1−(α+β), (63)
Fl = kαβlβ−1 = KαβLβ−1n1−(α+β) (64)
24 Mertens and Ravn 2011 is a useful example usage of isoelastic utility with
detailed parameter descriptions and accompanying empirical estimates.
25 Although precisely it is only a curvature parameter in the absence of risk.
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Cobb-Douglas production conforms to our assumptions on the
production function derivatives, and it is homogeneous of de-
gree α+ β, so ν = α+ β in our general notation. α and β are
capital and labour shares respectively. This implies increasing
marginal costs if α+ β < 1.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used for simula-
tion exercises. They are benchmark for this simple model, and
Market Power ζ (0, 1)
Capital Share α 0.3
Labour Share β 0.5
Fixed Cost φ 0.3
Entry Cost γ 3.0
Technology A 1.0
Risk Aversion σ 1.0
Discount Rate ρ 0.025
Labour Weight ξ 0.01
Labour Elast. (Frisch) η 0.5
Table 1.: Parameter Values for Numerical Exercises
are replicated from Brito and Dixon 2013. For comparison,
Jaimovich 2007 and Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008 calibrate a
similar model and parameters taking a ‘formal calibration’ ap-
proach. In Jaimovich 2007 the markup (price over marginal
cost definition) is switched between µ = 1.05 and µ = 1.10,
so in terms of Lerner Index (ζ = 1 − 1µ ) then ζ = 0.047 and
ζ = 0.09. In Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008 it is µ = 1.3 so
ζ = 0.231. Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008 calibrate the fixed
cost φ to be a percentage of sales nφY =
φ
y = 0.127, and use
slightly larger proportion of 15% in the appendix. In this pa-
per we assume no intersector substitutability θI = 1 (different
products across industries i.e. no substitution across industry)
and infinite intrasector substitutability θF = ∞ (homogeneous
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goods within industry i.e. perfect substitution within indus-
try). Whereas Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008 emphasize keeping
these parameters free, but it gives similar outcomes to our as-
sumptions θI = 1.001 and θF = 19.626. They assume indivisible
labour η = 0.
Under this parameterization the dynamical system (39)-(42)
becomes
C˙ =
C
σ
[
(1− ζ)AαKα−1Lβn1−(α+β) − ρ
]
(65)
e˙ = (1− ζ)AαKα−1Lβn1−(α+β)e
− 1
γ
(
AKαLβn−(α+β)(1− (1− ζ)ν)− φ
)
(66)
K˙ = n
[
AKαLβn−(α+β) − φ
]
− γ
2
e2 − C (67)
n˙ = e (68)
where is L is defined in terms of (C, K, n) through the intratem-
poral condition (4)
L =
(
(1− ζ)AKαβn1−(α+β)
ξCσ
) 1
1+η−β
(69)
26 Specifically they use ω and τ which since their aggregators are written as
p-norms and Holder conjugates, rather than elasticities as is common in
economics θI = 11−ω =
1
1−0.001 = 1.001 and θF =
1
1−τ =
1
1−0.949 = 19.6.
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and from which optimal labour behaviour follows (as shown
theoretically in theorem 2.2.1).
Ln =
1− (α+ β)
1+ η − β
L
n
(70)
LK =
α
(1+ η − β)
L
K
(71)
LC =
ξσ
(1− ζ)Aβ(β− 1− η)
Cσ−1
KαLβ−2−ηn1−(α+β)
(72)
= − σ
(1+ η − β)
L
C
(73)
Lζ = − 1(1− ζ)(1+ η − β)L (74)
LA =
1
A(1+ η − β)L (75)
2.4.2.3 Parameterized Steady State
To derive steady state outcomes under CES utility and Cobb-
Douglas production it is easier to use per firm variables k and
l. Thus, the intratemporal condition is
C∗ =
(
β(1− ζ)Ak∗αl∗β−1−ηn∗η
ξ
) 1
σ
(76)
the dynamical system is
C∗ = φ(1− ζ)ν
1− (1− ζ)νn
∗ (77)
e∗ = 0 (78)
αk∗α−1l(k∗, n∗)β = ρ
A(1− ζ) (79)
k∗αl(k∗, n∗)β = φ
A(1− (1− ζ))ν) (80)
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Therefore substituting C∗(n∗) into the intratemporal condition,
where ν = α+ β < 1, gives
l∗(k∗, n∗) =
 (1− ζ)1−σAk∗αβn∗−σ−η
ξ
(
φν
1−(1−ζ)ν
)σ

1
1+η−β
(81)
Solving (79) and (80), as plotted in figure 6, gives k∗ and l∗
k∗ = φα(1− ζ)
(1− (1− ζ)ν)ρ (82)
l∗ =
[
1
A
(
ρ
α(1− ζ)
)α ( φ
1− (1− ζ)ν
)1−α] 1β
(83)
These results capture that capital per firm is decreasing in mar-
ket power, whilst labour per firm is ambiguous. This verifies
the general results of theorem 2.4.1. Furthermore it emphasizes
that fixed cost raises both inputs as does returns to scale both
raise the output level that minimizes costs.
Rearranging the intratemporal condition (81) gives27
n∗ =
((
α
ρν
)σ (1− ζ)Aβ
ξk∗σ−αl∗1+η−β
) 1
σ+η
(84)
where k∗ and l∗ are in terms of model parameters defined in
(82) and (83). Since k∗ and l∗ are increasing in fixed cost φ, then
the number of firms is decreasing in fixed cost, which the next
equation shows. By substituting in k∗ and l∗, simplifying gives
27 Intermediate step from rearranging intratemporal condition is n∗ =(
l∗1+η−βξ
(
φν
(1−(1−ζ)ν)
)σ
k∗α(1−ζ)1−σAβ
)− 1σ+η
and by noting
(
φν
(1−(1−ζ)ν)
)σ
=
(
νρk∗
α(1−ζ)
)σ
sim-
plifies to above.
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an expression for the steady state number of firms entirely in
exogenous parameters28
n∗ =
[
β
ξνσ
{(
A
(
α
ρ
)α)1+η
(1− ζ)α(1+η)+β(1−σ)
(
1− (1− ζ)ν
φ
)1−ν+η(1−α)+σβ} 1β
1
η+σ
(85)
where ν = α+ β < 1. Whence we have an exact expression for
the number of firms in steady state, which is decreasing in the
fixed cost φ29. Given n∗ we can now determine all the steady
28 First rewrite as the following, then rearrange
n∗ =
 β
ξνσ
(
A
(
1− (1− ζ)ν
φ
)1−α (α(1− ζ)
ρ
)α) 1+ηβ ( φ(1− ζ)
(1− (1− ζ)ν)
)1−σ
1
η+σ
n∗ =
 β
ξνσ
A
(
1− (1− ζ)ν
φ(1− ζ)
) 1−ν+η(1−α)+βσ
1+η
(1− ζ)
(
α
ρ
)α
1+η
β

1
η+σ
29 Later we shall discuss the result that market power ζ enters the expression
twice, in one case it increases number of firms and in the other case it
decreases number of firms. In the numerical exercise we shall see that this
means raising market power can increase and eventually decrease number
of firms.
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state variables (C∗, e∗, K∗, L∗) which we previously derived in
per firm terms.
C∗ = n∗ φ(1− ζ)ν
1− (1− ζ)ν (86)
e∗ = 0 (87)
K∗ = n∗ φα(1− ζ)
(1− (1− ζ)ν)ρ (88)
L∗ = n∗
[
1
A
(
ρ
α(1− ζ)
)α ( φ
1− (1− ζ)ν
)1−α] 1β
(89)
2.4.2.4 How steady state changes with market power?
This section uses numerical analysis to reinforce the general
graphical description of steady state behaviour in section 2.4.1.1.
Figure 9 shows a 2D projection of steady states as market power
ζ changes with the values of ζ marked next to the points30. This
corresponds to the theoretical figure 7 discussed earlier. Figure
10 makes the equivalence clear by showing a panel of two plots
that depict how these steady states are determined from the in-
tersection of pi = 0 (curved line) and r = ρ (straight line). Fur-
thermore panel 2 plots two projections of the loci to show their
direction of motion from the zero market power lower curves
to the higher market power (ζ = 0.65) upper curves. Inciden-
tally this is approximately the market power that maximises
number of firms31. That is, the graphs show that by raising
market power ζ from no market power to dominance (0 → 1),
capital is always decreasing in ζ and number of firms increases
30 Figure 18 in Appendix B.4.1 offers an alternative perspective with ζ on the
z-axis.
31 More accurate numerical optimization shows that number of firms is max-
imised when market power is ζ = 0.625.
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then decreases after ζ = 0.65. Therefore after market power
is sufficiently high n∗ begins decreasing. This is a feature of
the parametrization, rather than general, as we noted in the
schematic approach figure 7 by commenting that steady state
is possible in any of the grey region. This can be understood
through the analytic n∗ derivation (85) which shows that there
is one component
(
1− (1− ζ)ν
φ
)1−ν+η(1−α)+σβ
=
(
1
AF(k∗, l∗)
)1−ν+η(1−α)+σβ
that increases n∗ as ζ increases, and a secondary component
(1− ζ)α(1+η)+β(1−σ)
that decreases n∗ as ζ increases (given positive power). The first
component is associated with the fixed cost and production
per firm. It raises number of firms as market power rises be-
cause production per firm falls as higher markups allow firms
to cover fixed cost by producing less, this creates room for more
incumbents. However, for this calibration, as market power
gets large this positive effect is dominated by the secondary ef-
fect which arises because of the negative effect of ζ on labour
per firm32 (see equation (83)). Figure 10 makes the relationship
to the nullclines clear. The nonlinearity in pi = 0 is responsible
32 This negative effect of ζ on n∗ relies on a positive power. However, risk
aversion σ is negative in the power which allows for ambiguity. A judicious
choice of risk aversion σ = 1 + αβ (1 + η) would switch off this effect by
making the power zero. Or indeed a σ exceeding this value would make the
power negative and thus the effect of ζ on number of firms positive, thus
reinforcing the primary effect. More market power would raise number of
firms. No ambiguity. Incidentally given the parameter values in table 1 this
value of σ would be σ = 1.9, not incomprehensible.
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for relatively fewer, and eventually decreasing number of firms,
as market power rises. At low levels of capital, small changes
in capital cause large changes in number of firms. A higher σ
risk aversion would flatten the profit nullcline (to maintain zero
profits a rise in n requires a larger rise in K) so that number of
firms continues to increases as the curve shifts upwards.
Figure 9.: Capital and No. Firms Equilibrium as Market Power
Changes
Figure 10.: Relationship between Intersecting Nullclines and
Steady State as Market Power Changes
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Figure 11 plots the household nonlinear intra- and linear in-
tertemporal conditions which we call the Income Expansion
Path (IEP) and Euler Frontier (EF) in steady state as discussed
earlier and graphed in figure 8. Since we have set unitary risk
aversion σ = 1 then there is log utility in consumption, and this
causes income and substitution effects to cancel out meaning
the rise in imperfect competition (solid lines to dashed lines)
has no effect on labour. Clearly consumption falls unambigu-
ously.
IEP C∗ =
(
β(1− ζ)Ak∗αl∗β−1
ξL∗η
) 1
σ
(90)
EF C∗ = φ(1− ζ)ν
1− (1− ζ)ν
L∗
l∗
(91)
Figure 11.: Determining Household Consumption-Labour
Choice
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2.4.3 Local Comparative Dynamics and Solution
Comparative dynamics explain how the economy transitions
to excess capacity steady state. Our interest is how imperfect
competition affects this transition, specifically through its effect
on firm capacity utilization. To understand this we solve the
four dimensional system which gives trajectories of the vari-
ables over t.
Our system is of nonlinear form x˙ = g(x), as defined in
definition 4, but we linearize it to x˙ = J(x − x∗), and analyse
the J operator which is a matrix on the space defined. J is the
Jacobian matrix where each element is a respective derivative.
The derivatives treat {K, n, C, e} as independent, and labour is a
function of these variables through the intratemporal condition
L(K, n, C). We solve the system recursively by first deriving
C and e as functions on K, n, then plugging these policy rules
back in to get K, n as functions of time and initial conditions.
Definition 5 Jacobian Matrix and the Jacobian (determinant).
The Jacobian matrix J : R4 → R4 is the nonlinear system matrix
evaluated at steady state x∗.

C˙
e˙
K˙
n˙

=
J︷ ︸︸ ︷
C∗
σ r
∗
C 0
C∗
σ r
∗
K
C∗
σ r
∗
n
−pi∗Cγ ρ −
pi∗K
γ −pi
∗
n
γ
Y∗C − 1 0 Y∗K Y∗n
0 1 0 0


C− C∗
e− e∗
K− K∗
n− n∗

(92)
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In the linearized model, the state vector is deviation from
equilibrium point33. Labour behaves according to the optimal
intratemporal condition L(K, n, C). Superficially, the elements
of the Jacobian appear the same as the perfect competition case
in Brito and Dixon 2013, for example element 3× 3 is Y∗n in both
cases. But their magnitudes change for any given point due to
the mark-up ζ, and as the steady state is also different they are
evaluated at different points.
A more granular version of the Jacobian expressed in K∗, n∗
terms is

C∗
n∗σ (1− ζ)AFkl LC 0 C
∗
n∗σ (1− ζ)A(Fkk + Fkl LK) C
∗
n∗σ (1− ζ)
[
(1− ν) ρ1−ζ + AFkl Ln
]
− (1−(1−ζ)ν)γn∗ AFl LC ρ − (1−(1−ζ)ν)γn∗
(
ρ
1−ζ + AFl LK
)
1
γn∗ (νφ− (1− (1− ζ)ν)AFl Ln)
AFl LC − 1 0 ρ1−ζ + AFl LK −ζνφ1−(1−ζ)ν + AFl Ln
0 1 0 0

(93)
which can be simplified even further with specification of func-
tional forms (65 - 68) and using Fl, Fkl, Fkk, LC, LK, Ln
− ρβ1+η−β 0 ρ
2ν((1+η)(α−1)+β)
σα(1+η−β)
φ(1−ζ)νρ(1−ν)(1+η)
(1−(1−ζ)ν)σ(1+η−β)
(1−(1−ζ)ν)βσ
γn∗(1+η−β)(1−ζ)ν ρ
−(1−(1−ζ)ν)ρ(1+η)
γn∗(1−ζ)(1+η−β)
φ(ν(1+η)−β)
γn∗(1+η−β)
−βσ
(1+η−β)(1−ζ)ν − 1 0
ρ(1+η)
(1−ζ)(1+η−β)
φ[−ζν(1+η−β)+β(1−ν)]
(1−(1−ζ)ν)(1+η−β)
0 1 0 0

(94)
33 In the terminology of the dynamical system all undetermined variables are
state variables, whereas in the terminology of the optimization problem
K, n are states and C, e are controls. Actually the dynamical system is only
2-dimensional, K, n is a basis for the whole system. C, e will be shown to be
functions of K, n
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In the second row I have not substituted out the n∗ component
which is in terms of model parameters because it does not sim-
plify nicely. Appendix B.6 offers a detailed derivation of the
parameterized Jacobian34.
Figure 12.: Sets of 4 Eigenvalues for 20 Values of Market Power
Figure 12 shows that the Jacobian evaluated at steady state
is a saddle point (2 positive eigenvalues, 2 negative eigenval-
ues) for different values of market power ζ. That is, the plot
shows 20 values of market power ζ ∈ (0, 0.05...0.95) on the
x-axis and the corresponding 4 eigenvalues at each of these lev-
els of market power. There are always two unstable (positive
eigenvalues) and two stable (negative) eigenvalues. This will
allow us to show that the model is able to generate endoge-
nous productivity movements which the next section explains.
The numerical illustration is useful for the case of larger market
34 One notable feature is that element J3,4 = Y∗n is 0, so output is maximised
with respect to number of firms, when ζ = β(1−ν)
ν(1+η−β) . In our numerical
example this implies a Lerner Index ζ = 0.125 or a markup µ = 1.14 will
maximise aggregate output.
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power because the theoretical eigenvalue approximation Brito
and Dixon 2013 Dockner and Feichtinger 1991 is less accurate
with less symmetry.
2.4.3.1 Solving the Model
As shown in figure 12 and supported theoretically by Brito and
Dixon 201335, the four dimensional system has two positive and
two negative eigenvalues, so the system is a saddle which is lo-
cally asymptotically unstable. Given the system is a saddlepath,
then by the stable manifold theorem, we show saddlepath sta-
bility by setting the constant of integration on the two explo-
sive eigenvalues to zero, thus reducing attention to the stable
set. This gives a system of saddle-path conditions that may be
solved for C and e. These conditions (policy functions) for C and
e describe the stable manifold M ∈ R2 of the system that en-
sures the constants on the explosive eigenvalues are zero, and
thus solutions asymptotically reach steady state.
The solution in open-loop form which is in terms of initial
values (K0, n0), t, and the parameters that comprise the eigen-
vectors Pij,k and eigenvalues λj in steady state is as follows
36:
35 A synopsis of their results is in appendix B.7.
36 Detailed derivations in appendix B.8
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
c(t)
e(t)
K(t)
n(t)

=

c∗
e∗
K∗
n∗

+
1
Ps1,3P
s
2,4 − Ps2,3Ps1,4

Ps1,1P
s
2,4e
λ1t − Ps2,1Ps1,4eλ2t −Ps1,1Ps2,3eλ1t + Ps2,1Ps1,3eλ2t
Ps1,2P
s
2,4e
λ1t − Ps2,2Ps1,4eλ2t −Ps1,2Ps2,3eλ1t + Ps2,2Ps1,3eλ2t
Ps1,3P
s
2,4e
λ1t − Ps2,3Ps1,4eλ2t −Ps1,3Ps2,3eλ1t + Ps2,3Ps1,3eλ2t
Ps1,4P
s
2,4e
λ1t − Ps2,4Ps1,4eλ2t −Ps1,4Ps2,3eλ1t + Ps2,4Ps1,3eλ2t

K(0)− K∗
n(0)− n∗
 (95)
Notably on impact t = 0 elements (2, 3) and (1, 4) 37are 0, and
elements (1, 3) and (2, 4) are 1. In other words states do not
move on impact, jump variables do, which is vital for the en-
dogenous productivity dynamics derived in the next section.
2.5 main result : capacity utilization
We use the theoretical results of section 2.4.3.1 to prove the en-
dogenous productivity dynamics of the system. As the theory
shows in the short run, the state variables, capital and number
of firms are predetermined, so they do not adjust immediately
when there is a shock. This can be seen from the solution to
the system, since at t = 0 the state variables equal their ini-
tial condition x0, whereas the controls change depending on
the eigenvectors. Labour is one of these free variables that will
jump instantaneously. The timing difference between immedi-
ate labour adjustment and slow capital and firm adjustment ex-
acerbate the capacity utilization effect which causes measured
productivity to exceed underlying productivity. Underlying
37 Which may first be simplified to Ps1,3P
s
2,3(e
λ2t − eλ1t) and Ps1,4Ps2,4(eλ1t − eλ2t)
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productivity is the steady state value P∗ defined in (35); it de-
pends on {A, ν, φ, ζ} and is independent of model variables.
Measured productivity P is productivity observed at any in-
stance.
In steady state firms have excess capacity. Since entry is a
slow process, a positive production shock prompts incumbent
firms to increase their capacity toward full capacity, making
better use of their fixed costs, which improves productivity. A
negative production shock causes firms to decrease their capac-
ity, further from full capacity, making less use of their fixed
costs and decreasing productivity. In the long run, firms will
exit until zero profit returns each firm to producing a long-run
level of output which is unchanged. Ignoring labour, with bet-
ter technology each firm will require less capital to produce the
long-run level. Hence capital per firm should fall.
Theorem 2.5.1 Measured Productivity Overshooting.
A change in technology causes a greater change in measured produc-
tivity than underlying productivity. There is overshooting.
∣∣∣∣dP(0)dA
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣dP∗dA
∣∣∣∣
Proof. (Full derivation Appendix B.9)
dP(0)
dA
− dP
∗
dA
=
(
ζ
1− ζ
) [
dP∗
dA
+
P∗FLLA
νF
]
(96)
= ζ
(
φ
A(1− (1− ζ)ν)
)1− 1ν (
1+
AFLLA
F
)
, ν < 1
(97)
87
2.5 main result : capacity utilization
The degree of measured productivity overshooting depends
on the level of industry competition ζ, the fixed cost of produc-
tion φ, and the response of endogenous labour LA. Marginal
cost returns to scale ν are less important as the proposition still
holds with constant returns to scale ν → 1. But notably, the re-
sult is undefined if there are constant returns and perfect com-
petition ζ = 0 since equilibrium cannot exist in the presence of
a fixed cost, returns are globally decreasing.
Corollary 2 Nature of Productivity Overshooting.
Imperfect competition, fixed costs in production and labour response
all reinforce the overshooting effect.
• Imperfect competition ζ > 0 is necessary for measured produc-
tivity overshooting, and overshooting is increasing in ζ. As
proof consider that if ζ = 0 then dP(0)dA =
dP∗
dA .
• Fixed cost φ > 0 necessary for productivity overshooting be-
cause it endogenously creates locally increasing returns to scale
that incumbent firms exploit on impact.
• Positive elasticity of labour term AFLLAF caused by endogenous
labour strengthens overshooting. This arises because labour
jumps immediately on impact, unlike the slow response of states.
A positive once-and-for-all technology shock immediately raises
output per firm. Firms do not have time to adapt, incumbents
absorb the new technology and produce more output given
their existing capital. Producing more reduces their excess ca-
pacity. Profits increase (pi is increasing in A). Over time capital
and number of firms adjust, returning production to y∗ and
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profits to zero. Capital per firm will fall because better technol-
ogy reduces the inputs needed to produce the fixed long-run
level y∗. Endogenous labour strengthens the impact response,
and causes more overshooting.
2.6 chapter summary
This chapter shows that non-instantaneous entry and exit of
firms to macroeconomic conditions causes endogenous produc-
tivity dynamics over the business cycle. The result is that pro-
ductivity shocks are amplified in the short run relative to their
long-run level.
We propose the theory through an endogenous firm entry
dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfect competi-
tion and endogenous entry costs. Imperfect competition creates
monopoly profits which cause “too many” entrants in steady
state. Each incumbent has excess capacity defined by the amount
it underproduces relative to a cost minimizing level of out-
put. Incumbents’ excess capacity varies in the short-run be-
cause firms cannot enter/exit so incumbents vary production
in response to economic shocks. Through increasing returns to
scale, variations in production, and therefore capacity utiliza-
tion, cause variations in firm productivity which aggregate to
the macroeconomy. The effect is ephemeral because over time
firms enter/exit which ameliorates the shock, causing incum-
bents to return to their original production.
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The next chapter extends this analysis to consider that firm
dynamics affect market competition which affects pricing markups
(unlike this chapter with fixed markups). The benefit of this ap-
proach is to add a long-run productivity narrative to the short-
run productivity dynamics studied hitherto.
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productivity with firm entry and endogenous markups
In this chapter I present a theory of firm entry and exit in the
business cycle that links short-run productivity overshooting
to long-run persistence, a dynamic observed in contemporary
‘productivity puzzles’. The theory emphasizes two mechanisms:
(1) slow firm entry/exit and (2) firm pricing that reflects the
number of competitors in the market. Given these mechanisms,
economic contraction causes a short-run exacerbated fall in pro-
ductivity (overshooting) because the negative shock is absorbed
by incumbents due to slow exit responses. This weakens incum-
bents’ returns to scale, thus worsening productivity. However,
the productivity overshooting recedes over time as firms exit
which dynamically reallocates resources among incumbents, re-
viving the remainders returns to scale and thus productivity.
This process of exit consolidating the market is not purely ben-
eficial for productivity because the remaining firms face fewer
competitors and thus charge higher markups which damages
productivity. Therefore despite some reversion from the initial
fall, there is a long-run persistent negative effect on productiv-
ity due to higher markups responding to the fall in number of
firms. To analyze the trade-off between productivity improving
dynamic reallocation and productivity degrading endogenous
markups, I develop a continuous time, analytically tractable
DGE model. The main mechanisms are dynamic entry so firms
are slow to respond causing initial overshooting, and endoge-
nous markups so pricing behaviour depends on the number of
competitors firms face.
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3.1 introduction
The chapter proposes a business cycle theory in which firm
entry and exit cause endogenous short-run and long-run pro-
ductivity movements. Interest in endogenous productivity over
the business cycle is high in light of Great Recession produc-
tivity puzzles1. The puzzles describe exacerbated productivity
falls with weak recovery, and are prominent in several Euro-
pean countries shown in figure 13a for labour productivity2.
The problem is especially pronounced in the UK, and empirical
studies (Barnett et al. 2014) find that up to half of the shortfall
in UK labour productivity relative to pre-crisis trend arose be-
cause of impaired resource allocation and unusually high firm
survival rates3. This evidence emphasizes the importance of
firm dynamics in explaining macroeconomic productivity, but
traditional macroeconomic theory nullifies entry by assuming
that the number of firms in an economy adjusts instantaneously
to arbitrage profits. If entry is instantaneous, it can only af-
fect productivity through an immediate change in the number
of competitors which affects pricing markups, but it ignores
the short-run effect of sluggish entry reallocating resources as
firms adjust to arbitrage profit. In this chapter I analyze the
1 The term has been used extensively in the media and academia e.g. The
Productivity Puzzle Under the Bonnet, The Economist, May 30, 2015; Bud-
get 2015: How do you solve the ‘productivity puzzle’?, BBC News, July 8,
2015
2 The source of both figures is Barnett et al. 2014 and they have been repro-
duced in the press e.g. Emily Cadman’s UK Productivity Puzzle: The Bank
of England’s Answers, Financial Times, August 14, 2014.
3 Goodridge, Haskel, and Wallis 2014 show that accounting for labour and
capital still leaves a TFP puzzle. I focus on TFP.
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new trade-off that emerges when noninstantaneous entry is
combined with competitive endogenous markups.
The main result is a theory to explain that shocks initially
exacerbate productivity movements but the exacerbation relin-
quishes as firm entry/exit adjusts. Crucially productivity never
regains long-run underlying productivity because of structural
changes in competition due to long-run changes in the number
of incumbents. To be clear, ‘entry’ is net entry, so when negative
it is exit. Therefore entry and exit the same process–they can-
not arise together. A contractionary shock will solely cause exit
(negative net entry); an expansionary shock will solely cause
entry (positive net entry). Hence the theory is a general ex-
planation of endogenous productivity over the business cycle,
with initially exacerbated and persistent positive productivity
effects associated with entry in expansion and exacerbated and
persistent negative productivity effects associated with exit in
contraction. Although general, Great Recession productivity
puzzles provide a contemporary view of the theory since they
depict a short-run exacerbated fall in productivity followed by
some persistence due to structural factors. Therefore my re-
sults provide a theory that combines the two hypotheses posed
by the Bank of England in figure 13b. I demonstrate that a
negative shock to the economy, modeled as a supply-side TFP
shock, is first absorbed by incumbent firms because exit can-
not arise initially. Therefore productivity falls drastically as the
incumbents output falls and they suffer worse returns to scale
(hypothesis I in figure 13b). Lower output per firms causes neg-
ative profits which leads to exit. As exit occurs productivity
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improves because resources are reallocated among incumbents
and better returns to scale improves productivty, as shown by
the hypothesis I reversion. However, this consolidation of re-
sources among fewer firms reduces the competitive pressure
on those who remain allowing them to charge higher markups.
Higher markups mean each unit sold generates more revenue
so that in a long-run zero profit equilibrium firms can produce
less to cover their fixed cost of production. By choosing to pro-
duce less their scale suffers which creates an offsetting negative
productivity effect that persists in equilibrium and hence links
to hypothesis II in figure 13b.
I develop a tractable model of dynamic (endogenous) firm
entry in the macroeconomy with imperfectly competitive prod-
uct markets that cause endogenous markups. Dynamic entry
means that firms slowly adjust to arbitrage profits, so short-
run profits are nonzero. This entry friction arises because a
congestion effect raises sunk entry costs as entry increases4. Im-
perfect competition creates a markup of factor prices above
their marginal products, and the markup is endogenous be-
cause it depends on the number of firms. The relationship is
negative and occurs because firms are large in their industry
so they strategically interact under Cournot competition. With
this model setup, I analyze the trade-off between endogenous
markups and dynamic reallocation. Endogenous markups cause
entry to increase productivity and exit to decrease productivity.
Dynamic reallocation causes entry to decrease productivity and
4 A familiar notion in industrial organization (IO) theory e.g. Ericson and
Pakes 1995
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(a) Cross-country Labour Productivity
(b) Productivity Puzzle Hypotheses
Figure 13.: Productivity Puzzles (Source Barnett et al. 2014)
exit to increase productivity. For example, with endogenous
markups exit (entry) weakens (strengthens) competition which
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raises (lowers) markups, thus decreases (increases) productiv-
ity. In opposition, dynamic reallocation means exit (entry) con-
centrates (dissipates) resources thus increasing (decreasing) in-
cumbents’ scale and therefore productivity. Dynamic realloca-
tion emphasises not the amount of resources, but their division
among firms. And entry determines this division. I analyze
measured productivity, which is an adjusted measure of total
factor productivity (TFP).
The model demonstrates procyclical profits, entry, employ-
ment and productivity, whereas markups are countercyclical.
For example, a positive shock to technology is initially borne
by incumbents who raise their output whilst entry is inert in
the short-run. Through greater scale incumbents’ productiv-
ity increases. However, by raising output incumbents accrue
monopoly profits, these non-zero profits incentivise potential
firms to begin entering. Entry reallocates resources and reduces
output per firm which diminishes scale and therefore produc-
tivity. The influx in entry diminishes profits and through con-
gestion raises the sunk entry cost which slows the rate of entry.
Eventually the profits from incumbency arbitrage to zero so en-
try ceases and zero incumbency profits are balanced with zero
sunk entry costs because there is no congestion. The long-run
effect of a rise in the number of incumbents is that competition
in the market is fiercer, so firms charge a lower markup. In or-
der to cover fixed costs, firms with lower markups must raise
revenue by increasing output, therefore in zero-profit (free-entry)
equilibrium firm scale is increased which means there is a long-
run permanent effect on productivity. In summary, the positive
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shock increases output, profit, employment (an input) and en-
try, whereas markups decrease because entry increases compe-
tition.
Formally the model follows a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans setup.
There is endogenous labour and capital, and the novel addi-
tions are firm entry and endogenous markups. A representa-
tive household chooses its consumption and labour exertion,
but the household is limited by a budget which consists of
labour income and investment income. Investment income con-
sists of returns on capital and returns on firm ownership (firm
profit). The return on capital is the economy’s risk-free rate,
which consequently determines the opportunity cost of invest-
ing in a firm. This balance between paying a cost to setup a firm
and investing that cost at the market rate binds firm entry. It is
a dynamic condition because sunk costs depend on the number
of entering firms (congestion effect). Hence in free entry equi-
librium5 profits are zero, so a household is indifferent between
creating a firm or investing that sunk cost at the risk free rate.
For example, if the value of incumbency exceeds the risk free
alternative, then there will be entry. Consequently congestion
will stifle start-ups and entry will slow. On the firm side of
the economy there is imperfect competition and generalized re-
turns to scale (U-shaped cost curves). All firms produce with
the same production function (firms are symmetric) which has
a fixed overhead cost and nondecreasing marginal cost. The
fixed overhead allows for imperfect competition which causes
5 The long-run equilibrium when firms have freely entered to arbitrage posi-
tive profits.
98
3.1 introduction
pricing markups. Firms are aggregated across two levels. The
lowest level of aggregation is the firm level, and aggregating
firms gives the industry level. The macroeconomy is the aggre-
gate across all industries. I focus on symmetric equilibria so an
industry is representative of the whole economy. Firms have
price setting power within their industry, but are small in the
aggregate economy. The influence of a firm on industry price
causes endogenous markups6. Within an industry firms strate-
gically interact with Cournot competition, so they maximise
profits by choosing output to produce. This output choice is in-
fluenced by the number of competitors in the industry. When
there are more competitors demand functions reflect a higher
elasticity of market demand and therefore weaker markup set-
ting power.
The model economy includes three core assumptions 1) en-
dogenous entry 2) returns to scale 3) endogenous markups. The
counterfactual of each assumption emphasizes its importance.
First, in the absence of endogenous entry there is instantaneous
free entry7. This counterfactual implies that there is no short-
run productivity effect as incumbent firms bear shocks.Second,
in the absence of increasing returns to scale, returns to scale
are constant. This counterfactual makes entry impotent be-
cause firms produce at the same productivity regardless of size.
Third, in the absence of endogenous markups, markups are
6 If a firm were small in its industry, markups would be fixed as in the status-
quo Dixit and Stiglitz 1977 case.
7 This is a limiting case of my model, as is the other extreme a fixed number
of firms.
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fixed. This counterfactual implies there is no persistent effect
on productivity because firms do not alter their markups.
Related Literature This chapter links Etro and Colciago 20108
to Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008. The first paper includes slug-
gish firm entry and endogenous markups, but does not discuss
productivity. Their contribution is to improve business cycle
moment-matching using Cournot and Bertrand strategic inter-
actions; I use Cournot which the authors advocate. The second
paper has endogenous markups and analyzes productivity, but
firm entry is instantaneous. Their contribution is to explain the
productivity effect of instantaneous entry on markups. This is
equivalent to the long-run effect that causes productivity persis-
tence in my chapter. My link combines endogenous entry with
endogenous markups to explain productivity over the business
cycle. The result is that endogenous entry distinguishes short-
run productivity dynamics from long-run productivity dynam-
ics.
The endogenous entry setup of this chapter follows Datta
and Dixon 2002 which is close to industrial organization litera-
ture by Das and Das 1997. Importantly this differs from most
recent endogenous entry literature that uses Bilbiie, Ghironi,
and Melitz 2012 (BGM)9. However, the interpretation of the two
approaches is analogous. Both endogenous entry formulation
reduce to an arbitrage condition that equates sunk entry costs
to incumbency profits. A strength of the Datta and Dixon 2002
8 Etro and Colciago 2010 also note that Cournot competition causes ineffi-
ciency through excess entry. Etro 2009 provides an excellent survey of
macroeconomic models with endogenous entry and endogenous market
structures.
9 For example, Lewis and Poilly 2012 and Etro and Colciago 2010.
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formulation is that dynamics stem from endogenous sunk costs,
rather than fixed sunk costs in BGM. These endogenous sunk
costs are called congestion effects since they increase as num-
ber of entrants (congestion) increases. It is then a lemma that
sunk entry costs equate to profit from incumbency, rather than
in BGM where this is assumed. The BGM setup is influential
in discrete time, simulation exercises10, whereas the model in
this chapter is continuous time and analytically tractable. BGM
distinguish entry from exit (exit is exogenous), whereas this
chapter treats them as symmetric. Entry measures the change
in the number of incumbent firms, so negative entry is exit.
Lewis 2009, Lewis and Poilly 2012, Lewis and Stevens 2015 and
Berentsen and Waller 2009 all recognise the importance of con-
gestion effects in macroeconomic models with entry.
An important distinction of this chapter is its focus on quali-
tative dynamical systems, rather than quantitative simulations
in the afforementioned works. This follows Brito and Dixon
2013. Rather than productivity, their focus is on theorems to
show that firm entry is sufficient for nonmonotone responses
to fiscal shocks. Excluding imperfect competition removes the
vital mechanism for generating increasing returns to scale that
are necessary for productivity dynamics. This mechanism is
present in Aloi and Dixon 2003 who use firm entry to explain
productivity in an open economy without capital or endoge-
nous markups. This mechanism between imperfect competi-
tion, increasing returns to scale and productivity is an estab-
10 And not limited to macroeconomics. Examples include Loualiche 2014 in
finance, Peters 2013 in growth and Hamano and Zanetti 2014 in macroeco-
nomics.
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lished explanation for procyclical productivity over the busi-
ness cycle (Hall 1989, Hall 1987, Caballero and Lyons 1992).
There are two competing formulations of endogenous markups.
There is a supply-side approach, used in this chapter, Etro and
Colciago 2010, Jaimovich 2007, and Jaimovich and Floetotto
2008. There is a demand-side approach used by Bilbiie, Ghi-
roni, and Melitz 2012. The supply-side approach relies on firms
strategically interacting which affects market demand. The
demand-side approach relies on consumers’ elasticity of sub-
stitution varying as product variety changes with entry. Lewis
and Poilly 2012 compare the methods. Empirical business cy-
cle literature shows many examples of countercylical markups.
A cornerstone work is Bils 1987, and there are many contribu-
tions by Rotemberg and Woodford surveyed in Rotemberg and
Woodford 1999. These traditional explanations of countercycli-
cal markups rely on price stickiness. Whereas, the study of
entry provides a new factor to enrichen markup countercyli-
cality. The idea stems from the ubiquity of the relationship in
empirical IO. For example Campbell and Hopenhayn 2005 find
a negative correlation between markups and entry in many sec-
tors of the US economy. In macroeconomics, Portier 1995 shows
that entry is procylical and markups countercyclical over the
French business cycle. Other empirical features that relate to
this chapter are procyclical productivity Rotemberg and Sum-
mers 1990, and procyclical net business formation Bergin and
Corsetti 2008. Lastly Brito, Costa, and Dixon 2013 model an
economy with endogenous markups that embeds both tradi-
tional Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and entry-driven
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supply-side markups. This shows that monopolistic competi-
tion is a special case of the endogenous markups framework
when there is only one firm per industry. They explore the crit-
ical bifurcation that arises as an economy moves from a contin-
uum of 1-firm industries competing under monopolistic compe-
tition to a continuum of multi-firm industries competing under
Cournot.
Roadmap – Section 3.2 explains the intuition behind the model.
Section 3.3 outlines a model of firm entry in the macroecon-
omy where firms compete with strategic interactions. Section
3.4 begins analysis by explaining how the competition effect of
entrants reducing markups affects factor prices and profits. Sec-
tion 3.5 investigates static outcomes showing that long-run out-
put and productivity are endogenous since they depend on the
number of operating firms. Section 3.6 is the main result which
presents a theorem to explain productivity puzzles, where pro-
ductivity overshoots on the impact of a shock, then relinquishes
but leaving some persistence.
3.2 intuition of excess capacity with short-run and
long-run capacity utilization
Before developing a complex dynamic model with endogenous
entry, imperfect competition and endogenous markups, a sim-
ple diagram can explain the intuition of how entry causes en-
dogenous and persistent productivity dynamics. Figure 14 shows
the cost curves and equilibria of a firm with increasing marginal
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Output
Costs
Overhead φ
MC AC
yIC yPC
excess cap.
Short Run: Slow entry
improves capacity as
incumbents bear positive
shock
SR
Long Run: Competition
improves capacity as
incumbents lower markup
LR
Figure 14.: Excess Capacity, Short-run and Long-run Utilization
costs and a U-shaped average cost due to a fixed overhead cost
φ. Under imperfect competition a firm produces yIC11 which
is less than the perfect competition outcome yPC, which is also
the efficient outcome as it minimizes costs. The difference be-
tween yIC and yPC is excess capacity12 (labelled), and utilizing
excess capacity lowers costs which improves firm productiv-
ity and in turn aggregate productivity. With an entry mech-
anism the underproduction of each firm in imperfect compe-
tition corresponds to excess entry. This means ther are ‘too
many’ firms each underproducing, so a more efficient outcome
is fewer firms but each producing more, hence with yIC closer
to minimium cost yPC.
11 This is the long-run Chamberlin-Robinson equilibrium in which marginal
revenue equals marginal cost and profits are zero. I omit the MR and MC
curves for clarity, and I assume the curves have fully shifted following any
shock.
12 Macroeconomists should note this definition of excess capacity which fol-
lows Vives 1999. It is distinct from capital utilization or any form of input
intensity.
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If there is a positive shock to the economy, and entry is slow
(endogenous), then that shock is initially borne by the incum-
bents so they utilize capacity and costs lower. A move from
yIC to point SR in the diagram. This indicates an immediate
increase in productivity in aggregate. But in this new position,
incumbents earn monpoly profits which attracts entrants. Over
time entrants move into the market, gradually reducing the ca-
pacity of incumbents so excess capacity rises back towards the
initial level, finally halting at a position like LR where profits
are zero again. This mechanism corresponds to the gradual
amelioration of the initial boost in productivity as firms adjust.
The final part of the story is most important, because it explains
why although the initial drastic effect subsides there is still
some long-run effect on productivity, so output per firm returns
to LR rather than initial yIC. As firms enter to arbitrage profit to
zero they must now each produce more yLR > yIC because the
positive shock encouraged entry (raised the number of competi-
tors) which put downward pressure on markups. Therefore in
long-run zero profit equilibrium firms charge lower markups
than in the initial pre-shock position. Consequently each in-
cumbent must raise revenue by increasing output to cover the
costs of production φ and attain zero profit. So overall there
is a small fall in costs per firm due to capacity utilization, and
thus a small but persistent improvement in productivity after
the initial positive shock.
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3.3 endogenous entry model with imperfect com-
petition and endogenous markups
The model follows a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans setup. Additions
are imperfect competition, firm entry, endogenous markups
and capital accumulation. The model is deterministic, and
labour is endogenous. There are two state variables: capital
and number of firms (K, n) ∈ M ⊆ R2, where M is the state
space of the control problem that later forms a subset of the gen-
eral dynamical system state (or phase) space. I solve the model
as a decentralised equilibrium because imperfect competition
distorts the optimising behaviour of the firm.
Definition 6 Notation and Terminology.
Yx denotes the derivative of Y with respect to X, except when X = t
which denotes time dependence. For clarity I usually omit the (t) no-
tation that denotes time dependence in ordinary differential equations
(ODEs). To be clear, the primitive endogeneous model variables are
C(t), e(t), K(t), n(t), defined later. They are the state variables of the
four dimensional dynamical system which forms the model economy.
The four states depend on time and therefore so do functions of them
L(t), r(t), w(t),pi(t), Y(t), y(t), µ(t),P(t),Π(t), Z(t). Time depen-
dence is irrelevant in steady state, which I denote with an asterix Y∗.
Also for clarity, I often suppress function domains. For example, after
first introduction F : K× L→ R is written F rather than F(K, L).
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3.3.1 Firm
In the economy there is a continuum of sectors of measure one.
In each industry, there is a finite number of intermediate firms
that each produce a homogenenous good. Since the goods are
homogeneous, they are perfectly substitutable in the produc-
tion of an industry good. However, at the next level of aggre-
gation, industry goods are imperfect substitutes for eachother
when aggregated into a final good. Entry and exit of firms into
existing sectors occurs until profits are zero. This does not hap-
pen immediately but occurs in the long run. This is known as
the free entry equilibrium. In the short-run profits will diverge
from zero as they are arbitraged by entrants. Perfect factor mar-
kets mean that each firm faces the same price w for labour and
r for capital, and the result is that aggregate capital and labour
are divided equally among firms k = Kn and l =
L
n . A lowercase
letter denotes per firm, so output per firm y = Yn .
A fixed cost in production allows firms to compete under
imperfect competition in the product market. Strategic interac-
tions occur under imperfect competiton because firms are large
in their industry so can influence industry price. This is why
markups are endogenous (depend on number of incumbent
firms), rather than fixed in the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz monop-
olistic competition case where firms are small therefore do not
affect industry price level (in fact this is a special case of my en-
dogenous markup model where there is one firm per industry).
I focus on Cournot competition so firms strategically interact
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through their choice of output to maximise profits given the be-
haviour of others. The form of strategic interaction determines
the markup of factor price above marginal cost. Specifically
I focus on the level of factor price markup above the factor
marginal product. That is the markup of wage above marginal
product of labour and interest rate above marginal product of
capital.
It is important to note that in this chapter the measure of
market power is the markup µ which is price over marginal
cost PMC which rises from unitary under perfect competition
to infinity under market dominance. Whereas, in the previous
chapter our measure of market power was the Lerner Index
ζ, the difference in price and marginal cost as a proportion of
price P−MCP . Therefore the relationship is µ =
1
1−ζ . The Lerner
Index was useful because it bound market power between (0, 1)
which eased taking limits. The change in focus here keeps the
chapter comparable to literature on endogenous markups such
as Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008 and Lewis and Poilly 2012.
Final output Y is produced by a competitive firm using the
output of a continuum of industries (aka intermediate goods or
sectors) Qj for j ∈ [0, 1] as inputs in a CES production function
with constant elasticity of substitution θI ∈ (0,∞).
Y(t) =
(∫ 1
0
Qj(t)
θI−1
θI dj
) θI
θI−1
, θI ∈ (0, 1) (98)
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Cost minimization leads to conditional demand for industry j
Qj(t) =
(
Pj
P
)−θI
Y (99)
Thus the inverse demand function is Pj =
(
Qj
Y
)− 1θI P. Substi-
tuting the conditional industry demand (99) into the aggregate
production function (98) gives the aggregate price index
P =
(∫ 1
0
P1−θIj dj
) 1
1−θI
(100)
Notice that perfect competition in the final goods market re-
quires equality of price and marginal cost P.
Assumption 5 Firm Production with U-shaped Average Cost
Curve.
Firms are symmetric, so each has the same production technology. The
ith firm in the jth industry produces output:
yj,i(t) := max{AF(k j,i(t), lj,i(t))− φ, 0} (101)
where F : R2+ ⊇ (k, l)→ R+ is a firm production function with con-
tinuous partial derivatives which is homogenous of degree ν ∈ (0, 1)
(hod-ν) on the open cone R2+, and φ ∈ R+ a fixed cost denominated
in output. The Hessian matrix of F has a symmetric main diagonal
(Young’s theorem), negative mixed derivatives (off-diagonal), and its
determinant is positive so the concavity properties are
Fkl = Flk > 0, Fkk, Fll < 0, FkkFll − F2kl > 0
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Inada’s conditions hold so that marginal products of capital and labour
are strictly positive which rules out corner solutions.
Fk, Fl > 0
Although we shall focus on the case of U-shaped average
costs many of our calculations hold without loss of general-
ity for several cases. Appendix C.6.1 solves the firms static
cost minimization problem from which these conclusions are
deducible.
• φ > 0, ν ∈ (0, 1) U-Shaped average cost and increasing
marginal cost curve compatible with imperfect and per-
fect competition.
• φ = 0, ν = 1 Constant returns and no fixed cost so glob-
ally constant returns to scale. Average cost and marginal
cost are equivalent.
• φ > 0, ν = 1 A fixed cost with constant marginal cost
leads to globally decreasing average cost.
• φ > 0 and ν ∈ (1,∞) Both average and marginal costs
are increasing, so there are globally increasing returns to
scale. The extent to which ν exceeds 1 is bounded.
Notice that we view number of firms as a factor of produc-
tion F(k, l) = F
(K
n ,
L
n
)
= n−νF(K, L). It is essentially a measure
of organization which captures how resources are divided. The
production function with a fixed cost and decreasing returns
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to scale cause a U-shaped average cost curve. Decreasing re-
turns to scale arise because the variable production function
F : R2+ ⊇ (k, l) → R+ is convex, ν ∈ (0, 1), in capital and
labour which causes increasing marginal cost. The fixed cost φ
creates a nonconvexity which prevents some firms producing
because an active firm must sell at least enough to cover the
fixed cost. The fixed cost occurs each period, and is different
to the sunk entry cost which is paid once to enter (see Entry
Section 3.3.1.3)13. A ∈ [1,∞) is a scale parameter reflecting the
productivity level. It may be interpreted as total factor produc-
tivity (TFP). In Section 3.5.1.1 we derive measured productivity
which is a function of TFP that captures the fixed cost and re-
turns to scale effect. Since the average cost curve is U-shaped,
there is an efficient level of production at minimum average
cost, where average cost and marginal cost intersect. This is the
Walrasian outcome that would arise under perfect competition.
3.3.1.1 Strategic Interactions and Endogenous Markups
Within each industry j there is Cournot monopolisitc competi-
tion among a set I(j) of n(j) ∈ (1,∞) firms. So the represen-
tative ith firm in industry j chooses output to maximise profits
subject to the inverse demand function implicit in (99) and the
quantities yj,i′ supplied by other firms i′ ∈ I(j) \ i. It takes as
given the quantitiy of final output Y produced by the competi-
tive sector, the aggregate price level P of the intermediate sector
13 As in Jaimovich 2007 and Rotemberg and Woodford 1996 the role of this pa-
rameter is to reproduce the apparent absence of pure profits despite market
power. It allows zero profits in the presence of market power.
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(it cannot influence this price level) and the factor market prices
w and r. Therefore it solves
max
(y(j,i),li,ki)
P
(
(yi +∑i′ yi′)
Y
)− 1θI
yi − rki − wli (102)
s.t. yj,i(t) 6 AF(k j,i(t), lj,i(t))− φ (103)
Each firm’s technology is symmetric with respect to interme-
diate inputs that are shared equally due to perfect factor mar-
kets k = Kn and l =
L
n . The result is a symmetric equilibrium
outcome, so we can drop i, j indexes and focus on a single rep-
resentative industry as the whole economy.
Proposition 3 Markups are Endogenous.
Under symmetric equilibrium the first order conditions of the firms
profit maximising problem lead to a markup µ(n(t)) ∈ (1,∞) of
price above marginal cost.
µ(n(t)) =
θIn(t)
θIn(t)− 1 (104)
Where θI ∈ (1,∞) is intersectoral substitutability
Lemma 1 Markup Decreasing in Entry.
The markup is endogenous and decreasing in the number of firms
µn = − θI(θIn−1)2 < 0.
The negativity of the derivative of the markup with respect to
number of firms captures the competition effect of entry lower-
ing markup. When there are many firms in the industry n→ ∞,
the markup disappears µ → 1 so price equals marginal cost
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which is the perfect competition outcome. The opposing limit
n = 1 is the monopolistic competition special case.
Corollary 3 Fixed Monopolistic Competition Markup Special
Case.
If n(t) = 1 then the economy is populated by a continuum of one firm
industries each producing a differentiated product and the resulting
fixed markup is the well-known monopolistic competition case (Dixit
and Stiglitz 1977).
µ¯ =
θI
θI − 1 (105)
It is clear that the Dixit-Stiglitz case is an upper bound on the markup.
Therefore endogenous markups will always be lower than the fixed
markup case.
µ(n) 6 µ¯
In this chapter, the most important feature of the endogenous
markup is that it is decreasing in n. However, there are a num-
ber of ways to make the markup more complicated by assum-
ing substitutability in industry rather than the homogeneous
goods I have, or changing Cournot competition to Bertrand.
This leads to various forms of markup that rely on both intra-
and inter- sectoral substitutability and therefore provide useful
extra degrees of freedom in numerical exercises like Jaimovich
2007 and Etro and Colciago 2010. However, despite possible ad-
ditions all these papers’ markups embody the key feature of a
competition effect. In fact, like other theory papers Dos Santos
Ferreira and Dufourt 2006 I shall later set θI = 1, so the markup
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is only in terms of n. This is equivalent to a Cobb-Douglas ag-
gregator of industry level goods.
An optimizing firm’s choice of labour and capital correspond
to an imperfectly competitive factor market equilibrium such
that the price of a factor does not reflect its marginal product.
Proposition 4 Factor Market Equilibrium.
Under symmetric inter and intra-industrial equilibrium the optimal
price setting rules are a markup of firms’ marginal products.
AFk(k(t), l(t)) = µ(n)r(t) (106)
AFl(k(t), l(t)) = µ(n)w(t) (107)
The marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) AFk
µ(n) equates
to the price of capital and the MRPL AFl
µ(n) equals to the price of
labour. As markups increase the marginal revenue from an ad-
ditional unit of production is less. Because the MRPs are non-
monotone functions of nt there is the possibility of multiple
equilibria. Different numbers of firm cause the factor market
relationship to hold. I do not investigate these implications,
instead I assume a unique solution.
3.3.1.2 Profit
Operating profit pi(t) : (K, L, n) → R is the profit of an in-
cumbent firm in a given period. Operating profits exclude the
one-time sunk entry cost that is included in aggregate profits,
discussed after we cover the entry process.. Therefore operat-
ing profit of a firm is pi(t) := y(t)− r(t)k(t) + w(t)l(t) and by
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substituting in factor prices and using Euler’s homogeneous
function theorem we get profit under imperfect competition14
pi(L, K, n; A, φ) =
(
1− ν
µ(n(t))
)
AF(k, l)− φ (108)
Profit is increasing in the markup and is greater than the perfect
competition case of µ→ 1. Profits are nonzero in the short run,
but in long-run steady state we shall see they are zero (Section
3.5).
3.3.1.3 Firm Entry
I use the entry setup developed in Datta and Dixon 2002. The
process of entry determines the number of firms n(t) and the
amount of entry e(t) in a period. It is important to empha-
size that ‘entry’ is ‘net entry’, so it measures the change in the
stock of firms. If the stock of firms increases then net entry is
positive so there has been entry, whereas if the stock of firms
decreases then net entry is negative so there has been exit. This
emphasizes that entry is a single symmetric process incorporat-
ing both entry and exit, and they cannot occur together. This
is unlike papers that treat entry and exit as different processes.
For example recent macroeconomics literature models a pro-
cess of firm creation (entry), but treats exit as a fixed exogenous
process (analogous to depreciation of capital). The importance
of this point is that a positive shock to the economy will always
14 Rearranging the profit function gives the income identity which makes it
clearer how markups enter output per firm and is equivalent to the pro-
duction approach as follows y(t) := r(t)k(t) + w(t)l(t) + pi(t) = AFl
µ(n(t)) l +
AFk
µ(n(t)) k+
(
1− ν
µ(n(t))
)
AF− φ = νAF
µ(n(t)) +
(
1− ν
µ(n(t))
)
AF− φ = AF− φ =
y(t).
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cause solely entry and a negative shock solely exit. I shall fo-
cus on negative exit-inducing shocks, but the inverse argument
would hold for positive shocks.
An endogenous sunk entry cost and an entry arbitrage con-
dition determine the number of firms operating at time t. The
sunk entry cost increases with the the number of entrants, and
the arbitrage condition equates sunk cost with incumbency prof-
its. Das and Das 1997 term the endogenous sunk cost an entry
adjustment cost; in macroeconomics, Lewis 2009 and Berentsen
and Waller 2009 use the term congestion effect, since more en-
trants cause congestion in entry that increases the sunk cost.
The justification for congestion effects is that resources used to
setup a firm are in inelastic supply, so that more entrants raises
competition for the resources and therefore increases sunk cost.
For example, when introducing a new product, if more firms
are entering there is a negative entry externality because it is
more costly to differentiate a product. Additionally to evidence
for entry externalities and their prevalence in industrial organi-
zation literature, the assumption provides an analytical frame-
work to study short-run dynamics away from steady state. It is
the sunk entry cost that prevents instantaneous adjustment of
firms to steady state15.
15 The entry adjustment costs theory is analogous to capital adjustment cost
models which recognise that investment (deinvestment) in capital is more
costly for larger investment (deinvestment). The cost of investment depends
on level of investment which is the flow of capital; analogously, the cost of
entry depends of the level of entry which is the flow of no. firms. See Stokey
2008 for a modern account of capital adjustment costs.
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Assumption 6 Sunk Entry Cost (congestion effect).
Sunk entry cost q ∈ R increases with the number of entrants n˙ in t.
q(t) = γn˙, γ ∈ (0,∞) (109)
Entry and exit are symmetric for simplicity. A prospective
firm pays sunk cost q to enter, and an incumbent firm pays −q
to exit. When firms are exiting n˙ < 0 =⇒ q < 0, hence
−q > 0 so the cost of exit is positive. The congestion parame-
ter γ is the marginal cost of entry, and its bounds are the two
well-known cases: less sensitivity to congestion limγ→0 q(t) im-
plies instantaneous free entry, and more congestion sensitivity
limγ→∞ q(t) implies fixed number of firms. An extension of the
sunk cost assumption to have a fixed cost and the congestion
effect, where the fixed cost is paid regardless of the number of
entering firms. This setup is closer to Das and Das 1997, and
captures the classic case of fixed sunk costs as in Hopenhayn
1992a and Jovanovic 1982, but leads to multiple equilibria in
our setup.
The congestion effect assumption is common in industrial
organization literature, and has growing support in macroeco-
nomics. Mata and Portugal 1994 show empirically that firm fail-
ure and industry entry rates are positively correlated, and the-
oretically Das and Das 1997 and Ericson and Pakes 1995 both
assume sunk entry costs that rise with number of entrants16.
The intuition for congestion is that there is more competition
16 Ericson and Pakes 1995 assume the sunk cost is non-decreasing in num-
ber of entrants. The assumption includes the simple case of fixed cost not
responding to entrants, which they assume in the numerical exercise.
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for a fixed resource needed to setup. For example, many firms
entrants raise initial advertising costs to make consumers aware
of the product. If many firms are entering there will be many
startup advertising campaigns vying for attention. Congestion
effects are also called ”entry adjustment costs”. In macroeco-
nomics, Lewis 2009 uses a VAR analysis to show that conges-
tion effects in entry weaken the volatility of entry responses
which can improve model fit. Both Lewis and Poilly 2012 and
Berentsen and Waller 2009 model congestion effects in a DSGE
model. They differ slightly to our setup because entry reduces
the probability of survival, for example by reducing the likeli-
hood of a sale.
Similarly to Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz 2012 (BGM) the cru-
cial equation that binds entry is an arbitrage condition between
returns to entry and the opportunity cost. Despite the litera-
ture’s differing approaches to attaining endogenous entry (such
as congestion sunk cost), all models of this theme ultimately re-
duce to a condition which equates profits from incumbency to
the outside option.
Assumption 7 Entry Arbitrage (intertemporal zero profit).
The return to paying a sunk costs q to enter and receiving profits
equals the return from investing the cost of entry at the market rate
r(t).
q˙(t) + pi(t) = r(t)q(t) (110)
Therefore there is an intertemporal zero profit condition that im-
plies expected profits of an entrant are always zero; if they were
118
3.3 model with endogenous markups
ever non-zero, a firm would revise entry to a more profitable
time. The zero-profit condition is dynamic rather than static.
In the static case current profits, rather than expected future
profits, are instantaneously zero (e.g. Jaimovich and Floetotto
2008), so the value of the firm equates to current profits.
Together the congestion effect assumption 6 and arbitrage
assumption 7 form a second-order ODE in number of firms
γn¨(t)− r(t)γn˙(t) + pi(t) = 0 (111)
The equation states that if profits are high, then to maintain
zero the cost of entry is also high because there will be many
entering firms. By defining entry, this second-order ODE is
separable into two first-order ODEs
Definition 7 Net Entry and Exit.
Entry (or exit) is measured by the change in the stock of firms, there-
fore it is net entry, which if negative is called exit.
e(t) = n˙ (112)
Therefore the model of industry dynamics which determines
the number of firms is two ODEs
n˙(t) = e(t) (113)
e˙(t) = −pi(t)
γ
+ r(t)e(t), γ ∈ (0,∞) (114)
With entry defined as the change in number of firms (112),
the arbitrage condition’s (114) interpretation depends on the
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rate of change of entry e˙(t), which is acceleration in number of
firms n¨(t). For example the rate of entry is increasing e˙ > 0
if the outside option r(t)e(t) exceeds the profit from entering
pi(t)
γ . This is because when households invest in the more at-
tractive outside option, as opposed to setting up firms, the cost
of setting up a firm falls because there is less congestion. The
result is an increase in the amount of entry. Initially, it is coun-
terintuitive that the rate of entry decreases with profits, but
this captures that when profits are high entry is high, so via
congestion the cost of entry is high, and thus the rate of entry
slows. The dynamic sunk cost causes firms to respond over-
time rather than immediately. Intuitively a firm cannot instan-
taneously know its cost of entry. A propspective entrant must
wait an instance in order to observe the amount of entry and
therefore its sunk cost. Consider the contradiction that entry
cost is fixed so observable in an instance, q(t) = γ ∀t. In which
case the second-order ODE that dictate industry dynamics be-
comes static pi = rγ, so there is no dynamic entry. Rather
than the intertemporal zero-profit condition, there is an instan-
taneous alignment of current profit and opportunity cost. As
shown in Datta and Dixon 2002 an implication of the model is
that net present value of the firm (stock market value) equates
to the sunk entry costs. In this sense the model is equivalent
to BGM’s approach, except the advantage here is that efficient
stock market value is a corollary whereas in BGM it is assumed
and then firms dynamics follow.
The aggregation of the sunk costs paid by entering firms
leads to a deadweight loss that is not accounted for in operat-
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ing profits pi(t) (which are period by period profits). Therefore
aggregate profits must account for each firm’s operating profits,
less the aggregate sunk cost of entry. Based on the congestion
effect assumption 6, if net entry is 0 then cost of entry is 0, for
the next firm entering in that instance the cost now rises by an
increment γ, and so on for each additional entrant up to the
final eth entrant in that time instance. Therefore the aggregate
deadweight loss of entry Z(t) ∈ R is
Z(t) = γ
∫ e(t)
0
i di = γ
e(t)2
2
(115)
Therefore aggregating all n firms operating profits and deduct-
ing the deadweight loss gives
Π(t) = n(t)pi(t)− Z(t) (116)
Π = n
[
AF(k, l)
(
1− ν
µ(n)
)
− φ
]
− γ e(t)
2
2
(117)
Aggregate profits are an important factor driving capital in-
vestment K˙. Ceteris paribus entry reduces aggregate profits.
It increases the aggregate sunk costs of entry, and diminishes
supernormal operating profits through the competition effect
lowering markups. Further, this heightened effect of entry on
profits will reduce the amount of entry and therefore reduce
the size of the aggregate sunk entry cost.
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3.3.2 Household
In the economy there is a continuum of identical households.
This identical household chooses its future series of consump-
tion {C(t)}∞0 ∈ R and labour supply {L(t)}∞0 ∈ [0, 1] to max-
imise lifetime utility U : R2 → R. We assume u : R× [0, 1]→ R
is jointly concave and differentiable in both of its arguments. It
is strictly increasing in C and strictly decreasing in L. A house-
hold’s choice of consumption and labour is contrained by a
its budget constraint which accrues capital income, labour in-
come and profit income. The household owns capital K ∈ R
and takes equilibrium rental rate and wage r, w ∈ R as given.
Similarly they own firms and take profits as given Π ∈ R+.
The household maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint
rearranged to the law of motion of capital (119). The budget
constraint shows that income is earned from capital income,
labour income and profit from owning firms and it is spent on
consumption or investment in more capital.
U : =
∞∫
0
u(C(t), 1− L(t))e−ρtdt (118)
s.t. K˙(t) = rK(t) + wL(t) +Π(t)− C(t) (119)
The optimization conditions from the problem reduce to three17:
an intertemporal consumption Euler equation (120), an intratem-
17 Appendix C.1 derives the Hamiltonian and 6 associated Pontryagin condi-
tions.
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poral labour-consumption trade-off (121) and the resource con-
straint (119).
C˙(t) =
C(t)
σ(C(t))
(r(t)− ρ), (120)
w(t) = − uL(L(t))
uC(C(t))
(121)
where σ represents risk aversion σ(C(t)) = −C(t)uCC(C(t))uC(C(t)) . To
complete the solution for the boundary value problem, we im-
pose two transversality conditions on the upper boundary and
an initial condition on the lower boundary.
lim
t→∞K(t)e
−ρt > 0, lim
t→∞K(t)λ(t)e
−ρt = 0, K0 = K(0) (122)
This completes the unique solution for the boundary value prob-
lem that characterizes the optimal path of consumption and
labour: three variables (C, K, n), three equations (119)-(121),
three boundary conditions (122).
In general equilibrium these equations hold and boundary
conditions hold, with factor prices and profit determined en-
dogenously from factor market equilibrium r, w,Π : C × K ×
n→ R+.
3.3.3 Canonical Model in General Equilibrium
Combining the equilibrium conditions from the household and
the firm side of the economy defines the model economy as a
four dimensional dynamical system that determines consump-
tion, entry, capital and number of firms (C, e, K, n). Importantly
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labour supply L does not enter the system as an independent
variable because it can be defined in terms of C, K, n by com-
bining household intratemporal equilibrium condition with the
factor market equilibrium from the firm problem. By under-
standing the trajectories of labour, we can trace how the competi-
tion effect of entry reducing markups affects the model through
factor price equilibrium and consequently profits.
Proposition 5 General Equilibrium labour Supply.
Consumption reduces labour supply, whereas capital and number of
firms increase labour supply L(C−, K+, n+)
LC(C, K, n) < 0, LK(C, K, n) > 0, Ln(C, K, n) > 0
Proof. The effects arise through combining factor market equi-
librium (107), which determines wage, with the intratemporal
condition (121), which determines consumption-labour choice.
Then by the implicit function theorem differentiate the intratem-
poral condition with labour defined implicitly by L(C, K, n).
Derivations in appendix C.2.
For capital the important determinant of the sign of labour
response is labour marginal product which influences wage.
Capital complements labour, so a rise in capital improves the
marginal product of labour which consequently raises wage
and labour supply. Consumption decreases in labour supply
because additional consumption reduces the marginal utility
of consumption so the value of consumption declines, thus re-
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ducing labour to support consumption (in other words leisure–
inverse labour–becomes more attractive.)
The effect of entry on labour supply is more complex because
it has an effect on markups too. The effect will feed through to
the wage response to entry in section 3.4.
Corollary 4 Endogenous Markups Increase Labour Response
to Entry.
Endogenous markups strengthen the labour response to entry relative
to fixed markup (µ¯) case
Ln > Lµ¯n (123)
Proof. (µ(n) domain supressed.)
Ln =
uC AFlµ−1(µnµ−1 − (1− ν)n−1)
uLL + uC An−1Fllµ−1
Consider the case of a fixed exogenous markup then µn = 0
Entry (a rise in n) increases labour supply because it raises
marginal product of labour and in turn wage (labour fixed).
Wage rises because labour per firm falls which increases its
marginal product due to decreasing returns ν < 0. With con-
stant returns there is no effect Ln = 0 as firms employ labour
at equal productivity regardless of size. However with endoge-
nous markups this does not hold, as even with constant returns
there is the negative effect, µnµ−1, which captures that a lower
markup increases marginal revenue product of labour. Since
this effect of entry diminishing markup brings wage inline with
marginal product, it increases labour. Later we shall term this
the competition effect, and the first effect due to returns to scale
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will be the allocation effect. When we analyse wage behaviour
we shall see this extra markup effect will strengthen the labour
effect on wage which creates downward pressure, but is offset
by the direct effect of lower markup bringing wage closer to
marginal product.
An interesting implication of Corollary 4 is that entry and
labour supply are positively related. Vice-versa, exit leads to a
fall in labour supply. In this chapter, we investigate the influ-
ence of entry on measured productivity, whereas much empiri-
cal discussion is based on labour productivity. The result shows
that our model encapsulates labour productivity arguments as
a specific case. For example, if there is a negative shock to the
economy, to which firm exit does not respond instantaneously,
labour supply will be buoyed which worsens labour productiv-
ity. Only when firms exit will employment begin to fall which
will raise the productivity of remaining labour.
Definition 8 General Equilibrium.
Competitive equilibrium is the equilibrium paths of aggregate quanti-
ties and prices {C(t), L(t), K(t), n(t), e(t), w(t), r(t)}∞t=0, with prices
strictly positive, such that {C(t), L(t)}∞t=0 solve the household prob-
lem. {K(t)}∞t=0 satisfies the law of motion for capital. Labour and
capital {L(t), K(t)}∞t=0 maximise firm profits given factor prices. The
flow of entry causes the arbitrage condition on entry to hold (price
of entry equals net present value of incumbency). State variables
{K(t), n(t)}∞t=0 satisfy transversality. Factor prices are set accord-
ing to factor market equilibrium (107) and ensure goods and factor
markets clear.
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The dynamic equilibrium conditions from the previous sec-
tion are the capital accumulation equation, the number of firms
definition, the consumption Euler, and the entry arbitrage con-
dition.
Definition 9 Nonlinear System.
The dynamical system defines at a point in time t ∈ R the state of the
system (C(t), e(t), K(t), n(t)) = x(t) ∈ X ⊆ R4 described by a C1
vector valued transition map g : R5+P ⊇ X×R×Ω −→ R4. The
parameterization (φ, ν,γ, ρ) is defined on an open set Ω ∈ RP
The system is
K˙ = Y(t)− γ
2
e(t)2 − C(t), Y = n(F(k, l)− φ) (124)
n˙ = e(t) (125)
C˙ =
C(t)
σ(C)
(r(t)− ρ), σ(C) = −CuCC
uC
(126)
e˙ = r(t)e(t)− pi(t)
γ
, pi = AF(k, l)(1− ν
µ
)− φ (127)
where factor prices
r =
AFk(k, l)
µ(n)
, w =
AFl(k, l)
µ(n)
(128)
Substituting in factor prices, profits and output which are all
in terms of (C, K, n) and noting that by the intratemporal condi-
tion and wage equilibrium L is implicitly defined as L(C, K, n)
the model economy is a system of four ODEs in consumption,
entry, capital, number of firms (C, e, K, n). Also by Euler’s ho-
mogeneous function theorem note F(k, l) = n−νF(K, L) and
Fk(k, l) = n1−νFK(K, L). This gives a more primitive descrip-
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tion of the system, with less economic intuition, but easier to
understand the underlying dynamics.
K˙ = n(An−νF(K, L(C, K, n))− φ)− γ
2
e2 − C (129)
n˙ = e (130)
C˙ = − uC
uCC
(
An1−νFK(K, L(C, K, n))
µ(n)
− ρ
)
(131)
e˙ =
An1−νFK(K, L(C, K, n))e
µ(n)
−
An−νF(K, L(C, K, n))(1− ν
µ(n))− φ
γ
(132)
3.4 competition effect on factor prices and profit
The competition effect enters the model through factor market
equilibrium affecting factor prices r and w and in turn affecting
profit pi. After outlining these mechanisms in this section, the
following section on steady state analysis shows that the mech-
anism propagates to long-run outcomes, where it raises output
per firm and productivity.
Definition 10 Competition Effect of Entry/Exit.
The competition effect is caused by entry’s effect on markups. That
is, the markup µ(n(t)) decreases in the number of firms competing
µn < 0. This was shown in lemma 1. The competition effect is zero
with exogenous markups µ¯n = 0.
Definition 11 Allocation Effect of Entry/Exit.
The allocation effect is that entry and exit alter the allocation of re-
sources (capital and labour) among firms. This affects scale of pro-
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duction, which is important due to decreasing returns to scale in pro-
duction. Entry causes ‘business stealing’ reducing inputs per firm,
whereas exit causes ‘business consolidation’ raising inputs per firm.
There are three effects of an entering firm on factor prices,
and analogous three effects on operating profits which are a
function of factor prices and form a key result (proposition 6).
wn =
A
µ(n)
[
(1− ν)n−νFL + n1−νFLLLn − n
1−νFL
µ
µn
]
Q 0
(133)
rn =
A
µ(n)
[
(1− ν)n−νFK + n1−νFKLLn − n
1−νFK
µ
µn
]
> 0
(134)
The three effects are a positive allocation effect, an ambiguous
labour effect and a positive competition effect. The allocation
effect captures that an extra firm reduces per firm allocation
of inputs, but raises aggregate number of firms. The reduc-
tion in labour or capital per firm raises their marginal prod-
uct and therefore price due to returns to scale. Hence with
constant returns ν = 0 the effect is not present. The labour
effect captures that entry increases labour supply and there-
fore lowers wage or raises interest rate. Lastly the competition
effect that arises from endogenous markups µn < 0 captures
that an extra firm increases competition and lowers markups
which raises the marginal revenue product of labour (capital)
and so wage (interest rate) must increase to maintain equilib-
rium. The interest rate response (134) is unambiguous because
the labour effect is positive since labour complements capital,
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so it raises marginal product of capital. However in the wage
result (133) this same labour effect is negative which creates
an ambiguity because extra labour (caused by entry) reduces
the marginal product of labour so depresses wages. Despite us
showing in corollary 4 that the labour effect is stronger with en-
dogenous markups, there is the offsetting positive wage effect
that endogenous markups reduce the disparity between wage
an marginal product (competition effect), which is reasonable
to assume dominates the second-order effect on labour supply.
Furthermore labour marginal product is buoyed by entry di-
viding resources among more firms (allocation effect). I merely
acknowledge that entry and the surge in labour it creates can
detriment marginal product of labour to the extent that wage
indeed falls.
Profits are increasing in markups, which adds an extra effect
of a firm entering the market. The result is that profits diminish
faster, than if markups were fixed.
Proposition 6 Entry Effect on Profits.
Entry has two negative effects on operating profit.
pin =
A
µ
[
(µ− ν)
(
−νn−ν−1F + n−νFLLn
)
+
νn−νF
µ
µn
]
< 0
(135)
Proof. By substituting in Ln it can be shown that the negative
scale effect dominates the positive labour effect in the second
component of pin. See appendix C.3
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The three effects of an entering firm on factor prices feed
through to profits. The allocation effect decreases profit, the
labour effect increases profit, the competition effect decreases
profit. The competition (markup effect) and allocation (busi-
ness stealing) effect reinforce eachother. Making the negative ef-
fect of entry on profits larger than the case with fixed markups.
However, there is a positive effect on profits from labour, since
an entrant raises the market wage leading to a higher supply of
labour which raises per firm output and revenues. The effect
can be shown to be dominated hence the inequality.
Corollary 5 Profit More Responsive to Entry Under Endoge-
nous Markup.
The responsiveness of profit to firm entry is absolutely larger in the
case of endogenous markups.
|pi(µ(n))n| > |pi(µ¯)n|
In sum the competition effect of entry depresses markups
which raises wage and interest rate in factor market equilib-
rium. This effect of higher factor prices (prices closer to their
marginal product) causes profits to fall more from each entrant.
The result is that zero profit arises when fewer firms have en-
tered and so each firm has a larger market share. Conversely
a negative shock that leads to negative profits and exit means
each exiter raises incumbents profits less regaining zero profits
requires more exit and then remaining firms can produce less.
So the mechanisms in this section are responsible for the results
131
3.5 efficiency and steady state outcomes
in the next section that show output per firm and productivity
are increasing in the number of firms.
3.5 efficiency and steady state outcomes
This section first derives the efficient outcomes that correspond
to minimum average cost, or the number of firms that max-
imises output. It then analyzes the fixed point of the dynami-
cal system, which corresponds to the zero profit outcome, often
assumed instantaneously in other papers.
3.5.1 Efficient Output and Productivity
In symmetric equilibrium aggregate output is the number of
firms in a representative sector multiplied by the amount a firm
produces. It is homogeneous of degree 1 in K, L, n. This cap-
tures that capital and labour per firm do not change if all fac-
tors are changed equally, so output per firm is homogeneous
of degree 0, but aggregation across all firms causes a propor-
tional increase because of a proportional change in the number
of firms that are being aggregated.
Y(t) = n(t)y(t) = n(t)(1−ν)AF(K(t), L(t))− n(t)φ (136)
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The effect of an entrant on aggregate output is
Yn = (1− ν)n−νAF(K, L) + n1−νAFL(K, L)Ln(C, K, n)− φ
≈ (1− ν)n−νAF(K, L)− φ (137)
Ynn = (1− ν)n−1[−νn−νAF(K, L) + n1−νAFL(K, L)Ln(C, K, n)]
≈ (1− ν)n−1[−νn−νAF(K, L)] (138)
with approximations due to small second-order labour effect;
alternatively, take labour taken as given at aggregate level. There
are three effects of firm entry on aggregate output: an ambigu-
ous allocation (returns to scale) effect, a positive labour effect
and a negative fixed cost effect (resource duplication). The
scale effect is positive with decreasing returns ν ∈ (0, 1) and
zero with constant returns ν = 0. The effect captures that busi-
ness reallocation among more firms improves aggregate output
when there are decreasing returns.
At the point where the positive returns to scale and labour
effect equate the fixed cost effect, there is an optimal efficient
number of firms Yn = 0|ν<1. These outcomes are those that
would arise under Walrasian perfect competition, and if there
were no markups in our model (µ = 1). In the AC-MC diagram
this is where they intersect at minimum average cost. To ensure
the outcomes are defined we assume rising marginal cost ν ∈
(0, 1) and to ensure production is nonnegative we assume fixed
cost effect exceeds positive labour effect νφ > An1−νFL(K, L)Ln
so there are initially decreasing returns as costs decrease to-
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ward the minimum. Generally we assume the second-order
labour effect is small.
Proposition 7.
When output is maximised with respect to number of firms in the
economy the efficient levels of output are
F(ke, le) =
1
(1− ν)
(
φ
A
− Fl(k, l)Ln
)
≈ φ
A(1− ν) (139)
ye = AF(ke, le)− φ
=
1
1− ν (φν− AFl(k, l)Ln) ≈
φν
1− ν (140)
It is notable that most papers dicussing entry focus on con-
stant returns to scale. As this section has shown this implies
there is no optimal firm size; analogously there is no perfect
competition equilibrium because the market tends to a natural
monopoly due to the fixed cost teamed with constant returns to
scale. Firm size, in terms of factors it employs, is unimportant
because all firms produce at the same efficiency. This limits the
role of entry, so that productivity results arise solely from the
competition effect of more firms reducing markups. How out-
put is divided among firms does not matter. We shall see in
corollary 7 that when entry is high (the market is competitive),
imperfect competition outcomes converge on this section’s effi-
cient outcomes ((140) and later (142)).
134
3.5 efficiency and steady state outcomes
3.5.1.1 Homogeneous Degree Zero Productivity
I call productivity at a point in time measured productivity. The
measure is equivalent to TFPR (R for revenue) in Peters 201318.
Corresponding to the efficient levels of output is a definition
of productivity that is also maximised at these efficient output
levels, taking labour as given.
Definition 12 Measured Productivity.
Measured productivity P : K, L, n→ R+ is the amount of output an
economy produces for a given technology, with technology normalized
to be homogeneous of degree 1 to remove scale effects
P(t) = Y(t)
F(K(t), L(t))
1
ν
(141)
This aggregate measure is the same as the per firm measure P =
n(t)y(t)
F(K(t),L(t))
1
ν
= y(t)
F(k(t),l(t))
1
ν
.
A more productive economy has larger measured productiv-
ity because it combines inputs more efficiently and produces
more output with the same technology as another economy.
An outcome of this definition of measured productivity is that
when it is maximised with respect to number of firms Pn = 0
the corresponding levels of output are the efficient outcomes ye.
18 Based on Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 2008.
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Therefore the maximum attainable productivity P e that arises
at the efficient level of production is
P e = y
e
F(ke, le)
1
ν
=
(φν− AFl Ln)A 1ν (1− ν) 1ν−1
(φν− AFl Ln) 1ν
, φν > AFl Ln, ν ∈ (0, 1)
≈
(
Aνν
(
φ
1− ν
)ν−1) 1ν
(142)
And in the constant returns limit the maximum attainable mea-
sured productivity is equivalent to TFP limν→1 P e = A.
Since production technology in the denominator is hod −
ν we need to normalize it to be hod − 1. Then productivity
will be hod− 0 in inputs. That means that the scale of inputs
K, L, n does not affect productivity. Whereas with a typical non-
normalized measure an economy with more inputs would al-
ways appear less productive. Hence we capture changes in ef-
ficiency of technology use, how effectively the inputs are com-
bined with a given technology, rather than how many inputs
there are. Consider an example of two economies A and B.
They are identical in every sense, except economy B is en-
dowed with λ ∈ (1,∞) times more factors K, L, n. Since the
economies are identical, except for scale of factors, then a good
productivity measure should reflect that both economies have
the same productivity: they combine factors with the same
efficiency to produce output. Now assume the contradiction
that we do not normalize technology and use a standard, non-
normalized, TFP measure Pˆ . Then PˆA = Y(t)F(K(t),L(t)) and since
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Y is hod− 1 and F is hod− ν then PˆB = λY(t)
λνF(K(t),L(t)) = λ
1−νPˆA.
So PˆA < PˆB we conclude erroneously that economy B is more
productive simply because it has more factors, not because it
combines those factors more efficiently. Under our normalized
measure PB = λY(t)
(λνF(K(t),L(t)))
1
ν
= PA. With constant returns
ν = 1 there are no scale effects, so our measure collapses to the
common definition.
3.5.2 Steady State
Now I shall show that the steady state of our economy corre-
sponds to zero profits. And leads to levels of output and pro-
ductivity that depend endogenously on the number of firms,
and these levels are strictly less than the efficient levels that
would arise under perfect competition defined in section 3.5.1.
Assume that a solution of the system converges to a unique
steady state (K, n, C, e) → (K∗, n∗, C∗, e∗) as t → +∞19. In
steady state K˙ = n˙ = C˙ = e˙ = 0, which immediately implies
19 Ignore the trivial steady state that arises when the state vector is the zero
vector. It is possible that with endogenous markups there are multiple val-
ues of n∗ that allow steady-state to hold. This is an investigation for future
research.
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entry is zero via (144), which in turn, via 146, implies profits
are zero.
K˙ = 0⇔ Y∗(C∗, K∗, n∗) = C∗ (143)
n˙ = 0⇔ e∗ = 0 (144)
C˙ = 0⇔ r∗(C∗, K∗, n∗) = ρ (145)
e˙ = 0⇔ pi∗(C∗, K∗, n∗) = 0 (146)
In steady state aggregate output equates to consumption; en-
try is zero; the interest rate equals the discount factor and
profits are zero. Intuitively when profits are zero entry ceases
as there is no entry incentive, and when the discount factor
and interest rate are equated there is indifference between con-
sumption and saving so all output is consumed. Rewriting the
system in terms of underlying variables (C, e, K, n), again with
labour defined implicitly L(C, K, n), shows that ouput per firm
and therefore measured productivity depend endogenously on
the number of firms.
n∗
[
An−νF(K∗, L∗)− φ] = C∗ (147)
e∗ = 0 (148)
An∗1−νFK(K∗, L∗)
µ(n∗)
= ρ (149)
n∗
−ν
F(K∗, L∗) = φ
A
(
1− ν
µ(n∗)
) (150)
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3.5.3 Steady State Existence
In this section I provide a condition under which a steady state
solution always exists, and in appendix C.4 I calculate a specific
solution numerically. For a steady state to exist the following
system must be solvable for (C∗, K∗, n∗) (where I have substi-
tuted in the trivial n˙ condition that e = 0).
C˙ : 0 = r(C∗, K∗, n∗)− ρ (151)
e˙ : 0 = pi(C∗, K∗, n∗) (152)
K˙ : 0 = Y(C∗, K∗, n∗)− C∗ (153)
Therefore the determinant of the Jacobian of this three dimen-
sional system with respect to (C, K, n) is20

rC rK rn
−piC −piK −pin
YC − 1 YK Yn

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
=⇒

− − +
+ − +
− + ±
 (154)
where determining the signs rK < 0 and pin < 0 requires extra
work21, and the sign structure is determinable before evaluat-
ing at steady state. I assume Yn > 0. Each element is evaluated
in a neighborhood of the conjectured steady state, although the
sign structures hold regardless22.
20 This proof of existence follows the approach of Caputo 2005, pp.419.
21 See Appendix C.3 the results involve substituting in labour effects and show-
ing they are dominated by using the second partial derivative test for con-
cavity which the production function is assumed to satisfy.
22 Notice it is important to distinguish between the derivative of a variable x
with respect to z when x is in steady state x∗z , as opposed to the derivative
of a variable evaluated at steady state xz|x=x∗ .
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The determinant is
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−piKrCYn +
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−pinrK(YC − 1) +
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−piCrnYK
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
−− piKrn(YC − 1)
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−− piCrKYn
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−− pinrCYK (155)
Unfortunately the determinant is not clearly nonzero due to
the
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
−− piKrn(YC − 1) term even though all other terms are pos-
itive. However if this negative term can be shown to be domi-
nated by one of the positive terms, it provides a sufficient con-
dition for determinacy I.e. the determinant is strictly positive
ensuring that a solution C∗, K∗, n∗ exists by the implicit func-
tion theorem. The positive term
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−pinrK(YC − 1) proves a good
candidate to dominate the negative
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
−− piKrn(YC − 1) so their
sum is positive. That is,
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−piKrn(YC − 1)−
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
−pinrK(YC − 1) > 0,
or simply
Lemma 2 Steady State Existence.
A steady state solution {C∗, K∗, n∗} of the the system (151)-(153)
exists if the following sufficiency condition holds
rnpiK − rKpin < 0
This is a sufficient condition for determinacy, and it has an
intuitive interpretation to support it. The condition states that
the combined effect of rKpin dominates the combined effect of
rnpiK. Since rK is a direct effect (i.e. how capital effects its own
price) it is sensible to believe it outweighs rn, and similarly since
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pin is the direct effect of number of firms on value of firms it is
sensible to believe it is stronger than the piK effect. Hence we
should believe that the combined positive effect of two second-
order effects rnpiK is weaker than the combined positive effect
of two first-order effects rKpin. And thus the former minus the
latter will be negative. Indeed Appendix C.4 shows that for
a standard numerical example with Cobb-Douglas production
and Isoelastic utility a solution to the system exists.
Theorem 3.5.1 Endogenous Steady State Output and Produc-
tivity.
Steady state output per firm y∗ and measured productivity P∗ are
endogenous because they depend on the markup which depends on the
endogenous variable n(t), the number of active firms.
y∗(n∗
+
, µ(n∗)
−
) =
φν
µ(n∗)− ν (156)
P∗(n∗
+
, µ(n∗)
−
) :=
y∗
F(k∗, l∗) 1ν
= ν
[
A
µ(n∗)
(
µ(n∗)− ν
φ
)1−ν] 1ν
(157)
Proof. From the zero profit condition variable production be-
comes AF(k∗, l∗) = φµ(n
∗)
(µ(n∗)−ν) , and then y
∗ = AF(k∗, l∗) − φ.
Then substitute into the expression for productivity.
Corollary 6.
Steady state output per firm and measured productivity are increasing
in the number of firms in the economy.
y∗n > 0, P∗n > 0
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Proof. The result for output y∗ is clear. For productivity con-
sider
∂P∗
∂n
= −Aν
µ2
(µ− 1)
(µ− ν)νφ1−ν ·
∂µ(n∗)
∂n
> 0
Since markups are decreasing in number of firms, output
is increasing in number of firms, and similarly productivity
is increasing in number of firms. The simpler case of con-
stant marginal cost gives a similar outcome P∗|ν=1 = Aµ as in
Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008 and Peters 2013. Given markups
are negatively related to the number of firms, a single firm
needs to sell more output to cover its fixed cost and break even
in a free entry equilibrium. Hence with more firms, output per
firm rises.
From (157) the fixed cost (φ) and decreasing returns to scale
(ν < 1) cause a dampening effect that captures that productivity
is less sensitive to markups when the fixed cost is high. This is
because fixed costs induce higher output per firm and therefore
closer to constant returns to scale (nearer minimum AC), thus
variations in output around this point caused by the changing
markup has less of a productivity effect. This component falls
out when there are constant returns to scale φ1−ν
∣∣
ν→1 → 1,
because the fixed cost is used at equal efficiency regardless of
scale.
The markup causes extra profit that helps us to understand
the mechanism through which entry is affected. Profits offer
entry incentives, and incentives rise when markups are higher
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which encourages more entry than would arise under perfect
competition. However since markups are decreasing in number
of firms the excessive amount of profit will diminish faster as
firms enter, and zero profit will arise when fewer firms have en-
tered so the allocation effect (business stealing effect) is damp-
ened and larger firms remain. Thus each firm produces more
and benefits from returns to scale, which fosters endogenous
productivity. That is, long-run underlying productivity is a
function of number of firms whereas with fixed markups firms
entry always returns the economy to a position with the same
productivity. The extra mechanism is important, since a prospec-
tive firm now considers how fierce competition in the market
is, whereas with fixed markup it took for granted that it could
enter and charge a given markup, thus produce a given amount
in the long run. This leads to an important corollary
Corollary 7 Efficiency of Imperfect Competition.
When there is a high degree of competition (a large amount of entry)
the imperfect competition outcomes ((156) and (157)) converge upon
the efficient outcomes ((140) and (142)) because the markup is sup-
pressed.
3.5.4 Aggregate Output in Steady State
Using the endogenous steady state output expression (156) we
can infer the behavior of number of firms in steady state.
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Lemma 3 Firm Procyclicality.
Given aggregate output at steady-state level Y∗, the number of active
firms is procyclical.
n∗ =
[
AF(K∗, L∗(C∗, K∗, n∗))
(
µ(n∗)− ν
µ(n∗)φ
)] 1
ν
=
(
µ(n∗)− ν
φν
)
Y∗
(158)
Proof. For a given steady-state level of output Y∗, a change in
this level on n∗ causes n∗Y∗ =
(
µ(n∗)−ν
φν
)
> 0. The sign can be
determined since the markup µ(n) > 1 and returns to scale are
decreasing (increasing marginal costs) ν ∈ (0, 1), therefore the
numerator is positive.
See appendix C.4.2 for extended proof treating Y∗ endoge-
nously via implicit function theorem.
When there is a rise in steady state aggregate output Y∗ the
number of firms increases since
(
µ(n∗)−ν
φν
)
> 0. Closer to con-
stant returns to scale ν → 1 and higher fixed costs φ weaken
the procyclicality effect, whereas greater imperfect competition
µ(n∗) strengthens the effect23. Furthermore the direct effect of
an increase in technology A is to raise number of firms n∗A > 0
through its positive effect on Y∗. I validate this result numeri-
cally in section 3.6.2.
With fixed markups output per firm always returns to a con-
stant level that is the amount of sales required to cover the
fixed cost. Now µ is endogenous, if n rises then more sales are
needed to cover the fixed cost and therefore output per firm
23 This result generalizes eq. 19 Jaimovich and Floetotto 2008, pp. 1245 who
show an analogous outcome under constant returns and instantaneous en-
try.
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in equilibrium depends on the number of firms in the market.
Therefore in aggregate there is an increase in number of firms,
and there is an increase in output per firm
Y∗ = n∗y∗ = (AF(K∗, L∗(C∗, K∗, n∗)))
1
ν
(
µ(n∗)φ
µ(n∗)− ν
)1− 1ν ν
µ(n∗)
(159)
Aggregate output is much simpler with constant returns Y∗|ν=1 =
AF(K∗,L∗)
µ(n∗) . There is productive inefficiency from the markup,
which reduces Y∗, but the fixed cost component
(
µ(n∗)φ
µ(n∗)−ν
)1− 1ν
ν
is unimportant as all firms use the fixed cost with the equal effi-
ciency. It is useful to compare the endogenous markup case, to
the better-known case of fixed markups in steady state. With a
fixed markup number of firms does not affect aggregate output
through y∗ which is always fixed exogenously as a function of
given parameters, so an extra firm simply contributes this fixed
extra amount to output. With endogenous markup an extra
firm alters per firm output y∗ since a firm needs to produce
more to cover fixed costs due to fiercer markup competition.
∂Y∗
∂n = y
∗ + n∗y∗n. With fixed markups only the first effect is
present (the contribution of an entrant is to add y∗ to aggregate
output), but with endogenous markup there is also the com-
petition effect which raises output per firm of every incubent
because they face more competition n∗y∗n.
The conclusions from the static analysis are that output per
firm increases with number of firms, and productivity increases
with number of firms. These results arise because number of
firms degrade monopoly power, and this effect will always pre-
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vail over the dynamic business reallocation effect that causes
output per firm to decrease as each firm enters because any
shock rises productivity and output per firm too much on im-
pact. From the long-run perspective more firms is better in the
sense it raises output per firm, so more aggregate output can
be produced from fewer firms.
3.6 main result : productivity dynamics
The main result shows that the impact effect of a TFP shock
causes an exacerbated response in short-run productivity that
relinquishes over time but leaves some long-run persistence
due to the competition effect. This means that the difference
between measured productivity on impact and measured pro-
ductivity in the long-run is dampened because of a persistent
change in productivity draws it closer to the initial level.
Theorem 3.6.1 Permanent Change in TFP.
On impact of a shock productivity overshoots the long-run effect, but
there is no reversion to underlying productivity due to a persistent
change in degree of competition.
P(0)A −P∗A = P(0)A −P∗µ¯A −P∗µµ(n∗)A (160)
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ −P∗A =
(µ∗ − 1)P
∗
ν

(
1
A
+
F∗L L
∗
A
F∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alloc. Effect (+)
+
ν
µ∗(µ∗ − ν)µnn
∗
A︸ ︷︷ ︸
Comp. Effect (-)
 (161)
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where P∗ = ν
[
A
µ(n∗)
(
µ(n∗)−ν
φ
)1−ν] 1ν
Proof. Details in appendix C.5. From lemma 3, equation (158),
n∗A > 0 improved TFP raises the number of firms, see also nu-
merical result in section 3.6.2.
where P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ is the response of productivity on im-
pact (at t = 0), with all variables x beginning at steady state
x(0) = x∗.
The positive allocation effect captures that only incumbents
bear the change in TFP due to entry/exit inertia thus on im-
pact there is a direct effect on incumbents’ productivity from
having a different TFP and there is a reinforcing labour effect
that also responds immediately. The negative competition ef-
fect captures that the long-run level of productivity moves in
the same direction as the initial effect which closes the gap be-
tween initial impact and long-run productivity. In the absence
of a competition effect µn = 0, there is no persistent effect on
productivity.
Corollary 8.
Entry reduces the size of productivity overshooting, such that as n→
∞
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ = P∗A (162)
The result only exists with rising marginal cost ν ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. Since the markup disappears as firms increase limn→∞ µ(nt) =
1, see appendix C.7, then
lim
n→∞
(
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ −P∗A
)
= 0
This corollary can be interpreted as more competitive economies
have less productivity volatility. The result implies that produc-
tivity puzzles are weakened when there is more competition.
Conversly overshooting is greater when there are few firms per
sector. This strengthens imperfect competition and therefore
markups are higher. It also means that the long-run structural
change to competition will be greater. Consequently, the im-
pact of a technology shock causes a large change in measured
productivity initially but it then reverts to a similar but weaker
level of productivity in the long-run. Contrarily, if the sector
is very competitive, there are many firms in the sector and
the initial effect on productivity is small, likewise there is lit-
tle structural change to competition from more firms entering
because there are still many firms competing. The implication
is that more competition, which is synonymous to more firms,
implies less volatile productivity and less persistence in pro-
ductivity shocks24. Importantly this result does not hold under
constant returns to scale ν → 1 because as firms drive markup
to unitary no equilibrium exists as there is no cost minimizing
level of output.
24 This is an interesting testable implication to expand upon empirically. As
number of firms in the economy gets large then the long-run effect arises
immediately limn→∞ µ(n) = 1 so P(0)A = P∗A
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t
Productivity
P(A1)
Fixed Markup P(A2)µ¯
Endog. Markup P(A2)µ(n∗ )
underlying prod.
underlying prod.
Figure 15.: Exacerbated Productivity Followed by Long-run
Persistence
Figure 15 shows that the long-run competition effect tightens
the gap between impact and long-run effect. A negative shock
to technology from A1 to A2 causes an initially big fall in mea-
sured productivity (dashed arrow), but it recovers as firms be-
gin to exit. However, the ”Fixed Markup P(A2)µ¯” curve shows
that with fixed markups µ¯ productivity recovers to regain the
underlying level that incorporates the new worse technology
A2, whereas the ”Endog. Markup P(A2)µ(n∗)” time path shows
that despite some recovery there is always persistently worse
productivity in the long run (shown by the gray box), and this
is because the markup µ(n∗) rises due to less long-run compe-
tition from firms exiting.
t
Productivity
P(A1)
Fixed Markup P(A2)µ¯
Endog. Markup P(A2)µ(n∗ )
underlying prod.
underlying prod.
Figure 16.: Short-run Productivity Undershooting
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3.6.1 Competition Effect Strengthens Misallocation Effect
A special case that may arise is if the negative competition ef-
fect is larger than the positive allocation effect. The previous
discussion assumed that P(0)A − P∗A > 0. However, if the
competition effect is large then P(0)A − P∗A < 0, so the initial
movement in measured productivity is less than the long-run
change in productivity. In terms of a positive shock to TFP this
would mean an increase in measured productivity on impact
as incumbent firms benefit from the improved technology, but
then as firms begin to enter their negative effect of reallocating
business is less than their positive effect reducing markups, so
as they enter productivity continues to improve. If there is a
negative TFP shock as in figure 15 the result is an initiall fall
in productivity, followed by further worsening of productivity
to a long-run level below the initial movement. After the ini-
tial fall in productivity the further worsening occurs as firms
exit and weaker competition reduces productivity more than
the reallocation of resources among incumbents.
3.6.2 Supplementary Numerical Exercise
The theory of the previous section demonstrates the main result
of the chapter, but a numerical exercise is useful to gauge the
two effects to gain an intuition for whether undershooting or
overshooting in productivity arises. The baseline RBC model
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assumes isoelastic (constant elasticity) separable subutilties and
a Cobb-Douglas production function.
3.6.2.1 Utility
U(C, L) =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ − ξ
L1+η
1+ η
(163)
The derivatives are
UC = C−σ, UCC = −σC−σ−1, UL = −ξLη (164)
The degree of relative risk aversion is constant σ(C) = −C UCCUC =
σ. Isoelastic utility implies there is constant elasticity of utility
with respect to each good. σ 6= 1 is the constant coefficient of
relative risk aversion. σ → ∞ implies infinite risk aversion, so
consumption has little effect on utility. η is Frisch elasticity of
labour supply.
3.6.2.2 Production
F(k, l) = kαlβ = KαLβn−(α+β) = F(K, L)n−(α+β) (165)
Cobb-Douglas production conforms to our assumptions on the
production function derivatives,
Fk =αkα−1lβ = αKα−1Lβn1−(α+β), (166)
Fl =kαβlβ−1 = KαβLβ−1n1−(α+β) (167)
and it is homogeneous of degree α + β, so ν = α + β in our
general notation. α and β are capital and labour shares respec-
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tively. This implies increasing marginal costs if α+ β < 1. Thus
the impact versus long-run effect of a change in technology be-
comes25
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ −P∗A =
P∗
ν(n∗ − 1)
[
2
A
+ β
n∗A
n∗
− ν
µ(n∗) (µ(n∗)− ν)
n∗A
n∗2
]
(168)
If we assume that intersector substitutability is θI = 1 then the
markup purely depends on number of firms µ(n) = nn−1
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ −P∗A =
P∗
(α+ β)(n∗ − 1)
[
2
A
+
(
β− (α+ β)
n∗2
n∗−1
( n∗
n∗−1 − (α+ β)
)) n∗An∗
]
(169)
Given this parameterization a sufficient condition for under-
shooting P(0)A −P∗A < 0 is
2
A
+
(
β− (α+ β)
n∗2
n∗−1
( n∗
n∗−1 − (α+ β)
)) n∗An∗ < 0 (170)
therefore a necessary condition is
β <
(α+ β)
n∗2
n∗−1
( n∗
n∗−1 − (α+ β)
) (171)
where the right-hand side is the competition effect that arises
from endogenous markups26. The competition effect is zero
with exogenous (fixed) markups (n∗ → 1), therefore the nec-
25 Details in appendix C.6.
26 I label it the competition effect since it determines the magnitude of the
negative component.
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essary condition is always violated β ≮ 0 and undershooting
cannot arise. This formalizes the logic that if there is no persis-
tent effect on productivity then undershooting of the long-run
level cannot arise. Similarly, any effect that weakens the long-
run persistent effect of competition (decreases P∗µ) will reduce
the likelihood of undershooting. For example, the competition
effect is increasing in returns to scale ν := α+ β → 1 , leading
to undershooting.
In general equilibrium using previous parameter values (ta-
ble 1), numerical simulation27 makes the right-hand side of
the necessary condition 0.07 where number of firms is deter-
mined endogenously in steady state as n∗ = 44.156. Clearly
the right-hand side value does not exceed the labour share
β = 0.5 ≮ 0.07, thus undershooting does not arise in general
equilibrium. The conclusion is that the competition effect is
small relative to the allocation effect, an important result given
most literature focuses on endogenous markups (competition
effect) rather than business allocation. So let us ask under what
partial equilibrium conditions could undershooting arise, and
interpret the plausibility of the economic narrative.
Figure 17 shows a calibration that strengthens the necessary
condition by choosing close to CRTS with a low β. The nega-
tive region is quantitiatively small, so is unlikely to offset the
initial effect required to meet the sufficient condition, unless
n∗A is unrealistically large. For example, we can see there is a
region n∗ ∈ (3, 15) when the necessary condition is met, thus
27 This is a purely numerical calculation because the added nonlinearity of
endogenous markups precludes an analytic derivation of n∗. The value of
firms is high. The purpose here is intuition to aid the analytics.
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take n∗ = 5 and ν = α+ β = 0.6 + 0.2 = 0.8 meets the neces-
sary condition for negativity, so the sufficient condition, where
assuming A = 1, is 2− 2n∗A5 < 0. Therefore the condition is
n∗A > 5 = n
∗, so there must be a 100% change in market size if
the competition effect from entry is to exceed the initial misal-
location effect.
β = 0.2
α = 0.6
Figure 17.: Initial Overshooting Versus Undershooting
3.7 chapter summary
The chapter investigates the effect of firm entry on measured
productivity over the business cycle. I consider that entry is
noninstantaneous and entry affects the price markups that in-
cumbents charge. Together these mechanisms can explain short-
run procylical productivity and weaker long-run persistence.
Contemporary productivity puzzles provide a lens to view the
theory through. In relation to productivity puzzles, the theory
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explains that productivity is exacerbated on impact, since firms
cannot adjust immediately so incumbents bear shocks, and in
the long run underlying productivity is not regained because
subsequent adjustment of firms causes structural changes in
competition. The structural changes in competition reflect that
entry strengthens competition which improves productivity in
the long run (inversely, exit weakens competition, decreases
productivity). Furthermore I show that in highly competitive
industries the distinction between short-run and long-run pro-
ductivity is small, so measured productivity quickly and accu-
rately reflects underlying productivity.
A growing number of DSGE papers show promising quanti-
tative simulation results from adding a firm entry process. De-
spite these appealing data matching properties, little research
has reduced models to minimal state variables to understand
the analytical effect of entry. This chapter allows economists to
understand how the entry variables interact with the model in
a general setup before specifying functional forms or numeri-
cal calibrations. We learn that firm entry dynamics can explain
short-run dynamic changes in productivity over the business
cycle and long-run static changes that persist. The two expla-
nations arise from two different effects of entry, a dynamic real-
location effect that redistributes resources as firms adjust and a
static competition effect that alters firms’ pricing markup deci-
sions in response to competition from entry. A simple quantita-
tive exercise emphasizes the dominance of the allocation effect
over the competition effect, which is an important lesson for re-
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searchers who have tended to focus on firm dynamics’ effects
on markups rather than allocation.
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L E S S O N S F R O M F I R M D Y N A M I C S I N T H E
M A C R O E C O N O M Y
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4.1 summary of results
The thesis argues that firm dynamics (firm entry and exit) are
an important determinant of business cycle behaviour. Specif-
ically the changing number of firms that comprise industries
in the economy is an important determinant of short-run and
long-run measured productivity through its effect on competi-
tion and allocation of resources per firm. The thesis is crudely
summarized by the following statement
“Given the resources in an economy, how they are di-
vided among firms, and how these firms compete with
each other, helps us to understand how productively the
resources are used.”
4.1 summary of results
An example economic scenario best illustrates the results of the
thesis. Chapter 2 develops the short-run mechanisms and chap-
ter 3 develops the long-run mechanisms. Consider a negative
shock to the economy, like the 2007 financial crisis, it initially
impacts incumbent firms causing amplified productivity falls,
but these falls relinquish as firms begin to exit–chapter 2 es-
tablishes this. However, there is an opposing effect that exit
of firms reduces competitive pressures on those who remain
which prevents full reversion of productivity, so there is a per-
sistent productivity fall–chapter 3 establishes this.
Chapter 2 explains that firm entry teamed with imperfect
competition causes excessive entry because the monopoly prof-
its that arise under imperfect competition strengthen incentives
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to enter. The result of excess entry is that incumbents are inef-
ficiently small. They operate with excess capacity: each incum-
bent pays a fixed cost that it underutilizes. In the short run, in-
cumbents vary their capacity utilization in response to shocks
without other firms instantaneously responding. The result is
short-run productivity gains as firms utilize fixed costs. How-
ever, as firm entry adjusts, business reallocation overcomes the
short-run effect. Unlike recent research, this theory has fixed
markups (no competition effect); dynamic entry alone is suffi-
cient for endogenous productivity dynamics. The main finding
is that productivity shocks are amplified on impact due to inert
firms, but relinquish in the long run as entry/exit responds.
Despite the promising findings for short-run productivity
movements, this research cannot explain persistent effects to
productivity after shocks. This is particularly notable in times
when policy makers are dealing with so-called productivity
puzzles: the persistently low productivity post Great Recession.
Chapter 3 attempts to develop a theory that can help to under-
stand these puzzles.
Chapter 3 studies how firm entry determines macroeconomic
productivity through division of resources and competitive pres-
sure on markups. Recent research examines markup behaviour
under firm entry and its importance for macroeconomic pro-
ductivity, but the arguments focus on instantaneous firm entry.
I argue that this omits a mechanism: the changing allocation
of business as firms adjust. My contribution is to combine this
dynamic firm entry with competitive markups. The result is
a new trade-off: an exiter reduces industry competition which
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reduces incumbents’ productivity, but exit reallocates business
among incumbents which improves productivity through re-
turns to scale (vice-versa for entry which raises competition,
but steals business). The mechanism helps to clarify ‘produc-
tivity puzzles’. It explains that economic shocks cause exacer-
bated productivity responses that weaken as firms adjust, and
entry competition prevents reversion to trend productivity. The
main finding is that competition from firm entry ameliorates
short-run productivity volatility but in the long run productiv-
ity effects persist because of structural changes to competition.
The mutual argument that the thesis emphasizes is that sunk
costs cause firms to respond slowly to economic shocks, hence
entry and exit decisions are non-instantaneous. This slow re-
sponse of firm dynamics to economic conditions teamed with
imperfect competition has been observed in quantitative DSGE
models of firm entry. These papers observe particular simula-
tions, whereas this work offers an analytical narrative to the
‘blackbox’ driving simulated dynamics. Therefore I am able
to precisely describe the mechanics underlying productivity
movements. Throughout the thesis we can identify that the
returns to scale parameter and degree of competition can alter
and nullify productivity effects.
A clear prescription for applied researchers is that in order
to understand macroeconomic productivity notice should be
taken of firm behaviour, and this may mean that instantaneous
figures for productivity are misleading as firm dynamics take
time to adjust.
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4.2 future work
The thesis opens several new lines of research. The first is a nat-
ural development of the current work to consider its stochastic
analog. The second places more emphasis on empirical work
and the testable implications of the model, which opens policy
relevant questions like the effect of fiscal stimulus. The third
explores the mathematical theory of the thesis more deeply to
gain a better understanding of imperfect competition’s effect
on the system’s eigenvalues.
4.2.1 Stochastics and Heterogeneity
All the discussion in this thesis focuses on once-and-for-all shocks.
A relatively simple extension to the work is to consider a stochas-
tic model with a shock process in technology that reverts to its
initial level. This research’s logic would carry over, and relate to
the ‘amplification’ and ‘propagation’ keywords that tend to be
associated with stochastic business cycle models (Kocherlakota
2000). That is, in a traditional impulse response type analysis,
we would expect to observe amplification in productivity on im-
pact followed by a propagating effect due to competition even-
tually returning to the same initial equilibrium. This would
make the work directly comparable with other papers that sim-
ulate responses like this, but with the advantage of the tight
theoretical description this thesis develops. Another question
related to stochastics answers the FAQ “Where is the hetero-
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geneity?” that emphasizes the importance of selection effects
when discussing firm entry. In international trade it is the sta-
tus quo that different levels of productivity determine firm sur-
vival, entry and exit. The framework I have developed could
be extended to recognize that the sunk costs of entry are non-
symmetric. For example, a stochastic component in the sunk
cost could reflect that exit is less costly than entry. This would
strengthen the well-known asymmetries across entry and exit
rates, and could address the seemingly heteroskedastic relation-
ship between NBF and output. That is that recession tends to
lead to a relatively greater falls in net business formation (NBF)
than booms lead to rises in NBF (figure 2).
4.2.2 Productivity Puzzles and Fiscal Policy
A benefit of using industrial organization (IO) in macroeco-
nomics is that it opens a trove of firm level IO data to a field re-
liant on less-meticulous aggregate data. The thesis gives rise to
several testable implications. Among them are that productiv-
ity effects are weaker in more competitive situations character-
ized by economies with a large number of firms. Do more com-
petitive economies face less volatile productivity movements?
Chapter 3 refers to how the theory could explain productiv-
ity puzzles since the Great Recession. As Haskel, Goodridge,
and Wallis 2015 evidence, these puzzles of a fall in productivity
followed by persistently low levels are profound for UK data.
My theory implies that exit leading to market consolidation
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reduces competitive pressure on incumbents (raises markups)
leading to an opening of their capacity underutilization causing
a fall in productivity. Loose evidence for market consolidation
from exit (and more broadly mergers and acquisitions) in the
UK exists the test is to link this to a rise in excess capacity, a
variable that could be measured using the population of UK
firm level data contained in the inter departmental business reg-
ister (IDBR). Lastly, this thesis focuses on technology shocks,
but a question for policy makers is whether fiscal policy shocks
have a similar effect on productivity. If the results of Aloi and
Dixon 2003 carry over to the closed economy with capital set-
ting, then initial intuition suggests an increase in government
expenditure will stimulate entry and increase input marginal
products, thus improving productivity.
4.2.3 Theory and Speed of Convergence
Reducing the four-dimensional economic system with entry to
a two-dimensional stable manifold allows for analytical solu-
tions for the model within a neighborhood of the hyperbolic
fixed point. Initial results that arise from analytical solutions
show that imperfect competition reduces the set of complex dy-
namics, and raises eigenvalues which hastens convergence to
steady state. Importantly there is economic intuition to explain
the faster convergence, that is that imperfect competition raises
firm profits, so an entrant reduces industry profits more thus
arbitrage to zero profits quickens.
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4.3 closing remark
This section has shown that the results of the thesis open many
new questions for future study into firm dynamics and the macroe-
conomy. As the ideas of this field become more embedded into
status quo models, an exciting prospect is the natural align-
ment of industrial organization, finance and macroeconomics.
Recent work in macroeconomics has sought to improve under-
standing of financial frictions, and independently other work,
like this thesis, has been improving macro-IO relationships. It
seems promising for future researchers to link these two bodies
of research: understanding how financially constrained firms
alter their strategic behaviour, which impacts macroeconomic
behaviour and stock market value would be an eloquent devel-
opment for the discipline.
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C H A P T E R 1 A P P E N D I X
a.1 data description
FRED mnemonics are in square brackets.
US GDP Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
Annual Rate. US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domes-
tic Product [GDP], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis https://research.stlouisfed.org
/fred2/series/GDP/, January 4, 2016.
US TFP Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted. University of
Groningen and University of California, Davis, Total Factor Pro-
ductivity at Constant National Prices for United States [RTFP-
NAUSA632NRUG], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis https://research.stlouisfed.org
/fred2/series/RTFPNAUSA632NRUG/, January 4, 2016.
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A.1 data description
a.1.1 Net Business Formation (NBF) and New Incorporations (NI)
Released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, NBF includes NI
but also accounts for failures. NBF was assembled in-house by
the BEA, but the NI data it relies upon is from Dunn and Brad-
street consultancy. NBF is an index, 1967=100 base year. NI is
absolute numbers. Both are monthly and seasonally adjusted.
Survey of Current Business, Volume 76, (1996) has net busi-
ness formation (NBF) and New Incorporations (NI) data from
January 1948 to December 1994. Specifically it is section C-8
“Historical Data for Selected Series” of the survey, and is avail-
able in a clearer PDF via the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s
(BEA) online archive (I include the primary source in this Chap-
ter’s appendix). An additional 9 months up to September 1995
are available in the BEA’s Survey of Current Business, Nov-Dec
1995 release, section C-2 (I include the primary source in this
Chapter’s appendix). Section C-1 The New Incorporations se-
ries (NI) was collected by Dun and Bradstreet (a private consul-
tancy) over the entire period, and proprietary versions extend
for an additional three years to 1998. I do not use all these pro-
prietary years, which are available via the company The Confer-
ence Board. However, it can be freely extended by 21 months to
September 1996 using the Economagic data repository.
The Survey of Current Business describes New Business In-
corporations as
”V 21, new business incorporations. This series rep-
resents the total number of stock corporations is-
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sued charters under the general business corpora-
tion laws of the various States and the District of
Columbia. The statistics include completely new
businesses that have incorporated, existing businesses
changed from the noncorporate to the corporate form
of organization, existing corporations given certifi-
cates of authority to operate also in another State,
and existing corporations transferred to a new State.
Data for incorporations in the District of Columbia
are included beginning January 1963.”
and Net Business Formation as
”V 22, index of net business formation. This series
is compiled from monthly national data on num-
ber of new business incorporations, number of busi-
ness failures, and confidential data on telephones in-
stalled. These components are adjusted for seasonal
variation and number of trading days before being
combined into the index. ”
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C H A P T E R 2 A P P E N D I X
b.1 household optimization problem
To obtain the necessary conditions for a solution to the house-
hold’s utility maximisation problem I use the Maximum Princi-
ple. The current value Hamiltonian is
Hˆ(t) = u(C(t), L(t))+
λ(t)(w(t)L(t) + r(t)K(t) +Π(t)− C(t)− G) (172)
The costate variable λt is the shadow price of wealth in utility
units. The Pontryagin necessary conditions are 1
HˆC(K, L, C,λ) = 0 =⇒ uC − λ = 0 (173)
HˆL(K, L, C,λ) = 0 =⇒ uL + λw = 0 (174)
HˆK(K, L, C,λ) = ρλ− λ˙ =⇒ λr = ρλ− λ˙
=⇒ λ˙
λ
= −(r− ρ) (175)
Hˆλ := K˙t =⇒ K˙ = rK + wL +Π− C (176)
1
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B.2 costs and operating profit
Equations (173)-(175) reduce to two equations. These are a dy-
namic differential equation called the Consumption Euler equa-
tion (intertemporal condition) and a static injective mapping
between labour and consumption (intratemporal condition).
b.2 costs and operating profit
Total costs are wages paid on labour and interest on capital
wl + rk = AFl(1− ζ)l + AFk(1− ζ)k = A(1− ζ)[Fl l + Fkk]
= (1− ζ)νAF(k, l) (177)
Operating profit is output less total costs
pi = y− wl − rk = (AF(k, l)− φ)− ((1− ζ)νAF(k, l)) (178)
pi(L, K, n; A, ζ, φ) = AF(k, l)(1− (1− ζ)ν)− φ (179)
b.3 optimal labour derivatives
Partially differentiate the intratemporal Euler with respect to
each variable treating labour as an implicit function. Then by
implicit function theorem get labour responses L(C−, K+, n+; A+ , ζ−
)
uL + uC(1− ζ)AFl
(
K
n
,
L
n
)
= 0 (180)
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Assumptions:
Fll(
K
n
,
L
n
), uCC(C), uLL(L) < 0 (181)
uC(C), Fl(
K
n
,
L
n
), Flk(
K
n
,
L
n
) > 0 (182)
where l = Ln and k =
K
n
uLLLC + uCC(1− ζ)AFl + uC(1− ζ)AFll LCn = 0, (183)
LC =
−uCC(1− ζ)AFl
uLL + uC(1− ζ)A Flln
< 0 (184)
uLLLK + uC(1− ζ)AFlk 1n + uC(1− ζ)AFll
LK
n
= 0, (185)
LK =
−uC(1− ζ)A Flkn
uLL + uC(1− ζ)A Flln
> 0 (186)
uLLLn + uC(1− ζ)A
[
Flk
−K
n2
+ Fll
(−L
n2
+
Ln
n
)]
= 0, (187)
Ln =
uC(1− ζ)A(ν− 1) Fln
uLL + uC(1− ζ)A Flln
> 0 (188)
uLLLA + uC(1− ζ)Fl + uC(1− ζ)AFll LAn = 0, (189)
Assumptions on the functions, given above, are sufficient to
determine the signs in all cases except Ln, which depends on
returns to scale of the technology ν.
The denominator is the same in each derivation. It is the
intratemporal condition differentiated with respect to L, and
it is negative. The negativity reflects that utility is decreasing
in labour. Therefore the numerator distinguishes signs. The
numerator is the derivative of the intratemporal condition with
respect to the variable of interest.
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From (54) and (55)
Fk(k, l) = Υ, F(k, l) = Ξ (190)
where, Υ =
ρ
A (1− ζ) Ξ =
φ
A (1− (1− ζ) ν) (191)
Use Cramer’s rule to determine the effect of a change in ζ. Dif-
ferentiate with respect to ζ
Fkkkζ + Fkl lζ = Υζ (192)
Fkkζ + Fl lζ = Ξζ (193)
A︷ ︸︸ ︷Fkk Fkl
Fk Fl

kζ
lζ
 =
Υζ
Ξζ
 (194)
kζ
lζ
 = 1det(A)
 Fl −Fkl
−Fk Fkk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A−1
Υζ
Ξζ
 (195)
det(A) = FkkFl − Fkl Fk < 0, (196)
Υζ =
ρ
A(1− ζ)2 > 0 (197)
Ξζ = − φA(1− (1− ζ)ν)2ν < 0 (198)
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Hence,
kζ =
1
det(J)
(
FlΥζ − FklΞζ
)
< 0 (199)
lζ =
1
det(J)
(−FkΥζ + FkkΞζ) ≷ 0
if
∣∣∣∣ FkFkk
∣∣∣∣ ≶ ∣∣∣∣− φ(1− ζ)2ρ(1− (1− ζ)ν)2ν
∣∣∣∣ (200)
b.4.1 Numerical Bifurcation Exercise
Figure 18 repeats the figures in the paper but with ζ on the
z-axis.
Figure 18.: 3D Projection of Capital and No. Firms Equilibrium
as Market Power Changes
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b.5 elements of the jacobian : interest rate , profit,
output
Given optimal labour choice we can evaluate how interest rate,
profit and output respond.
b.5.1 Output
Y(L, K, n; A, φ) = n
[
AF
(
K
n
,
L
n
)
− φ
]
(201)
YC = AFl LC < 0 (202)
YK = A(Fk + Fl LK) > 0 (203)
Yn = (1− ν)AF− φ+ AFl Ln Q 0 (204)
Furthermore in steady state when F(Kn ,
L
n )
∗ = φA(1−(1−ζ)ν) then
Y∗n =
−φζν
1−(1−ζ)ν + AFl Ln which is positive or negative depending
whether the negative component outweighs the positive labour
effect.
b.5.2 Rents
r = (1− ζ)AFk (205)
rC = (1− ζ)An Fkl LC < 0 (206)
rK = (1− ζ)An [Fkk + Fkl LK] < 0 (207)
rn = (1− ζ)An [(1− ν)Fk + Fkl Ln] > 0 (208)
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Both rK and pin require extra work to derive the signs. They
may be found by substituting in LK and Ln respectively, from
which they can be rearranged into a form including FKKFLL −
F2KL which by assumption is greater than zero. The assumption
is that it satisfies the second partial derivative test for concavity.
b.5.3 Profit
pi = AF(k, l)(1− (1− ζ)ν)− φ (209)
piC = AFl
LC
n
(1− (1− ζ)ν) < 0 (210)
piK =
A
n
(Fk + Fl LK)(1− (1− ζ)ν) > 0 (211)
pin =
A
n
(−νF + Fl Ln)(1− (1− ζ)ν) < 0 (212)
Notice that for an k, l profit is higher so for any given K, L, n
profit is higher, but not necessarily for any given K, n which
is why in state space fewer firms can arise–which explains the
confusion over why despite higher profits we can have a reduc-
tion in firms; the answer is higher profits rely on given L.
174
B.6 jacobian
b.6 jacobian
The Jacobian before evaluating at steady state is

C˙C C˙e C˙K C˙n
e˙C e˙e e˙K e˙n
K˙C K˙e K˙K K˙n
n˙C n˙e n˙K n˙n

(213)

C∗
σ (1− ζ) An Fkl LC 0 C
∗
σ (1− ζ) An [Fkk + Fkl LK ] C
∗
σ (1− ζ) An [(1− ν)Fk + Fkl Ln ]
(1− ζ) An Fkl LCe−
AFl LC (1−(1−ζ)ν)
γn (1− ζ)AFk (1− ζ) An [Fkk + Fkl LK ]e− Ξ (1− ζ) An [(1− ν)Fk + Fkl Ln ]e−Ψ
AFl LC − 1 −γe A(Fk + Fl LK) (1− ν)AF− φ+ AFl Ln
0 1 0 0

(214)
where Ξ = A(Fk+Fl LK)(1−(1−ζ)ν)nγ and Ψ =
A(−νF+Fl Ln)(1−(1−ζ)ν)
nγ .
Then in steady state we have e = 0

−uC
uCC
(1− ζ) An Fkl LC 0 −uCuCC (1− ζ)
A
n [Fkk + Fkl LK ]
−uC
uCC
(1− ζ) An [(1− ν)Fk + Fkl Ln]
− AFl LC(1−(1−ζ)ν)γn (1− ζ)AFk − A(Fk+Fl LK)(1−(1−ζ)ν)nγ − A(−νF+Fl Ln)(1−(1−ζ)ν)nγ
AFl LC − 1 0 A(Fk + Fl LK) (1− ν)AF− φ+ AFl Ln
0 1 0 0

(215)
in steady state we also have Fk =
ρ
A(1−ζ) , and F =
φ
A(1−(1−ζ)ν)
Giving the unparameterized Jacobian in steady state in terms
of K∗ and n∗ (where function domain is in per firm form (e.g.
Fx is Fx(k, l)) and ν = α+ β) as
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
C∗
n∗σ (1− ζ)AFkl LC 0 C
∗
n∗σ (1− ζ)A(Fkk + Fkl LK) C
∗
n∗σ (1− ζ)
[
(1− ν) ρ1−ζ + AFkl Ln
]
− (1−(1−ζ)ν)γn∗ AFl LC ρ − (1−(1−ζ)ν)γn∗
(
ρ
1−ζ + AFl LK
)
1
γn∗ (νφ− (1− (1− ζ)ν)AFl Ln)
AFl LC − 1 0 ρ1−ζ + AFl LK −ζνφ1−(1−ζ)ν + AFl Ln
0 1 0 0

(216)
The signs of the Jacobian may be determined as

− 0 − +
+ + − +
− 0 + ±
0 + 0 0

(217)
Under the parameterized model, the elements of the Jacobian
can be determined entirely in terms of model parameters Ω :=
{α, β, φ,γ, ξ, ρ, η, ζ, σ}. We have
C∗
n∗
=
φ(1− ζ)ν
1− (1− ζ)ν , (218)
Fl = k∗αβl∗β−1, (219)
Fkl = αk∗α−1βl∗β−1, (220)
Fkk = α(α− 1)k∗α−2l∗β, (221)
L∗C = −
σ(1− (1− ζ)ν)
(1+ η − β)(φ(1− ζ)ν) l
∗, (222)
L∗n =
1− (α+ β)
(1+ η − β) l
∗, (223)
L∗K =
α
(1+ η − β)
l∗
k∗
, (224)
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This leads to the 4 × 4 Jacobian where Jr,c is element row r
column c.
J1,1 = − ρβ1+ η − β (225)
J1,2 = 0 (226)
J1,3 =
ρ2ν((1+ η)(α− 1) + β)
σα(1+ η − β)
=
ρ2ν(ν− 1+ η(α− 1)
σα(1+ η − β) (227)
J1,4 =
φ(1− ζ)νρ(1− ν)(1+ η)
(1− (1− ζ)ν)σ(1+ η − β) (228)
J2,1 =
(1− (1− ζ)ν)βσ
γn∗(1+ η − β)(1− ζ)ν (229)
J2,2 = ρ (230)
J2,3 =
−(1− (1− ζ)ν)ρ(1+ η)
γn∗(1− ζ)(1+ η − β) (231)
J2,4 =
φ(ν(1+ η)− β)
γn∗(1+ η − β) =
φ(α+ νη)
γn∗(1+ η − β) (232)
J3,1 =
−βσ
(1+ η − β)(1− ζ)ν − 1 (233)
J3,2 = 0 (234)
J3,3 =
ρ(1+ η)
(1− ζ)(1+ η − β) (235)
J3,4 =
φ[−ζν(1+ η − β) + β(1− ν)]
(1− (1− ζ)ν)(1+ η − β) (236)
J4,1 = 0 (237)
J4,2 = 1 (238)
J4,3 = 0 (239)
J4,4 = 0 (240)
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In the second row I have not substituted out the n∗ component
which is in terms of model parameters because it does not sim-
plify nicely.
J2,1 =

[
A
φ1−α
(
α
ρ
)α
(1− (1− ζ)ν)1−ν
] 1+η
β φ1−σνη(1− ζ)(1+η)(1+ αβ )
ξβη+σ+1

− 1η+σ
σ
γ(1+ η − β)
(241)
J2.3 =
−1
γ
 β
ξνσ
(
A
σ1−α
αα(1− (1− ζ)ν)1−ν
) 1+η
β
(φ(1− ζ))1−σ
(
ρ
1− ζ
) β(η+σ)+α(1+η)
β
 1η+σ 1+ η
1+ η − β
(242)

− ρβ1+η−β 0 ρ
2ν((1+η)(α−1)+β)
σα(1+η−β)
φ(1−ζ)νρ(1−ν)(1+η)
(1−(1−ζ)ν)σ(1+η−β)
(1−(1−ζ)ν)βσ
γn∗(1+η−β)(1−ζ)ν ρ
−(1−(1−ζ)ν)ρ(1+η)
γn∗(1−ζ)(1+η−β)
φ(ν(1+η)−β)
γn∗(1+η−β)
−βσ−(1+η−β)(1−ζ)ν
(1+η−β)(1−ζ)ν 0
ρ(1+η)
(1−ζ)(1+η−β)
φ[−ζν(1+η−β)+β(1−ν)]
(1−(1−ζ)ν)(1+η−β)
0 1 0 0

(243)
b.7 eigenvalues and eigenvectors
To solve for the eigenvalues of the 4-dimensional system, we ex-
ploit symmetry that allows us to solve the quartic characteristic
polynomial analytically. The process follows Brito and Dixon
2013, where the Jacobian matrix is analytically similar with the
same economic interpretations as here. In the presence of im-
perfect competition is provides a good approximation of dy-
namics, especially for less extreme values of market power, as
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supported by numerical simulation figure 12. Eigenvalues have
the general structure of Feichtinger, Novak, and Wirl 1994.
The characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian takes a stan-
dard form. And the solution of the quartic polynomial is sym-
metric around ρ2 , and non-zero since
ρ
2 > 0.
Proposition 8 Eigenvalues.
There are four eigenvalues
λs,u1,2 =
ρ
2
∓

(ρ
2
)2 − T
2
∓
((T
2
)2
− |J|
) 1
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆

1
2
(244)
λs,u1,2 =
ρ
2
±
{(ρ
2
)2 − (M2 − ρ2)
2
± 1
2
[
(M2 − ρ2)2 − 4|J|
] 1
2
} 1
2
(245)
T = M2 − ρ2 where M2 is the sum of the principal minors of order
2 of J, and |J| = M4 is the Jacobian determinant which is the sum of
principal minors of order 4 (i.e. the determinant).
M2 =
pi∗n
γ
+ ρY∗K +
C∗
σ
[r∗C(Y
∗
K + ρ)− r∗K(Y∗C − 1)] (246)
M4 =
C∗
σγ
[(1−Y∗C)(r∗Kpi∗n − r∗npi∗K) +Y∗K(pi∗nr∗C − pi∗Cr∗n)−Y∗n (r∗Cpi∗K − r∗Kpi∗C)]
(247)
So the eigenvalues are entirely in terms of parameters since at steady
state the variables are in terms of parameters.
Proposition 9 Determinacy and saddlepath equilibrium.
There are always two negative eigenvalues, either real or complex, so
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the system is determinate: we can choose state variables freely. The
result arises because inf
{[( ρ
2
)2 − T2 ∓ ∆ 12 ] 12} = ρ2 , so the greatest
lower bound of the open interval called the outer discriminant (the
term in square brackets) is ρ2 which will always be some e greater/less
than 0 when ±. Denoting the inner discriminant (inner square root)
as ∆. The proof follows from −T2 ± ∆
1
2 > 0, since T < 0.
The proposition also implies that no eigenvalue has zero real
part (system is determinate), therefore by Grobman-Hartman
within a neighbourhood of such a fixed point the linearized
system is topologically equivalent to the nonlinear system. This
verifies that the inference we make for the linearized system
holds locally for the nonlinear system.
From the analytic eigenvalues we can derive corresponding
eigenvectors and therefore the general solution of the system.
b.7.1 Eigenvectors
To calculate the four eigenvectors solve (J− λijI)Pij = 0 for Pij,
where there are four separate cases to solve for and hence four
eigenvectors, since there are four eigenvalues two stable PS1 , P
S
2 ,
two unstable PU1 , P
U
2 . Since the eigenvalues are chosen such that
|J− λI| = 0 and a zero determinant means the matrix J− λI is
completely linearly dependent (perfectly coupled). Then the
eigenvectors are unique only up to a scalar multiple. Hence
choose P1,4 = 1 as the normalization. Then from row four it
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follows P1,2 = λij. With P1,2 = λ
i
j, P1,4 = 1, we get from row 1
and 3
P1,1 =
1
CrC
σ − λij
[−Crn
σ
− CrK
σ
P1,3
]
(248)
P1,1 =
1
YC − 1
[
−Yn − (YK − λij)v1,3
]
(249)
Equating and solving
P1,3 =
C
σ rn(YC − 1)−Yn(Cσ rC − λij)
(CrCσ − λij)(YK − λij)− Cσ rK(YC − 1)
(250)
Plug back in
P1,1 =
C
σ (rKYn − rn(YK − λij))
(Cσ rC − λij)(YK − λij)− Cσ rK(YC − 1)
(251)
So our eigenvector

Pi,1
Pi,2
Pi,3
Pi,4

=

C
σ (rKYn−rn(YK−λij))
(Cσ rC−λij)(YK−λij)−Cσ rK(YC−1)
λij
C
σ rn(YC−1)−Yn(Cσ rC−λij)
(
CrC
σ −λij)(YK−λij)−Cσ rK(YC−1)
1

(252)
b.8 open loop solution form
This section shows how to derive the open-loop solution form.
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We may solve our linearized system to get x. The linearized
system has the form x˙ = Jx and if you factor out the eigenvec-
tors x = Pq we can write in Jordan canonical form
q˙ = P−1 JPq
where we denote P−1 JP = Λ and call it the Jordan normal form
of Λ where P is an invertible matrix.
The Jordan form has solution q = ωeλt where ω is a 1× 4
vector of constants and eλt is a 4× 1 vectors corresponding to
each eigenvalue of the system.
q =

qu2
qu1
qs1
qs2

=

ωu2 e
λu2 t
ωu1 e
λu1 t
ωs1e
λs1t
ωs2e
λs2t

(253)
gives the solution x = pq

c(t)− c∗
e(t)− e∗
K(t)− K∗
n(t)− n∗

=

Pu2,1 P
u
1,1 P
s
1,1 P
s
2,1
Pu2,2 P
u
1,2 P
s
1,2 P
s
2,2
Pu2,3 P
u
1,3 P
s
1,3 P
s
2,3
Pu2,4 P
u
1,4 P
s
1,4 P
s
2,4


ωu2 e
λu2 t
ωu1 e
λu1 t
ωs1e
λs1t
ωs2e
λs2t

(254)
Next we find what the stable constants ωs1,ω
s
2 must be in
order to suppress the explosive eigenvalues i.e. to ensure we
converge. So, set unstable constant of integrations to zero
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
c(t)− c∗
e(t)− e∗
K(t)− K∗
n(t)− n∗

=

Ps1,1 P
s
2,1
Ps1,2 P
s
2,2
Ps1,3 P
s
2,3
Ps1,4 P
s
2,4

eλs1t 0
0 eλ
s
2t

ωs1
ωs2
 (255)
Ps1,3 Ps2,3
Ps1,4 P
s
2,4

−1 K(t)− K∗
n(t)− n∗
 =
ωs1eλs1t
ωs2e
λs2t
 (256)
Ps1,3 Ps2,3
Ps1,4 P
s
2,4

−1 K(t)− K∗
n(t)− n∗
 =
eλs1t 0
0 eλ
s
2t

ωs1
ωs2
 (257)
t→ 0
Ps1,3 Ps2,3
Ps1,4 P
s
2,4

−1 K(0)− K∗
n(0)− n∗
 =
ωs1
ωs2
 (258)
which if we plug back in

c(t)− c∗
e(t)− e∗
K(t)− K∗
n(t)− n∗

=

Ps1,1 P
s
2,1
Ps1,2 P
s
2,2
Ps1,3 P
s
2,3
Ps1,4 P
s
2,4

eλs1t 0
0 eλ
s
2t

ωs1
ωs2
 (259)
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
c(t)− c∗
e(t)− e∗
K(t)− K∗
n(t)− n∗

=

Ps1,1 P
s
2,1
Ps1,2 P
s
2,2
Ps1,3 P
s
2,3
Ps1,4 P
s
2,4

eλs1t 0
0 eλ
s
2t

Ps1,3 Ps2,3
Ps1,4 P
s
2,4

−1 K(0)− K∗
n(0)− n∗

(260)
Multiplying out yields the solution in open-loop form

c(t)− c∗
e(t)− e∗
K(t)− K∗
n(t)− n∗

= (261)
1
Ps1,3P
s
2,4 − Ps2,3Ps1,4

Ps1,1P
s
2,4e
λ1t − Ps2,1Ps1,4eλ2t −Ps1,1Ps2,3eλ1t + Ps2,1Ps1,3eλ2t
Ps1,2P
s
2,4e
λ1t − Ps2,2Ps1,4eλ2t −Ps1,2Ps2,3eλ1t + Ps2,2Ps1,3eλ2t
Ps1,3P
s
2,4e
λ1t − Ps2,3Ps1,4eλ2t −Ps1,3Ps2,3eλ1t + Ps2,3Ps1,3eλ2t
Ps1,4P
s
2,4e
λ1t − Ps2,4Ps1,4eλ2t −Ps1,4Ps2,3eλ1t + Ps2,4Ps1,3eλ2t

K(0)− K∗
n(0)− n∗
 (262)
b.9 productivity effect
Denote F(K, L) by F. On impact t = 0 the state variables K, n
are predetermined so do not adjust; however, L adjusts2. By the
quotient rule differentiate P = Y
F
1
ν
= An
1−νF+nφ
F
1
ν
with K, n fixed
dP(0)
dA
= F−
1
ν (n1−νF + An1−νFLLA)−
(An1−νF + nφ)1
ν
F−
1
ν−1FLLA (263)
2 See Caputo 2005 p.426
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Evaluate impact effect beginning in steady state ∂P(0)∂A
∣∣∣
K∗,n∗
. In
equilibrium
P∗ = (1− ζ)Aνn∗1−νF(K∗, L∗)1− 1ν
= (1− ζ)A 1ν ν
(
φ
1− (1− ζ)ν
)1− 1ν
(264)
so ∂P∗∂A = (1− ζ)A
1
ν−1
(
φ
1−(1−ζ)ν
)1− 1ν
= P∗Aν . Therefore
dP(0)
dA
= n1−νF1−
1
ν +
P∗
(1− ζ)F FLLA −P
∗ 1
νF
FLLA
(265)
=
P∗
(1− ζ)Aν +
P∗FLLA
νF
(
ζ
1− ζ
)
(266)
=
1
(1− ζ)
dP∗
dA
+
P∗FLLA
νF
(
ζ
1− ζ
)
(267)
dP(0)
dA
− dP
∗
dA
=
(
ζ
1− ζ
)
dP∗
dA
+
P∗FLLA
νF
(
ζ
1− ζ
)
(268)
Substitute out P∗ and ∂P∗∂A
dP(0)
dA
− dP
∗
dA
= ζ
(
φ
A(1− (1− ζ)ν)
)1− 1ν (
1+
AFLLA
F
)
(269)
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C H A P T E R 3 A P P E N D I X
c.1 household optimization problem
Use the Maxmimum Principle to obtain the necessary condi-
tions for a solution to the household’s utility maximisation prob-
lem. The current value Hamiltonian is
Hˆ(t) = u(C(t), L(t)) + λ(t)(w(t)L(t) + r(t)K(t) +Π(t)− C(t))
(270)
The costate variable λt is the shadow price of wealth in utility
units. The Pontryagin necessary conditions are
HˆC(K, L, C,λ) = 0 =⇒ uC − λ = 0 (271)
HˆL(K, L, C,λ) = 0 =⇒ uL + λw = 0 (272)
HˆK(K, L, C,λ) = ρλ− λ˙ =⇒ λr = ρλ− λ˙ =⇒ λ˙
λ
= −(r− ρ)
(273)
Hˆλ := K˙t =⇒ K˙ = rK + wL +Π− C (274)
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The four Pontryagin conditions (271)-(273) reduce to two equa-
tions: a differential equation in consumption (consumption Euler
equation or intertemporal condition), and a static injective map-
ping between labour and consumption (intratemporal condition).
c.2 optimal labour derivatives
Partially differentiate the intratemporal Euler with respect to
each variable treating labour as an implicit function, and with
wage set at the imperfect competition market rate w(K, L, n) =
An1−νFL(K,L)
µ(n) .
uL(L) + uC(C)w(K, L, n) = 0 (275)
uL(L) + uC(C)
An1−νFL(K, L)
µ(n)
= 0 (276)
Recall the utility and production function assumptions:
FLL(K, L), uCC(C), uLL(L) < 0
uC(C), FL(K, L), FLK(K, L) = FKL(K, L) > 0
These can be used to sign the behaviour of labour
uLLLC + uC
An1−νFLLLC
µ(n)
+
uCC An1−νFL
µ(n)
= 0 (277)
LC =
−uCC An1−νFLµ(n)−1
uLL + uC An1−νFLLµ(n)−1
< 0 (278)
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uLLLK + uC
An1−νFLLLK
µ(n)
+
uC An1−νFLK
µ(n)
= 0 (279)
LK =
−uC An1−νFLKµ(n)−1
uLL + uC An1−νFLLµ(n)−1
> 0 (280)
uLLLn +
uC A(1− ν)n−νFL
µ(n)
+
uC An1−νFLLLn
µ(n)
+ uC An1−νFL
−µ(n)n
µ(n)2
(281)
Ln =
uC An1−νFLµnµ−2 − uC A(1− ν)n−νFLµ−1
uLL + uC An1−νFLLµ(n)−1
(282)
Therefore if we suppress notation and simplify (e.g. n1−νFLL(K, L) =
n−1n2−νFLL(K, L) = n−1Fll(Kn ,
L
n ) by Euler’s homogeneous func-
tion theorem) we get
Ln =
AuCFl(µ−1µn − (1− ν)n−1)
µuLL +UC An−1Fll
> 0, ν ∈ (0, 1) (283)
In all cases the denominator uLL + uC An1−νFLLµ(n)−1 < 0 is
the intratemporal condition differentiated with respect to labour,
and it is negative. Therefore the numerator distinguishes signs.
Concavity of the production and utility functions, assumptions
above, are sufficient to determine the signs of the numerator
except for Ln which depends on returns to scale of the technol-
ogy ν. With decreasing returns ν < 1 labour increases; with
increasing returns labour decreases and with constant returns
ν = 1 labour would be irresponsive to entry if there were fixed
markups µn = 0, but the endogenous markup µn < 0 means
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labour increases with entry even with constant returns. This
is because although the marginal product of labour does not
change because of constant returns, the fall in markups reduces
the wedge between marginal product of labour and wage, so
wage increases.
The economic intuition is easier to understand in terms of
wages, where wL¯ is wage with labour fixed.
LC =
−uCCw
uLL + uCwL
< 0, LK =
−uCwL¯K
uLL + uCwL
> 0, (284)
Ln =
wµnµ − uCwL¯n
uLL + uCwL
> 0 (285)
c.3 optimal interest rate , profit, output
Given optimal labour choice L(C, K, n) we can evaluate how
interest rate, wage, profit and output respond. The markup µ is
a function of number of firms µ(n), but I suppress the domain
for clarity.
c.3.1 Output
Y(L(C, K, n), K, n) = n1−ν[AF(K, L(C, K, n))− φ] (286)
YC = An1−νFL(K, L)LC(C, K, n) < 0 (287)
YK = An1−ν[FK(K, L) + FL(K, L)LK(C, K, n)] > 0
(288)
Yn = (1− ν)AF− φ+ AFl Ln Q 0 (289)
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Furthermore in steady state when F(Kn ,
L
n )
∗ = φA(1− νµ ) then Yn|x∗ =
−φµν
1− νµ + AFl Ln which is positive or negative depending whether
the negative component outweighs the positive labour effect.
c.3.2 Wage
w =
1
µ
AFl (290)
wC =
1
µ
A
n
Fll LC > 0 (291)
wK =
1
µ
A
n
[Flk + Fll LK] =
1
µ
A
n
[
µFlkuLL
µuLL + uC AFll
]
> 0 (292)
wn =
1
µ
A
n
[(1− ν)Fl + Fll Ln]− 1µ2µn AFl R 0 (293)
c.3.3 Rents
r =
1
µ
AFk (294)
rC =
1
µ
A
n
Fkl LC < 0 (295)
rK =
1
µ
A
n
[Fkk + Fkl LK] =
1
µ
A
n
[
µFkkuLL + AuC(FkkFll − F2kl)
µuLL + uC AFll
]
< 0
(296)
rn =
1
µ
A
n
[(1− ν)Fk + Fkl Ln]− 1µ2µn AFk > 0 (297)
Both rK and wK require extra work to derive the signs. They are
found by substituting in LK. Then rK can can be rearranged into
a form including FKKFLL − F2KL which is positive by the second
partial derivative test for concavity assumption.
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c.3.4 Profit
pi = AF(k, l)(1− ν
µ
)− φ (298)
piC = AFl
LC
n
(1− ν
µ
) < 0 (299)
piK =
A
n
(Fk + Fl LK)(1− νµ ) > 0 (300)
pin =
A
n
(−νF + Fl Ln)(1− νµ ) + AF(k, l)
ν
µ2
µn < 0 (301)
For any K, L, n profit is higher when imperfect competition µ
increases, but not necessarily higher for any given K, n. This
explains that even if imperfect competition increases and there-
fore higher profits are available, the number of firms can (coun-
terintuitively) decrease. The offsetting factor is the the indirect
labour effect: labour supply is discouraged by the rise in imper-
fect competition and as there is a bigger wedge between wage
and marginal product of labour. Therefore labour supply falls
such that profits are lower for a given K, n. I typically assume
these secondary labour effects to be too small to offset the pri-
mary mechanisms. So operating profit increases with imperfect
competition, even as L is allowed to adjust.
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(a) Steady State Numerical Solution
c.4 steady state results
c.4.1 Existence with Functional Forms Numerically
Since we have shown an analytical condition for existence, we
can move on from existence to ask what that solution is for a set
of numerical parameter values? Solving the highly nonlinear
number of firms in steady-state equation yields n∗ = 44.156.
The function for number of firms in steady state
n∗ =
[
β
ξνσ
{(
A
(
α
ρ
)α)1+η ( 1
µ(n∗)
)α(1+η)+β(1−σ)
(
1− ν
µ(n∗)
φ
)1−ν+η(1−α)+σβ
1
β

1
η+σ
(302)
is highly nonlinear as shown in figure 19a, where it intersects
the x-axis at the solution n∗ = 44.156. The markup is µ = nn−1
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hence the graph is undefined in the n = 1 region. The other
solutions are n∗ = 44.156, K∗ = 713.685, C∗ = 47.486.
c.4.2 Procyclical Firms
From (156) we have
Y∗ = n
∗φν
µ(n∗)− ν (303)
Then by the product rule and the implicit function theorem
Y∗n =
(µ(n∗)− ν)φν− n∗φνµn
(µ(n∗)− ν)2 > 0 (304)
The quadratic denominator is positive. The first component of
the numerator is positive because µ(n∗) > 1 and decreasing re-
turns ν ∈ (0, 1) so µ(n)− ν > 0 and the second component is
positive due to the double negative which occurs from endoge-
nous markups decreasing in number of firms µn < 0.
c.5 productivity dynamics
Throughout the derivations remember that the markup is a
function of number of firms µ(n), but for simplicity I write
µ.
P(t)A =
n1−νF + ynA + (n1−νA− ny 1νF−1)(FKKA + FLLA)
F
1
ν
(305)
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The crucial step with dynamic firms and capital is that state
variables do not move on impact KA = 0 and nA = 0. This
is what causes the distinction between short-run and long-run
productivity that is not present with instantaneous free entry.
Therefore at t = 0 the change in productivity depends on the di-
rect effect of better technology, and its indirect effect on labour,
which increases labour supply.
P(0)A =
n1−νF + (n1−νA− ny 1νF−1)FLLA
F
1
ν
(306)
P(0)A = n1−νF1− 1ν +
(
F−
1
ν n1−νA−P 1
ν
F−1
)
FLLA (307)
Assuming that the economy is initially in steady state when
the shock occurs, evaluate the expression with all variables x
at steady state x(0) = x∗. From pi = y − rK − wL then y∗ =
rK∗ + wL∗ so y∗ = Aνn∗−νFµ∗ and thus P∗ = n
∗y∗
F∗ 1ν
= Aνn
∗1−νF1− 1ν
µ .
This expression for productivity makes it easier to represent the
impact effect of a TFP shock in terms of steady state productiv-
ity P∗ as follows
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ =
µ∗P∗
Aν
+
(
µ∗P∗
νF∗
− P
∗
νF∗
)
F∗L L
∗
A (308)
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ =
µ∗P∗
Aν
+ (µ∗ − 1) P
∗
νF∗
F∗L L
∗
A (309)
Comparing the short-run impact effect to the long-run steady
state effect P∗A = P∗µ¯A + P∗µµA = P
∗
Aν + P∗µµnn∗A shows that
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the endogenous productivity effect dampens the difference be-
tween short-run and long-run effects
P(0)A −P∗A|x(0)=x∗ =
µ∗P∗
Aν
+ (µ∗ − 1) P
∗
νF∗
F∗L L
∗
A
− (P∗µ¯A + P∗µµA) (310)
P(0)A −P∗A|x(0)=x∗ =
µ∗P∗
Aν
+ (µ∗ − 1) P
∗
νF∗
F∗L L
∗
A
−
(P∗
Aν
+ P∗µµnn∗A
)
(311)
P(0)A −P∗A|x(0)=x∗ = (µ∗ − 1)
P∗
Aν
+ (µ∗ − 1) P
∗
νF∗
F∗L L
∗
A
−P∗µµnn∗A (312)
P(0)A −P∗A|x(0)=x∗ = (µ∗ − 1)
P∗
ν
(
1
A
+
F∗L L
∗
A
F∗
)
−P∗µµnn∗A
(313)
The expression for P∗µ can simplyify the expression further
Lemma 4.
P∗µ = −
P∗(µ− 1)
µ(µ− ν) < 0 (314)
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Proof.
P∗µ =
[
A
µ
(
µ− ν
φ
)1−ν] 1ν−1
×(
−A
µ2
(
µ− ν
φ
)1−ν
+
A
µ
(1− ν)
(
µ− ν
φ
)−ν 1
φ
)
(315)
=
[
A
µ
(
µ− ν
φ
)1−ν] 1ν (
− 1
µ
+
1− ν
µ− ν
)
(316)
=
[
A
µ
(
µ− ν
φ
)1−ν] 1ν ( ν(1− µ)
µ(µ− ν)
)
= −P
∗(µ− 1)
µ(µ− ν) < 0
(317)
Notice that with constant returns the expression is simply
P∗µ
∣∣∣
ν→1
= − A
µ2
and with many firms the markup tends to unity, therefore long-
run underlying productivity reflects true TFP.
P∗µ = −
P∗(µ∗ − 1)
µ∗(µ∗ − ν) (318)
P(0)A −P∗A|x(0)=x∗ =
(µ∗ − 1)P
∗
ν
(
1
A
+
F∗L L
∗
A
F∗
)
+
P∗(µ∗ − 1)
µ∗(µ∗ − ν) µnn
∗
A (319)
P(0)A −P∗A|x(0)=x∗ =
(µ∗ − 1)P∗
[
1
ν
(
1
A
+
F∗L L
∗
A
F∗
)
+
1
µ∗(µ∗ − ν)µnn
∗
A
]
(320)
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c.6 productivity dynamics with functional forms
First let us restate the short-run versus long-run productivity
effect, and focus attention on the square bracketed component
Γ that represents allocation versus competition effect.
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ −P∗A =
(µ∗ − 1)P
∗
ν
[(
1
A
+
F∗L L
∗
A
F∗
)
+
ν
µ∗(µ∗ − ν)µnn
∗
A
]
(321)
Define Γ =
1
A
+
F∗L L
∗
A
F∗
+
ν
µ∗(µ∗ − ν)µnn
∗
A (322)
From the state-state labour per firm l∗ we have
L∗ = n∗
 1A (ρα)α
1− νµ
φ
µ
1−α

1
β
thus L∗A = L
∗
(
n∗A
n∗
+
1
βA
)
(323)
We can also substitute out the following simplifications
F∗L
F∗
=
βKαLβ−1n−(α+β)
KαLβn−(α+β)
= βL∗−1 (324)
µ =
n
n− 1 therefore µn = −
1
n2
(325)
Therefore the allocation versus competition effect component
becomes
Γ =
2
A
+
β− ν( n∗
n∗−1
)2
(n∗ − (n∗ − 1)ν)
 n∗A
n∗
(326)
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C.6 productivity dynamics with functional forms
And short-run versus long-run productivity dynamics simplify
to
P(0)A|x(0)=x∗ −P∗A =(
1
n∗ − 1
) P∗
ν
 2
A
+
β− ν( n∗
n∗−1
)2
(n∗ − (n∗ − 1)ν)
 n∗A
n∗

(327)
P∗ = ν
[
A(n∗ − 1)ν
n∗
(
n∗(1− ν) + ν
φ
)1−ν] 1ν
(328)
c.6.1 Cost function
Static optimization problem so drop time subscripts
C(r, w, y) = min
l,k
wl + rk + φ s.t.y 6 Akαlβ − φ (329)
With Cobb-Douglas production the total cost function from sub-
stituting Lagrangean obtained conditional input demands k(r, w, y) =[(
wα
rβ
)β ( y+φ
A
)] 1α+β
and l(r, w, y) =
[(
rβ
wα
)α ( y+φ
A
)] 1
α+β
into the
cost function is
C(r, w, y) = (α+ β)
(
y + φ
A
) 1
α+β ( r
α
) α
α+β
(
w
β
) β
α+β
+ φ (330)
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C.7 markup properties
Where the firm takes factor prices as given. The average cost
AC := Cy is U-shaped and the marginal cost MC :=
dC
dy is in-
creasing in output with α+ β < 1.
MC =
∂C(r, w, y)
∂y
=
(y + φ)
1
α+β−1
A
1
α+β
( r
α
) α
α+β
(
w
β
) β
α+β
(331)
∂MC
y
=
(
1
α+ β
− 1
)
(y + φ)
1
α+β−2
A
1
α+β
( r
α
) α
α+β
(
w
β
) β
α+β
(332)
The leading multiplier 1α+β − 1 determines how marginal cost
responds to changing output. This shows that it is increasing
when α + β < 1 but is zero with constrant returns to scale
α+ β = 1 which reflects a flat marginal cost curve.
c.7 markup properties
If θI = 1 industry goods are imperfectly substitutable, and the
aggregate good is a Cobb-Douglas composite of industry goods.
Thus the markup is a common asymptotic function1.
Remark 2 (Endogenous markup). With many firms per industry
the markup is 1
Proof.
lim
n→+∞ µ(n(t)) = limn→+∞
n(t)
n(t)− 1 (333)
= lim
n→+∞
(
1
n(t)− 1
)
+ 1 = 1, n(t) ∈ (0,∞]
(334)
1 See Wolfram Alpha for eloquent properties.
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